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ABSTRACT
The American environment is a mythic narrative that has 
served to mystify the social and economic relationships 
linking people and place. This study examines the early 
writing of the environment, from the 1637 Pequot War to the 
creation of the first national parks in the late nineteenth 
century. Chapter 1 draws on the work of Michel Foucault and 
Edward Said to theorize "literary environmentalism" as a 
knowledge-power formation that functions as a domestic 
Orientalism. Chapter 2 theorizes the narratological and 
psychosociological bases of environmental constructions 
generally before analyzing two colonial texts whose literary 
environmentalism is paradigmatic: John Underhill's Newes 
from America (1638), which writes the New England wilderness 
via tropes of gender and race that explicitly link the 
environment's description to its possession, and Mary 
Rowlandson’s The Soveraiantv and Goodness of God (1682), 
which recapitulates but also complicates these figures.
Chapter 3 analyzes James Fenimore Cooper's The Last of 
the Mohicans (1826), paying particular attention to how its 
wilderness serves to naturalize the regeneration of a 
racially "pure" American civilization. Chapter 4 analyzes 
three works related by their linked constructions of 
Yosemite Valley. Lafayette Bunnell's account of the 
Mariposa Indian War (1851-1852), The History of the
Discovery of the Yosemite, utilizes an aesthetic discourse 
to justify the ethnic cleansing that accompanied the 
"discovery" of Yosemite. Frederick Law Olmsted's 1865 
management report on the new Yosemite Park implicates the 
national park idea in an urban-industrial ideology of 
"social sanitation through outdoor recreation." Clarence 
King's Mountaineering in the Sierra Nevada (1872) links 
environmentalism and literary realism to the exigencies of a 
fast-maturing corporate capitalism.
My concluding chapter analyzes the idea of the 
"postnatural" in two contemporary ecocritical texts, Bill 
McKibben's The End of Nature and Rebecca Solnit's Savage 
Dreams. McKibben's work recapitulates the early colonialist 
and capitalist trope of the "virgin wilderness," while 
Savage Dreams refuses the concept of an originary nature and 
adopts a more promising mode for a genuinely revisionist 
environmental writing, one that refuses to seek in nature 
the sorts of lessons and remedies available only through a 
conscious engagement with this nation’s own cultures.
CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction: Literary Environmentalism
From far Dakota's canyons,
Lands of the wild ravine, the dusky Sioux, the 
lonesome stretch, the silence . . .
The battle-bulletin,
The Indian ambuscade, the craft, the fatal 
environment. . . .
— Walt Whitman, "Death-Sonnet for Custer" (401)
In glorifying Custer's death at the Little Bighorn, 
Whitman conflates an act of resistance to United States 
colonialism with what may justly be called a canonical 
landscape. He writes of "far" lands, of what is not present 
at the scene of reading and can therefore only be 
represented, and his representation utilizes a language at 
once both romantic and racist, a language scarcely able to 
distinguish people from place: the ravine is "wild" and the 
Sioux are "dusky," but both seem equally insignificant 
within the vastness of the landscape itself. Indeed the 
wildness and the duskiness seem to function identically, as 
parallel markers of what is really important: the very 
otherness of a grand western landscape in which the canyons, 
the people, and the resistance are all of a piece.
Whitman uses the term environment here with an 
etymological precision that is fundamental to this study. 
While the term "literally refers," as Richard Slotkin has 
argued in Fatal Environment, to General Custer's "being
1
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surrounded and killed by Indians,"
Whitman means it to suggest something more: the 
idea that Custer's death completes a meaningful 
myth-historical design, a grand fable of national 
redemption and Christian self-sacrifice, acted out 
in the most traditional of American settings. And 
it is essential to the illusion of this myth that 
Custer's fate seem somehow implicit in the environ­
ment, a moral and ideological lesson which seems 
to emerge from the very nature of things— as if 
Nature or God composed the story and assigned its 
meanings, rather than men.
In this way, "[a]n environment, a landscape, a historical 
sequence is infused with meaning in the form of a story"
(11). And like Slotkin's Myth of the Frontier, this envi­
ronment has been (and remains) complicit with the notions of 
capitalism and Manifest Destiny which have, again in 
Slotkin's words, "been the building blocks of our dominant 
historiographical tradition and political ideology" (15).
Like the notion of the frontier, this storied American 
environment has a lengthy and continuous history, with roots 
in the colonial period and an undiminished power today. But 
it would not quite be accurate to speak of a "Myth of the 
Environment," as if the environment were something we have a 
myth about. Rather, the environment is itself a myth. It 
is a "grand fable," a complex fiction, a widely shared, 
seldom questioned, and by now ubiquitous nationalistic 
narrative. Nor would it be accurate to say that the 
environment is merely a narrative, for that would be to 
underestimate narrative's tremendous power to imagine and 
shape the world. (Consider those other narrated fictions, 
gender, race, and nation.)
This power of narrative is something for which on the 
one hand we might be thankful. The idea of the environment, 
after all, is coextensive with the environmental movement, 
and thus with an entire constellation of genuinely 
progressive political reforms. On the other hand, the 
environment's ideological underpinnings are by no means 
entirely consistent with the ideals of Green politics.1 As 
is true of the Myth of the Frontier, much of the 
environment's power and durability resides in its unseen 
ideological efficacy, in its ability to obscure basic 
economic, political, and historical relationships—  
particularly in the way it "substitutes" itself "for the 
complexities of capital formation, class and interest-group 
competition, and the subordination of society to the 
imperatives of capitalist development" (Slotkin 47). By 
thus obscuring reality, the idea of the environment has come 
to provide Euro-Americans with "a new basis upon which to 
understand their presence in America" (Greenfield 205)— that 
is, with a useful stance from which to misunderstand that 
presence, to mystify rather than clarify their relationships 
to both the land and the people they have tried to displace 
from the land. The "environment" has helped to enable— and 
helps still to sustain— many of the very forces and 
activities that environmentalism claims to oppose.
Give Me a Sign
Slotkin insists that "[t]he present forms in which our 
myths appear embody not only the solutions to past problems
and conflicts; they contain the questions as well, and they 
reflect the conflicts of thought and feeling and action that 
were the mythmakers' original concerns" (20), and this is 
certainly true of the environment. But our environmental 
myth thus perdures only as part of the discourse of 
environmentalism; it continues to make sense only through 
the continuing efforts of those institutions charged in one 
way or another with dealing with it or speaking for it. The 
environment seems stable and real only because it is 
reconstituted, on a daily basis and at the most seemingly 
benign levels of perception, within living institutions and 
interlocking systems of signs.
To demonstrate what I mean, to clarify what this study 
frames as the broad cultural politics of literary 
environmentalism, I would like to turn now to figure 1. 
Depicted in this Jim Dunagin cartoon is a landscape of 
mountains, trees, and a meandering stream— a traditionally 
attractive vista, an apparently pristine environment, a 
scene we all "know" to be pleasing. It is just the sort of 
place where one might expect to find a roadside marker of 
some kind, though no such marker is present. In the upper 
left-hand portion of the panel are a woman and her male 
partner, viewing the scene from a position that commands 
both the frame and the represented landscape. With her head 
turned toward the man, she asks, "Are you sure this is a 
scenic view? There's no sign."
Wittingly or not, this cartoon is about the 




"ARE YOU SURE THIS IS  A SCENIC VIEW ? 
THERE'S NO S IS N ."
Fig. 1. Problematizing landscape. Cartoon by Jim Dunagin. 
Baton Rouge, La. Advocate (30 October 1993): 6B.
landscape. It is about how rivers and trees and mountains—  
categories of the tangible, enumerable aspects of a 
territory— are constructed as beautiful, as worthy of 
special notice and protection, as part of "the environment" 
in precisely the sense I am trying to develop, and finally 
it is about who authorizes such constructions. The joke 
depends, of course, on our knowing, without being told by 
the missing roadside marker, the absent sign, that the view 
is scenic: only with this knowledge can we see the woman's 
question as laughable. But without the authorization of the 
sign, the only way of knowing this for sure would be by 
virtue of some innately knowable presence, some ability of 
scenery to signify itself as such without mediation: one 
should be able to tell, just by looking. But what if 
landscape lacks such presence? What if we take this woman's 
question seriously, and begin to share her suspicion that 
perhaps it is not the landscape that grounds the sign, but 
the sign that grounds the landscape? Simply by reading 
"sign" here in. its semiotic sense, we can enlarge these 
questions into questions about the discursivity of the 
environment itself.
The cartoon depicts a location where one might normally 
expect to find an interpretive marker of some sort, an 
authorizing sign; it depicts a situation where signs 
establish norms. If, as this study maintains throughout, it 
is not the landscape that grounds the sign but the other way 
around, what is it that in turn authorizes the sign? To put 
it another way, in a deliberate double entendre, who erects
the sign? The cartoon gives clues. First, the woman speaks 
in response to the man' s assertion (not part of the caption 
but clearly implied by it) that the view is indeed scenic. 
That his words can be left out of the caption in this way 
indicates that his interpretation of the landscape-text is 
the unmarked reading, the default, the assumed— just as his 
is in general the unmarked gender. It is his reading and 
his authority that are presumed an adequate substitute for 
those of the absent road-sign; institutional authority and 
male authority are aligned and, in a pinch, interchangeable. 
By contrast it is the woman's reading— unauthorized, 
eccentric, laughable— that questions and problematizes the 
institutional-male, which is to say, patriarchal, sign. It 
is her reading that challenges not only a particular reading 
of a particular landscape but also the seductive and 
ingrained illusion of landscape-as-presence itself.
Thus far I have treated the woman in the cartoon as if 
she were a speaking subject. But within the signifying 
economy of patriarchy, "woman" does not truly speak; lacking 
in presence, like the "far canyons" of the western 
landscape, she is written— by "man," much as Dunagin has 
indicated in the cartoon, where the female figure is 
positioned so as to be encompassed within the man's view of 
the scene, while she, by contrast, cannot take in man and 
landscape simultaneously, but only separately. He sees her 
in the environment, while she sees him apart from it and 
viewing it. Suggesting the woman's identification with and 
the man's separation from the environment, this composition
neatly illustrates concepts that have come to be challenged 
by ecofeminism. For this woman to speak as she does— rather 
than remain as silent as the rest of the landscape and 
simply be seen— can itself be seen as an ecofeminist act.
In contrast to the cartoon, the photograph shown in 
figure 2 is no joke. It depicts the uncontested operation 
of a patriarchal literary environmentalism. In this photo, 
taken in Yosemite National Park, we again see a woman and a 
man viewing a scenic landscape. Between landscape and 
viewers, however, is now interposed the sign, whose surface 
defines the plane through which the landscape is visible—  
purportedly even more visible than it would be otherwise, 
since such signs are thought to help one see and understand 
more clearly what lies behind them. As before, the male 
figure dominates the visual space of the illustration, 
encompassing the woman within his view of the environment 
while remaining apart from it himself. His outstretched arm 
and pointed finger foreground a particular feature of the 
environment; his female companion looks where she is bid to 
look and listens to the words that presumably accompany the 
gesture. But this time there is no implied challenge to the 
man's authority. If the woman has a different reading of 
the landscape, there is no indication of it. The 
authorizing interpretive sign, which dominates the scene 
nearly as much as the male figure, in fact forecloses on any 
such divergent interpretation, just as it physically 
encloses the woman between itself and the man. The sign 
mediates for both humans, but it seems to restrict only her.
*
F IG . 3 -1 . V isitors to sp ec ific  parks and other recreation areas often seek experiences 
that build upon kn ow led ge from previous v isits. Y o sem ite  National Park, California. 
(P hoto  by Grant W . Sharpe)
Fig. 2. The authorizing interpretive sign. Photograph by 
Grant W. Sharpe. From Grant W. Sharpe, ed., Interpreting 
the Environment (New York: Wiley, 1976): 46.
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Environmental Literacy, Environmental Politics
As we will see below, the American environment has been 
fundamentally gendered and racialized by largely unconscious 
narrative and psycho-sociological processes; it possesses 
certain political valences by the mere virtue of having been 
brought into discourse by particularly situated human 
beings. Beyond this most basic level of environmental 
politics is another, implied by the notion of the 
environment's totality, of its consisting, supposedly, of 
everything that surrounds one. This totality cannot in 
practice refer inclusively and exhaustively to the infinity 
that remains after a finite subset— whether some personal 
"I" or communal "we"— is abstracted from everything else.
As the object of the study and concern and political action 
of environmentalism, as a manifest target in concrete 
practices, the environment is necessarily finite and 
particularized.
Any politically actionable environment, that is, rests 
upon two creations of difference. First there must be an 
initial discrimination of an outside from an inside 
(signaled in figure 2 by the interposing of the sign between 
the viewers and the object viewed). Second, there must be a 
secondary marking off and foregrounding of some targeted 
portion of the remaining totality (signaled in figure 2 by 
the man's pointing finger). But what part shall we thus 
privilege with our attention? Out of an infinitude of 
possibilities, what is to count as environment? Surely not 
everyone will agree on what counts— or if there appears to
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be an agreement, one may reasonably suspect that not every­
one has been in on the choosing. In engaging this level of 
environmental politics, the critic is free to challenge 
claims of universality and objectivity, to ask not only 
"What has come to matter?" but also, "What has come to 
matter to whom?" The critic is also free to ask whether 
what in any specific instance comes to count as the envi­
ronment is that which matters to the culturally dominant, 
and finally to explore the ways in which the construction of 
the environment is itself an exercise of cultural power.
All this speaks to the insinuation of politics not 
merely into explicit environmentalist practice— where one is 
used to seeing and analyzing it— but into the environment 
itself. where it remains inaccessible to the traditional 
critic. Underlying my approach to what is coming to be 
called "ecocriticism" is the conviction that the critic 
should highlight this more elusive politics. Ecocriticism 
should help us realize that our environmental concerns are 
not exclusively of the order of "Shall this forest be 
preserved? or "Shall this river be dammed?"— important as 
such questions are— but also of the order of "What has 
counted as the environment, and what may count? Who marks 
off its conceptual boundaries, and under what authority, and 
for what reasons? Have those boundaries and that authority 
been contested, and if so, by whom? With what success, and 
by virtue of what strategies of resistance?"
These questions of boundary and authority will sound 
analogically familiar to anyone who has followed the last
decade's controversies over the literary canon and notions 
of cultural literacy. The national parks can be thought of 
as a canon of environments, a collection of Great Texts 
whose meanings have been considered transparent and 
unchallengeable, and whose political utility has been to 
stabilize a particular vision of the culture that has so 
reverently preserved them. The canonized environments of 
the national parks have for the most part been "read" and 
"taught" in ways that today's cultural conservatives would 
approve: as if, "transcending accidents of class, race, and 
gender," in the words of Lynne Cheney, they embodied 
"truths" which could "speak to us all"— helping thereby to 
unify what these critics see as an otherwise fractured and 
stratified society (14). As William Bennett put it (in what 
seems a cruelly ironic metaphor), the study of the Great 
Books makes us all "shareholders in our civilization" (4).
More than a century ago, Frederick Law Olmsted had said 
much the same thing about beautiful scenery. As a wealthy 
member of the New York elite, Olmsted was quite literally a 
"shareholder" in his civilization; he was also the first 
superintendent of the then-new Yosemite State Park, and he 
felt landscapes like Yosemite's should be made available to 
as many people as possible— should be widely read and widely 
taught— because they exemplified great truths that could 
help unify a badly divided nation. (He outlined these views 
during the Civil War). They could also be the means to an 
aesthetic and moral education that would help reduce crime, 
elevate the public taste, and level class distinctions.2
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In arguing for the edifying powers of landscape, 
Olmsted saw himself as arguing against a certain type of 
reactionary park opponent, "the ignorant exclusive," in the 
words of his mentor, the landscape architect Andrew Jackson 
Downing, who has "no faith in the refinement of a republic" 
and who would prefer to see marvelous landscapes pass into 
private ownership. Downing was arguing in favor of the 
preservation as a public space of New York's Central Park; 
Olmsted, extending a developing ideology of public outdoor 
recreation from the urban to the wilderness setting, quotes 
Downing at length in his pioneering report on the management 
of the Yosemite Park. The anti-park elitists, Downing had 
predicted, would eventually be proved wrong and would "stand 
abashed,"
before a whole people whose system of voluntary 
education embraces (combined with perfect indiv­
idual freedom) not only schools of rudimentary 
knowledge, but common enjoyments for all classes 
in the higher realms of art, letters, science, 
social recreations and enjoyments. Were our 
legislators but wise enough to understand, today, 
the destinies of the New World, the gentility of 
Sir Philip Sidney, made universal, would be not 
half so much a miracle fifty years hence in 
America, as the idea of a whole nation of laboring 
men reading and writing was, in his day, in 
England, (qtd. in Olmsted 21)
For both Downing and Olmsted, the environmentalism of the 
early park movements was part of a larger array of 
democratic reforms. There are several points I could 
mention here: that Downing’s invocation of a universal 
literacy (and Olmsted's foregrounding of that invocation in 
his own report) is just one more turn on the trope of
nature-as-text; that the two men’s managerial vision 
projects for the United States a highly suspect teleology of 
"progress"; that the insistence on the "voluntary" nature of 
a literacy compatible with "perfect individual freedom" 
might be seen as actually betraying a certain nervousness 
about that freedom, and so on. But what I wish to stress is 
how the comparison of the U.S. parks movement to England's 
early literacy movement makes the most spectacular New World 
landscapes into Great Books that can edify the masses, that 
might turn each of us into a model citizen like Sidney.
Clearly the sort of literacy Olmsted had in mind was a 
version of what E. D. Hirsch has termed "cultural literacy." 
Hirsch theorizes cultural literacy, quite simply, as 
"information that our culture has found useful, and 
therefore worth preserving." This information can quite 
objectively "be identified and defined" (ix); it "is not a 
mystery" and "can be taught to all" (xiv). As with the 
national parks, however, the notion carries with it an aura 
of privilege. "Only a small fraction" of this information 
"gains a secure place on the memory shelves of the 
culturally literate," and the importance of that select 
fraction "is beyond question"— precisely because it serves 
as a "collective memory [that] allows people to communicate, 
to work together, and to live together" in "shared 
communities". In fact, according to Hirsch, cultural 
literacy is "a distinguishing characteristic of a national 
culture" (ix); it "helped create the nation-state" and "can 
perpetuate it and make it t h r i v e .”3
As several recent studies have established, however, 
neither the concept of literacy nor its consequences are as 
straightforward as critics like Hirsch seem to believe.4 
Recent critiques have made it impossible to view literacy 
straightforwardly as a disinterested provision of skills 
giving access to "information"; it must be seen instead as a 
complex and highly interested organization of reading and 
writing activities in the interests of the state. Following 
such recent theorists as Harvey Graff and Wlad Godzich, this 
dissertation treats environmental literacy as "a shorthand 
description for a determinate set of relations that we have 
to language"— to what literary environmentalism repeatedly 
tropes as the language of nature— "relations that [arise] 
under, and [are] conditioned by, concrete historical 
circumstances" (Godzich 5). As such, literacy is thus 
something that "can be understood only in terms of its 
historical development" and only by remaining attentive to 
its "social and cultural contradictions" (Graff, Legacies 
vii, 265).
Graff stresses the material bases and ideological 
utility of writing throughout its history. This utility is 
apparent even in the "early civilizations of Babylonia and 
Egypt," where "writing developed partly out of the need to 
keep accounts and insure property rights." In this 
"historical use of writing," "social consolidation, 
standardization, power, and control overlapped" and were 
even then "closely tied to the exigencies of the state and
16
empire," to the expanding need for "legitimation and 
reproduction; order, control, and regulation; 'administration 
and centralization" (Legacies 19). In eighteenth-century 
Europe, notions of a widespread literacy became linked more 
specifically to notions of moral progress (173-174), and by 
the nineteenth century, the meanings and uses of literacy 
continued to proliferate, forming "new configurations" and 
new "relationships between literacy and industrialization" 
(260). By the time of the early national parks movement, 
literacy was felt specifically to condition a "controllable, 
docile work force, willing and able to follow orders" (262).
In addition, "however nominal" literacy might prove in
practice, it was more and more held to signify "in theory
the observance of an ordained and approved social code"
(Graff, Legacies 263). Most broadly:
The moral bases of literacy accompanied the shift 
from a moral economy to a political economy in 
Western Europe and North America from the late 
eighteenth to the nineteenth centuries. It 
developed in response to sweeping societal 
transformations. . . . Literacy was expected to 
contribute vitally to reordering and reintegrating 
the 'new1 society of the nineteenth century; it 
represented one central instrument and vehicle in 
the efforts to secure social, cultural, economic, 
and political cohesion in the political economy of 
the expanding and consolidating capitalistic 
order.
Literacy was not a straightforward reform but a wide-ranging 
and conflicted technology. It would help effect a massive 
societal transformation, replacing "traditional popular 
culture with new values and habits" (including, as we shall 
see, the new sensibilities underpinning tourism and
17
landscape appreciation). Still, its primary goal remained 
"recreating cultural hegemony" in the new order (263-264).
By Olmsted's time literacy was thus expected to carry a
complex ideological burden, and certainly not all of its
uses were unproblematically progressive. Indeed, "[i]ts
potential for liberation was at best one use among many, and
perhaps not the dominant one" (Graff, Legacies 340). Even
so, conservatives were often apprehensive about literacy's
deployment. Some, "haunted by fears of too much education,"
felt "it would weaken society by alienating people from
manual labor, threaten the natural social order, [and]
promote social mobility" (174). Such fears were ameliorated
primarily by a growing conviction "that the masses should be
schooled properly" (262):
Reformers insisted that 'moral training, including 
rudimentary reading, would make men content with 
their lot, not ambitious, and that education would 
increase social stability, not disruption.' The 
social transformation required a replacement for 
traditional ranks and deference; schooling, with 
literacy the vehicle for its moral bases, was to 
be the new social cement. In part, reformers 
prevailed by arguing that their program would 
serve conservatives' own goals: stability, 
discipline, and deference. (315)
At the "core of the emerging consensus" was an "emphasis on 
social morality" (315); "morality" in fact became the 
concept that mediated the concerns of conservative and 
reformer and enabled the consensus that made literacy 
campaigns possible.
The "notion of literacy" that would thus become 
"operative" was precisely that advocated by conservatives
18
such as Bennett and Cheney, a cultural but not a critical
literacy. It was, in Godzich's terms, "a restricted
literacy" that provided "for competence in a specific code,
with little, if any but the most rudimentary, awareness of
the general problematics of codes and codification in
language" (5). Despite such restrictions, however, literacy
remained problematic for conservatives. "Happily," as one
study has it,
literacy like education more generally cannot be 
reduced to behavioral conditioning. It endows 
people with skills that they can (although do not 
always) use to receive and emit messages of an 
almost infinite range, a range that in any event 
escapes the control of those who imparted liter­
acy. . . . Literacy is potential empowerment. 
(Arnove and Graff 26)
Despite sometimes elaborate precautions, a "genuinely
radical political culture developed during the eighteenth
and early nineteenth centuries, and literacy was a part of 
it" (Graff, Legacies 324).
Interpreting Landscape: The National Park System
Whoever expounds a text . . .  is an interpreter. 
And no such person can go about the work of inter­
pretation without some awareness of forces which 
limit, or try to limit, what he may say. . . .  I 
am describing the world as it is or as we all know 
it, and am doing so only because its familiarity
may have come to conceal from us its mode of
operation.
— Frank Kermode (72-73)
It is in this context of literacy as a contingent, 
thoroughly political, and contested sphere that I wish now 
to examine a specifically environmental literacy, as it has
come to be provided by the National Park Service. The sign 
depicted in figure 2 is not just an isolated marker calling 
attention to a unique natural entity. It is, rather, one 
element among many in a consciously constructed signifying 
system, in that particular form of literary environmentalism 
known to the National Park Service personnel who practice it 
as "interpretation." Because it is so completely methodized 
within the Park Service bureaucracy, "interpretation" leaves 
behind it explicit traces that in other forms of literary 
environmentalism are more deeply effaced. I want to take 
advantage of the comparative transparency of interpretation 
and analyze it here as a sort of introductory case study of 
the operation of environmental literacy, as a demonstration 
of the theoretical concepts discussed so far and a gesture 
toward the chapters to come. Taking seriously the woman in 
figure 1, I want to analyze interpretation as a highly 
interested, historically specific form of nature writing, an 
officially sanctioned but also contested system for making 
nature signify particular and desired meanings.
Though it has roots in the late nineteenth-century 
nature-study movement championed by such educators as 
Liberty Bailey and Anna Botsford Comstock, environmental 
interpretation more properly begins with Enos Mills, "the 
father of nature guiding," who as early as 1889 was 
conducting educational field trips in what was to become 
Rocky Mountain National Park. Mills worked in an unoffical 
capacity, but following the creation of the Park Service in 
1916 he argued publicly that guides such as himself should
be taken on as regular employees (Weaver 29). Park Service 
director Stephen Mather was cool to the idea at first, but 
gradually came to see in interpretation a way to build 
appreciation for the parks among a public whose commitment 
to wilderness preservation was still shaky. He seems to 
have first realized the full potential of interpretation 
during a 1919 lecture by the ornithologist Loye Holmes 
Miller, whose superb presentation had attracted an audience 
both large and enthusiastic— a combination that was "exactly 
what Mather was seeking" to counter the influence of "those 
persons who would selfishly destroy park values." Mather 
asked Miller to bring his show to Yosemite, where he would 
be designated a "special ranger" and paid a salary. Miller 
agreed, and worked in the summer of 1920 as the first 
officially sponsored national park interpreter (Weaver 29- 
32; Mackintosh 7).
Miller's employment marked the beginning of the 
"carefully directed and planned public contact work" that 
would quickly spread from Yosemite to Yellowstone and then 
the other parks to become "the most direct and most 
important function of the service." Over the following 
decades, with the help of sizable private grants and 
donations, interpretation was integrated into the park 
system as a whole.5 To coordinate interpretive activities, 
Mather in 1921 appointed Ansel Hall chief of the service's 
Education Division. Two years later, Mather upgraded this 
division and placed it on an equal footing with the 
Service's two other major administrative units, the
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divisions of engineering and landscape architecture. Almost 
from the beginning, that is, the Service treated the 
discursive construction of the park environment just as 
seriously as the material construction of any other park 
facility (Weaver 32; Mackintosh 13).
Hall began at once to systematize interpretation. He 
set up a training program, the Yosemite School of Natural 
History, and formulated criteria for applicants for the new 
position of Ranger Naturalist. (Prerequisite to the 
Yosemite program, for example, were at least two years of 
college.) Hall also organized the Yosemite Museum 
Association, later replaced by the Yosemite Natural History 
Association, whose task was to gather and disseminate 
information on the park's natural and human history, 
contribute to the educational activities of the Yosemite 
Nature Guide Service, promote scientific investigation, 
maintain a library, study and preserve the customs and 
legends of the Native Americans of the region, and publish 
Yosemite Nature Notes in cooperation with the Park Service 
(Mackintosh 10, 13-14). The Association functioned as a 
sort of clearinghouse, assembling and relating the work of a 
heterogeneous group of academic specialists— biologists, 
historians, educators, anthropologists, and sociologists®—  
in ways that were invaluable to the more modestly educated 
rank-and-file of park interpreters. Similar associations 
sprang up at other parks, forming a broad, interdiscursive 
institutional base for more refined and authoritative 
constructions of the various park environments.
From the beginning, interpretation was driven not so 
much by the park visitor's desire to learn but by the 
Service's desire to educate and persuade, to use the 
public's interest in spectacular scenery to build support 
for preservation.7 By the 1950s, interpretation had become 
an overt environmental politics, ostensibly grounded in the 
1916 legislation establishing the Park Service, whose two 
major objectives were "to provide for the enjoyment" of and 
"to use and conserve" the parks. In fulfillment of the 
first aim, as then-director Conrad Wirth wrote in 1953, 
interpretation gave the visitor the "background of 
information necessary for his fullest understanding, 
enjoyment, and appreciation of these areas." In fulfillment 
of the second, as Wirth added in a rather revealing 
metaphor, interpretation served as an "offensive weapon in 
preventing intrusion and adverse use" of park lands. For 
interpretation "to contribute to preservation" in this way 
was seen as both "obligation and opportunity" (Mackintosh 
105).
This sense of interpretation as an opportunity had 
grown apace with the steady increase of tourism in the 
parks, particularly following World War II. By 1957 the 
historian Christopher Crittenden— noting that annual park 
visitation had surpassed the 250-million mark— could welcome 
interpretation as a "new means of reaching our people," a 
"new channel of mass communication." (In figure 3, Jim 
Dunagin wryly suggests the pitfalls of conserving parklands 





“ WE'RB HERE TO HELP SAVE. THE NfflOWL PARKS!"
Fig. 3. A new channel of mass communication. Cartoon by 
Jim Dunagin. Baton Rouge, La. Advocate (4 July 1994): 6B.
a
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wonderful opportunity," Crittenden added approvingly,
interpretive professionals had responded with a flurry of
activity, developing "new and very effective techniques and
methods of telling their story," experimenting
with many things: with different methods of 
restoring or reconstructing historic buildings, 
with ingenious maps and dioramas. . . .  They have 
introduced special lighting and sound effects. In 
toto they have tried out scores and hundreds of 
devices in order that objects might become to the 
visitor seeable and hearable.
Did all these things just happen . . . 
without rhyme or reason? Obviously they did not. 
They are merely evidence of a new approach, a new 
philosophy. This latter is interpretation, the 
effort to make real and vivid to our people our 
common heritage, (qtd. in Tilden xii)
The Service's interpretive intent remained the same: not 
merely to reify nature but, as Frank Kermode said of 
literary interpreters, "to establish harmony between 
canonized texts" (78)— to enlist each park landscape in a 
totalizing framework, to inscribe it within a particular 
metanarrative and thereby naturalize a particular liberal- 
humanist notion, in this case Crittenden's "common 
heritage."
The new narrative technology being developed held great 
promise in this regard. While welcome and useful, however, 
all this activity posed special problems. Sometimes the new 
techniques proved just as exciting as the natural objects 
being interpreted, threatening to overwhelm the message with 
the medium. And in a rapidly expanding bureaucracy rife 
with experimentation, fragmentation seemed inevitable. How 
was the Service to monitor and unify the content of its
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message? Interpretation could not be allowed to "just 
happen"; it would have to be systematized and disciplined to 
a greater degree than before. That in turn would require "a 
new philosophy," a theory, and that theory would be provided 
largely by Freeman Tilden's Interpreting Our Heritage 
(1956)— a book still highly regarded by park interpreters 
and widely used in their training.8
Tilden posited interpretation as multi-media narrative, 
an active, innovative, and responsive storytelling practice. 
The interpreter must become adept at "making a few words 
tell a full and moving story" (57); the "lifeblood of 
satisfying interpretation," he insisted, "flows from the 
proper and ingenious use" of "devices of language" such as 
metaphor, simile, and analogy (30). The process is thus 
more artistic than scientific, but science nonetheless 
remains useful as an authorizing device, inasmuch as it 
fosters "a vision of the continuity of law which looks like 
a purpose in nature" (28). What sort of purpose are we 
supposed to envision in nature? Tilden approvingly cites an 
interpretive ranger who, ostensibly speaking of processes of 
erosion and plant succession, "told a thrilling story of the 
way the rock under our feet was attacked by the physical and 
organic forces; how vegetation begins; the creation of 
little harboring places in the rocks; the coming of grasses, 
of shrubs, finally of trees. Our grasses, our forests"
(39). Without much effort, nudged by the images of the 
"rock" and the "little harboring place," we can read here a 
thinly veiled retelling of the familiar story of the arrival
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of the persecuted pilgrims at Plymouth Bay, and the
subsequent raising of villages, towns, and cities— a
providential metanarrative of progress and civilization,
mapped onto the historical field of the appropriation and
development of "our" nation, mapped finally onto the
naturalizing field of the park environment. This, writes
Tilden, was stellar interpretation, capable of holding its
audience of travel-weary sightseers in "rapt attention" (39).
Textualizing Landscape
If the teacher is the guide, the curriculum is the 
path. A good curriculum marks the point of 
significance so that the student does not wander 
aimlessly over the terrain, dependent solely on 
chance to discover the landmarks of human 
achievement.
— William J. Bennett (6)
Of the many ways of writing environment as readable 
text, perhaps the most revealing is the interpretive genre 
known as the SGT or self-guided trail (see figure 4). The 
SGT, which came into its own "as a major component of the 
overall interpretive program" because of "budget problems 
[and] lack of personnel," is an integration of "natural" and 
written signs into a single text, "a meandering footpath 
along which the visitor's attention is drawn to interesting 
or unusual features which might otherwise be overlooked or 
not fully appreciated." Though designed to place visitors 
"in direct contact with the park or forest resource" (Sharpe 
247), such trails obviously afford a highly mediated 
contact, with their natural elements carefully preselected 
and then foregrounded and glossed by the written sign. Out
Self-Guided Trails 255
FIG. 14-3. Permanent stations should not be crowded together as in the ab ove  
example, but should be at least 7 5 -1 0 0  ft (2 3 -3 0  m ) apart. V isitors w ill ignore so m e  
stations w hen the trail gets crowded. (Photo by Grant W . Sharpe.)
Fig. 4. Textualizing landscape. Photograph by Grant 
Sharpe. From Grant W. Sharpe, ed. Interpreting the 
Environment (New York, Wiley, 1976): 255.
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of a multidimensional and anarchic web is thus distilled a 
linear sequence of signifiers, ordered into an apparently 
coherent and monologic text that "will develop an awareness 
of what makes up that environment" (250).
In designing the self-guided trail, interpretive 
personnel are encouraged to "put a story together" "which 
will unfold logically as the visitor moves from station to 
station" (Sharpe 254). To tell such a story well— to 
maintain reader interest and achieve narrative closure— the 
interpreter must pay attention to the written trail markers' 
location as well as their content. This is a matter of 
syntax— the markers must be "oriented perfectly so there is 
no misunderstanding about what is being interpreted" (266)—  
and of suspense: the interpreter should "[w]ind the trail 
around rock outcrops, trees, or other features," since the 
narrative is "more exciting if you can only see short 
segments at any one time" (254). The interpreter must take 
care in general not to work at cross-purposes to the Park 
Service's designs upon the reader. One training text, for 
example, warns against laying out an SGT by "mark[ing] the 
trees along the route with paint or axe blazes," because 
doing so "disfigures the trees" (254)— damaging the trees 
themselves, to be sure, but also, as my added italics are 
meant to suggest, disrupting their efficacy as figures, as 
signifiers of a pristine environment.
Not just the SGT but all forms of interpretation are 
designed to render the environment readable. According to 
the National Park Service's Personal Training Program for
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Interpreters, interpretation must "help the visitor derive
meaning from [the] environment" (18). Before designing a
project, interpreters are to ask themselves, "When you are
in the role of a visitor in an unfamiliar environment, how
do you derive meaning?" (23). This is a matter not merely
of pedagogy but also of epistemology, of "the organized
knowledge and ways of knowing within the areas to be
interpreted" (16). Since "increasing the number of ways by
which a visitor can look at something rather than looking at
many things in just one way, helps a visitor derive meaning
from an environment" (23), interpreters should access the
full range of knowledges consolidated for them by such
groups as the Yosemite Natural History Association. At its
most effective, that is, interpretation constructs the
environment interdiscurs ivelv.
Illusions of Presence
The controlling fact governing the development of 
educational work in the National Parks is that 
within these reservations multitudes are brought 
directly in contact with striking examples of 
Nature's handicraft. To lead people away from 
direct contact with nature, to beguile them into a 
building where they are surrounded by artifacts 
. . .  is contrary to the spirit of this enter­
prise. The real museum is outside the walls of 
the building and the purpose of museum work is to 
render the out-of-doors intelligible.
— Hermon Carey Bumpus (104)
As is suggested by the oxymoronic phrase "to make 
real," the Park Service's vision of interpretation— read 
here as a naive theorizing of literary environmentalism 
itself— proves highly problematic. On the one hand, Tilden
writes that interpretation in the field is superior to 
education in the classroom precisely because it is only in 
the field that the student "meets the Thing itself" (3).
This is the popular notion of the natural environment as a 
site of complete, unmediated presence— as exemplified, for 
example, in the advertisement reproduced in figure 4, which 
posits "the out-of-doors" as the site of "authenticity" and 
informs us that in the outdoors "there are no perceptions. 
Only reality." On the other hand, even though interpreters 
"work closely with the [natural] feature itself" and are "in 
direct contact with" the park visitor, they nonetheless 
"have a lot of media to rely on" (Sharpe 6)— and of what use 
are media but to mediate between viewer and scene?
Despite the putative reality and presence of the park 
environment, visitors "depend on park interpreters to tell 
them what it's all about" (Personal Training 4). To "stand 
at the rim of the Grand Canyon of the Colorado is to 
experience a spiritual elevation that could come from no 
human description of the colossal chasm," but it nonetheless 
requires the work of a vast institution, of "(t]housands of 
naturalists," to reveal "something of the beauty and wonder, 
the inspiration and spiritual meaning that lie behind what 
the visitor can with his senses perceive" (Tilden 3-4).
With what, then, is the visitor in direct contact? Not the 
real after all, it seems, but only some inconsequential 
surface, for the "true interpreter" must lead the visitor 
"beyond the apparent to the real" (8). The visitor depends 
upon the interpreter's presumed ability, as Kermode put it
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T h e re ’s no  pretending; You e ith e r  have w h a t it  takes to m ake it in  th e  o u e o f-d o o rs , o r 
you d o n 't ,  I t’s  ca lled  au th en tic ity . G iven  th a t  peop le have been',\Voaririg our o u td o o r  
w e a rs in c c  1830, it se em s fair to > ;  ■ . . say-tye’ve ea rn e d .th a t d istinc tion .
Fig. 5. The outdoors as the site of unmediated reality. 
Summit 1 (Fall 1990): 72.
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in the case of the interpreter of the literary text, "to 
elicit senses not available to persons of ordinary 
perceptions" (78). Interpreters are "in the business of 
conducting readers out of the sphere of the manifest" (85) —  
and into the highly mediated sphere of environmentalist 
discourse.
In doing so, writes Tilden, the effective interpreter 
"pares away all the obfuscating minor detail and drives 
straight toward the perfection" of the story (31). 
Interpretation is a highly selective process of 
foregrounding and suppression, and this suggests a critical 
strategy for a poststructuralist ecocriticism or green 
cultural studies: to inquire into what has been deemed 
"minor" or "irrelevant" to the "perfection" of interpretive 
stories, and to ask by whom and for what reasons such 
decisions have been made. Such a criticism would attempt to 
bare the more subtly concealed devices of literary 
environmentalism, to recover enough of its "obfuscating" 
details to breach the closure of its texts and keep the 
environment openly problematic.
Tilden quotes the following motto from a Park Service 
administrative manual: "Through interpretation, 
understanding; through understanding, appreciation; through 
appreciation, protection" (38). Omitted here is the step 
that makes the interpretive process circular rather than 
sequential: "through protection, interpretation." With the 
circle closed in this way, interpretation is no longer a 
mere intermediate step toward the goal of protection; what
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we see instead is that in preserving landscapes we also 
preserve the "grounds" of the stories we tell about them.
We must now consider the possibility that we value the 
stories at least as much as we do the environment "itself," 
that while literary environmentalism clearly tells stories 
in order to protect the landscape, it also preserves the 
landscape in order to tell stories. In this formulation— if 
I may simplify— the task of the environmental historian is 
to ask what happens when someone alters the environment, 
while the task of the ecocritic is to explore what happens 
when someone tries to alter the stories, and to give those 
stories a genealogy by recovering their histories and 
contexts.
One could also describe the ecocritic' s -cask in terms 
of the earlier discussion of literary canonicity. To the 
traditional critic, canonical works quite pointedly do not 
speak of the specificities of existence in racialized, 
gendered, and class-stratified societies; rather they "tell 
us how men and.women . . . have grappled with life's 
enduring, fundamental questions"— by which, of course, is 
meant such platitudes as "What is justice? . . . What is 
courage? What is noble?" (Bennett 3). The Great Books are 
not to be taught in an "ideological manner," "as if they 
were . . . subordinated to particular prejudices" (16) but 
rather in ways that allow us to "protect and transmit a 
legacy" that is thought to be damaged by critical and 
divergent readings (17). Indeed, writes Lynne Cheney, 
criticism which aims "to expose and refute their biases" is
not legitimate intellectual activity at all but rather an 
unacceptable "form of political activism" (12). What to 
Cheney is unacceptable, however, seems to me to be precisely 
what is necessary, and the questions I wish to ask of our 
Great Landscape-Texts are very like the questions she 
explicitly proscribes: "What groups did the authors of these 
works represent? How did their works enhance the social 
power of those groups over others?" (12). I propose to 
enlist the nation's environmental narrative in a critical 
rather than just a cultural literacy.
A Heritage Preserved for Him
Taking my cue from the gender politics implicit in 
figure 2, I would like to give a brief example of what I 
have in mind. In 1957, Park Service director Conrad Wirth 
wrote that interpretation's job is "presenting, for the 
benefit of every American, an interpretation of the unique 
heritage preserved for him in the National Park System"
(qtd. in Tilden vii). Is there any contradiction in Wirth's 
promise that interpretation would benefit every American by 
illuminating a heritage preserved for him? It is true that 
women had worked in interpretation since at least 1917, when 
the federal government licensed Esther Burnell as a nature 
guide in what today is Rocky Mountain National Park. By the 
1980s, in fact, the number of women in the profession 
actually equalled or exceeded that of men (Sharpe 10; 
Mackintosh 74). But this apparent gender equality owed less 
to an enlightened Park Service mentality than to the 
creation of an interpretive ghetto, created as male rangers
who associated natural-history work "with qualities lacking 
in 'he-men'" gravitated toward other positions. (In
addition, interpretive positions were not on the fast track 
for career advancement.9) Women, on the other hand, were 
considered in all the usual ways to be especially suited to 
the work; where men were considered "too independent and 
hard to control," women were thought "natural hostesses, 
more outgoing." One supervisor, citing "studies in 
industry," claimed women were better able "to perform duties 
of a repetitive and routine nature," while another found 
them "more susceptible to instruction, more obedient, and 
. . . less of a management problem" (Mackintosh 16; 73-74).
With their presence in interpretation less an 
expression of gender equality than a function of gender 
stereotypes, it is not surprising that feminist rangers only 
comparatively recently began to contest interpretive 
constructions of gender. It was not until the 1970s that 
interpreters at Morristown National Historical Park in New 
Jersey appropriated that park's rural landscape to ground a 
chapter of Herstory, pointedly casting women as active and 
capable agents by stressing their role in the American 
Revolution as "both camp followers and those left to manage 
daily farms while the men were fighting." Such innovations 
were received only cautiously within the profession, which 
displayed a sense of reaction and containment even where it 
was apparently sympathetic. While admitting, for example, 
that "the presence of women has desirably expanded and
enriched interpretive content," administrators stressed that 
care must "be taken that undue emphasis is not given 
tangential female roles at the expense of primary park 
themes." This comment presaged a more general retrenchment 
that would occur when James Watt ran the Department of 
Interior. "As late as 1979," wrote one observer, 
"environmental education [had been] an essential management 
function for every park." But during the Reagan years, "a 
back-to-basics movement" squeezed out all but the most 
traditional forms of interpretation, "frown[ing] on programs 
not directly based on park resources or extending too far 
beyond them." The interpreter's job once again became only 
"to interpret the resources and themes of our parks, not to 
function as subject matter educators or as spokespeople for 
special causes" (Mackintosh 71-75). Morristown's modestly 
feminist interpretation was eclipsed as "female roles" in 
the nation's history were thus declared the merely 
"tangential" concerns of a "special cause."
Environmental constructions may be contested along 
lines of race as well as gender, as is clearly evident in 
recent events at Little Bighorn National Monument— a park 
whose very name was until quite recently a matter of bitter 
dispute. Little Bighorn, of course, is the location of 
George Armstrong Custer's "fatal environment," the famous 
1876 battle in which Sioux and Cheyenne troops defeated the 
warriors of the U.S. Cavalry. In 1879 the War Department 
declared the site a national cemetery and erected a memorial 
to the dead U.S. cavalrymen, but no memorial was set up to
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honor the Indian dead, and the monument itself, in a 
deviation from the usual custom, was named not after the 
location (Gettysburg, Antietam, Pearl Harbor) but after the 
losing commander: Custer Battlefield.
In 1925, a Northern Cheyenne woman petitioned the 
Secretary of War to allow the placement of a memorial to her 
father, who had died in the 1876 battle. The War Department 
did not answer, and the issue apparently lay dormant until 
the American Indian Movement renewed the woman's request in 
1976. By this time the site had become a national monument 
under the management of the National Park Service. Like the 
War Department, the Park Service ignored the petition; in 
response, AIM first placed an unauthorized plaque of its own 
at the perimeter of the site and later, in 1991, conducted a 
protest march at the monument. By this time Ben Nighthorse 
Campbell had been elected as the nation's first Native 
American in Congress, and Barbara Booher, the second Native 
American to attain such a rank within the National Park 
Service, had been appointed monument superintendent. That 
same year, six decades after the original request and only 
after a rancorous debate, Campbell sponsored and Congress 
approved legislation authorizing the construction of an 
Indian memorial and renaming the site Little Bighorn 
Battlefield National Monument. 1°
Even after the name change, however, interpretation at 
the site continued to operate within racist institutional 
constraints. In 1989, one of the monument's rangers, Randy 
Parker, reported that he had been instructed to stop
recommending to visitors that they read Dee Brown's Bury Mv 
Heart at Wounded Knee as background material. What Parker 
thought would help visitors to a more balanced understanding 
of Indian-white relations had been deemed "too biased" by 
the monument's park historian; not only that, but it was not 
for sale at the Visitor Center's bookstore. Superintendent 
Booher supported Parker, but had no authority over the 
bookstore, which— in an arrangement typical of the park 
system— was operated by an independent nonprofit group, the 
Custer Battlefield Historical and Museum Association. When, 
in response to a letter-writing campaign begun by Parker, 
the Association's book-review committee took up the matter, 
the vote was 4-3 not to carry the book. (None of the 
committee members were Native Americans.) Booher then asked 
the Association's board of directors to override the review 
committee; they too voted against the book, by the even 
greater margin of 5-1.n
Theory: Literary Environmentalism as Domestic Orientalism
It made the slovenly wilderness
Surround that hill.
— Wallace Stevens, "Anecdote of the Jar" (129) 
Until recently, the critic of environmental literature 
has tacitly assumed the existence of an entity, "the 
environment," as both the motivation for and the object of 
environmentalism. As should be clear by now, this study 
approaches "the environment" instead as a construct, not as 
the prediscursive origin and cause of environmental 
discourse but as an effect of that discourse. As a set of
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represented relations, an idea rather than a presence, "the 
environment" becomes manifest as what Michel Foucault called 
a dispositif, a strategic category that organizes around 
itself the heterogeneous disciplines that claim (in this 
case) "the environment" as their common object of study and 
concern. The environment is that particular abstraction 
that can be studied not only by what we think of as 
environmentalists per se— that is, not just those who work 
to protect it— but by all those whose pronouncements have 
described it and elaborated upon it and validated it as 
worthy of attention in the first place: the artists who find 
it beautiful, the scientists who find it complex, 
interconnected, and fragile, the theologians who find it 
spiritually regenerating (however much they may once have 
found it, as uncontrolled nature, vile and dangerous), the 
sociologists who find it an antidote to the ills of urban 
society, and so on.
In the traditional reading of Stevens's "Anecdote," the 
famous jar not only exercises dominion over the wilderness 
but retrieves it from "perceptual chaos," thereby rendering 
it visible to the observer. In much the same sense, the 
environment makes objects, processes, disciplines, and 
languages sprawl intelligibly around it, creating a sense of 
order and relation out of an otherwise slovenly complex of 
words and things. 12 The environment is the epistemological 
catalyst that allows us to perceive as unified and logical 
such recognizably environmentalist discourse as this quote 
from Tu Wei-Ming, which I have selected almost at random
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from a collection of essays entitled Worldviews and Ecology:
The unprecedented scientific and technological 
achievement that enables us not only to survey all 
boundaries of the good earth but even to measure 
the thickness of the air we breathe is certainly 
an established fact. Yet, a more compelling 
actuality is the realization of how precious and 
precarious this lifeboat of ours is in the midst 
of the turbulent ocean of galaxies. This reali­
zation, heightened by a poetic sensitivity and 
infused by a religious sense of awe, impels us to 
recognize as professionals as well as concerned 
citizens of the world that we ourselves now belong 
to the category of the endangered species. This 
poignant recognition is deduced from the obvious 
fact that we have mercilessly polluted our own 
habitat.13
One would be struck by the sheer breadth of this sort of 
statement, were it not so familiar. In physical scope it 
ranges from the local to the galactic; colliding audibly 
within it are the varied languages of geography, biology, 
atmospheric science, politics, ethics, and theology; its 
rhetoric swings from the mundane and technical to the 
belletristic. How is it that such polyphonic text can 
strike us as authoritative and not merely cacophonous? 
Certainly its persuasiveness is enhanced by the urgency of 
its genre (the jeremiad) and by its appeals to established 
forms of authority. But it is the discursive mediation of 
the environment itself, as an apparently stable and self- 
evident center, that prevents such prose from seeming as 
opaque as the fictional Chinese encyclopedia quoted by 
Foucault in The Order of Things, that prevents us today from 
sensing how at some earlier time, not really so long ago, 
such words might have struck us as possessing "the exotic
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charm of another system of thought," perhaps prompted us 
even to shake our heads at "the stark impossibility of 
thinking that."14
It is this interdisciplinarity, this intersection and 
interlocking of discourses— and of the diverse and often 
divergent ways of knowing the world for which individually 
they speak— that creates the epistemological space within 
which environmentalism may refer intelligibly to its object. 
In this study I use the term "literary environmentalism" to 
refer not narrowly to consciously engaged environmental 
politics, but more broadly to the discursive processes of 
constructing the environment— by studying it, by describing 
it, and originally, as this study will show, by possessing 
it. The material and historical contexts within which these 
processes take place do not completely determine the 
environment, but they nonetheless prevent it from being, in 
the words of Edward Said, "a free field of thought and 
action" (3). Nor can literary environmentalism be seen as a 
self-evidently pure and "good" resistance to an external and 
"bad" force that "exploits" the environment. For however it 
may represent itself and its history, environmentalism has 
not always operated in isolation from or strictly in 
opposition to power, but rather has often been an 
establishment and consolidation of power, an alignment with 
many of the forces it claims in the broadest terms to 
oppose. Necessarily, environmentalism seeks constantly to 
buttress the speaking and acting authority of its agents by 
establishing links, whether between those agents as
individuals, between individuals and institutions (both new 
and preexisting), and between one institution and another. 
Out of this peopling and institutionalizing of 
environmentalism, this expansion and refinement of its 
network, comes the elaboration of its discourse, the 
incorporation of the otherwise unrelated ways of 
classifying, measuring, and describing its object so evident 
in the example above.
This study therefore views literary environmentalism 
not simply as the written record of a political movement, 
nor solely as Literary Environmentalism, as the production 
of that movement's most inspirational and now canonical 
texts. Literary environmentalism is rather the textual 
manifestation of a larger cultural practice, of an ensemble 
of interlocking ideas, people, and institutions, of what is 
today a sprawling formation within which environmental 
discourse attains its intellectual, popular, and legal 
authority— a formation within which the environment itself 
has been invented and naturalized. In other words, I treat 
literary environmentalism as a sort of Orientalism, as the 
latter has been formulated by Said: a "created body of 
theory and practice" (6), the "corporate institution" 
empowered to deal with the environment "by making statements 
about it, authorizing views of it, describing it" and even 
"ruling over it" (3). Of the infinite potential modes for 
exercising power, literary environmentalism will be seen as 
just a particular "style for dominating, restructuring, and 
having authority" (3) over the territories and lives— in
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particular, as we have already begun to see, the territories 
and lives of Native Americans, of women, of the poor— for 
which the environment is invoked as a representation and 
which it inevitably misnames.is 
An Environmental Prehistory
This dissertation explores what might be called the 
prehistory of the environmental movement by analyzing the 
shifting constructions of that movement's object, the 
environment "itself," from the early colonial period to the 
creation of the early national parks. I will not pretend 
that the range of texts I have selected for that purpose is 
particularly representative; genuine representativeness did 
not seem possible, and I was guided by other considerations.
I chose, for one thing, to privilege the popular over the 
conventionally literary; hence my choice of three books that 
were best-sellers in their time: Mary White Rowlandson's The 
Sovereignty and Goodness of God. James Fenimore Cooper's The 
Last of the Mohicans, and Clarence King's Mountaineering in 
the Sierra Nevada. (The latter has the additional advantage 
that the Yosemite landscape it helped to write remains a 
tremendously popular text in its own right; unlike much of 
the landscape of, say, Cooper's New York, Yosemite is still 
"in print" and still widely read in the "original edition.")
I also wished simply to introduce some fresh material into 
the discussion o.f "environmental literature," to present 
alternatives to what seem to have become regular fixtures in 
the field; hence the fact that this study contains little 
Henry David Thoreau and absolutely no John Muir.
In Chapter Two of this study I theorize some specific 
narratological and psychosociological bases of American 
environmental constructions before analyzing their operation 
in two colonial texts whose literary environmentalism 
strikes me as paradigmatic. John Underhill's Newes from 
America (1638), a combined promotional pamphlet and account 
of the Pequot War, writes the New England wilderness via 
tropes of gender and race that explicitly link the 
environment's description to its possession. I then turn to 
Mary Rowlandson’s The Soveraiqnty and Goodness of God 
(1682), which recapitulates but also considerably 
complicates these figures. Lacking the blustering self- 
assurance of Underhill's account, Rowlandson's writing is 
tentative and nuanced, marked by hesitations and resistances 
that suggest the possibility of radically rewriting the 
American environment.
Chapter Three analyzes The Last of the Mohicans, paying 
particular attention to its construction of a gendered and 
racialized "wilderness" which, in its "virgin" purity, may 
serve as the ground of a perpetual regeneration of a "pure" 
white American civilization. But however much the novel 
tries to naturalize its visions of racial and natural 
purity— and however much it tries to make its wilderness 
landscape self-originating— the elusive and profoundly 
troublesome figure of Magua always manages to frustrate such 
aims. This repeated disruption steadily erodes the novel's 
confidence in the "reality" of the wilderness it writes, 
reducing the story towards the end to a series of skits and
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masquerades that destabilize the very categories of "nature" 
and "culture"— suggesting thereby that nature itself is 
fully performative in the sense developed by Judith Butler 
in her analyses of sex and gender.
Chapter Four examines three noncanonical works related 
intertextually by their contributions to the canonicity of a 
fourth text: the Yosemite landscape. Lafayette Bunnell's 
account of the Mariposa War (1851-1852), The History of the 
Discovery of the Yosemite and of the Indian War which Led to 
that Event, demonstrates the role of aesthetic discourse in 
neutralizing the genocidal horrors of a paradigmatically 
violent "environment," the Euro-American invasion and 
conquest of Yosemite. Frederick Law Olmsted's "The Yosemite 
Valley and the Mariposa Big Tree Grove," the first 
management report on the newly established Yosemite State 
Park, implicates the very idea of the national park in an 
ideology of what might be called "social sanitation through 
outdoor recreation," a conservative social praxis that had 
already proved effective in the urban and suburban East by 
the time Olmsted adapted it to the wilderness of the West.
Continuing the theme of the East writing the West, I 
turn to Clarence King's Mountaineering in the Sierra Nevada 
to demonstrate the links between environmentalism, literary 
realism, and the exigencies of a fast-maturing corporate 
capitalism. Using his surveying and mountaineering 
activities as figures for struggle, competition, progress, 
and domination, King writes brilliantly of landscapes now 
preserved as national parks, but simultaneously mystifies
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the social and economic developments that were to so 
completely transform the remainder of the state.
In my concluding chapter I take up the question of the 
"postnatural" as it has been developed in two contemporary 
ecocritical texts, Bill McKibben's The End of Nature and 
Rebecca Solnit's Savage Dreams. McKibben claims his work to 
be postnatural, but naively recapitulates the early 
colonialist and capitalist trope of the "virgin wilderness"; 
Solnit, by contrast, refuses the concept of an originary 
nature altogether and adopts a much more promising mode for 
a genuinely postnatural environmental writing. Radically 
resituating the reader of the Yosemite environment in what 
she terms the "hidden wars of the American West," Solnit 
makes a point of recovering the voices that have been 
silenced by traditional forms of environmental literature. 
Savage Dreams refuses to seek in nature the sorts of lessons
and remedies that are in fact available only through a
conscious engagement with one's own culture.
I do not pretend to have written a full-fledged history
of the environment. My goals have been much more modest. I
hope first of all simply to have demonstrated that the 
environment has a history, that it is not simply "out there" 
waiting either to be destroyed or preserved but rather that 
it brings considerable historical and ideological baggage to 
every discussion about it. Second, I hope that this study 
can suggest ways to bring the environment into larger 
debates about imperialism, gender, race, and class, and 
concomitantly to develop ecocriticism into a viable and
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productive form of postmodern intellectual work. Certainly 
we need a clearer understanding of the relations between 
capitalism, colonialism, and environmentalism, for without 
such an understanding, green movements risk running at 
cross-purposes, naturalizing forms of social oppression even 
as they combat the other toxic residues of the New World 
Order.
Notes to Chapter One
1 Analyzing a variety of contemporary ecological 
discourses in The Chicago Gangster Theory of Life; Nature's 
Debt to Society. Andrew Ross argues that environmentalism 
threatens a reactionary "revival of appeals to the authority 
of nature and biology." He notes the historical flirtations 
of fascist groups with ecology and conservation (4) and 
suggests that "we may soon be engaged yet again in the 
struggle to prevent nature becoming the referee of our fate" 
(5). Also instructive in this vein are the chapters "Think 
Like a Mountain" and "Nazi Ecology" in Luc Ferry's The New 
Ecological Order.
2 Olmsted 21. I discuss Olmsted's views in much 
greater detail in Chapter Four.
3 Hirsch xiv. Hirsch’s claim that the most crucial 
knowledge can be readily identified and defined is itself 
problematic, since the first of these terms implies a simple 
recognition of a fact and the second the assignment of a 
meaning. Hirsch's conflation of these terms indicates how 
the idea of cultural literacy naturalizes value judgments as 
simple "information."
Interestingly enough, just as Olmsted invokes literacy 
in his theorizing of the environment, Hirsch argues for the 
importance of cultural literacy by citing its utility in 
comprehending environmentalist discourse (xiii).
4 In addition to the works cited in the text, see 
Raymond Williams, Writing in Society: Harvey J. Graff, The 
Literacy Myth; Literacy and Social Structure in the 
Nineteenth-Centurv City: and Elsa Auerbach, "Literacy and 
Ideology."
5 With Congress at first reluctant to sponsor 
interpretive activities, the Park Service looked to outside 
funding to pay for them and created quasi-independent
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organizations to help coordinate them. In 1918 Charles D. 
Wolcott, secretary of the Smithsonian Institution, formed 
the National Parks Educational Committee, which with 
Mather's assistance created the nonprofit National Parks 
Association, among whose purposes were "to interpret the 
natural sciences which are illustrated in the scenic 
features, flora and fauna of the national parks and 
monuments, and to circulate popular information concerning 
them in text and picture" (Mackintosh 6). To further such 
efforts, John D. Rockefeller helped fund the museum at Mesa 
Verde National Park in 1923; the Laura Spellman Rockefeller 
Memorial Fund and the Carnegie Corporation paid for 
interpretive facilities at Grand Canyon National Park, 
including a museum that opened in 1926; and the Loomis 
family, owners of the Los Angeles Times. funded a museum 
that opened in Lassen Volcanic National Park in 1929. The 
federal government did not fund any comparable facility 
until 1930 (Mackintosh 12).
6 Interpreters are urged, for example, not to "rely 
upon a limited set of time-honored techniques without 
examining their current appropriateness" but instead to make 
use of "[c]urrent knowledge about human behavior in leisure 
settings" that will "suggest alternative interpretive 
strategies" (Field and Wagar 44).
7 Grant W. Sharpe notes that in addition to its overt 
political value in environmental.ism, interpretation has an 
"often overlooked" "management aspect," affording a variety 
of concrete benefits ranging from "favorably promot[ing] the 
image of the agency which supplies it" (4) to providing 
"substantial assistance to law enforcement through 
educational persuasion" (18).
8 Tilden's book has had considerable influence.
William C. Everhardt, as head of the National Park Service's 
Division of Interpretation and Visitor Services, advised his 
interpretive staff in 1965 not just to read but to "[rjeread 
Freeman Tilden's Interpreting Our Heritage," since "[t]here 
isn't anything much better" (United States, Interpretive 
Planning). Ten years later, Everhardt noted approvingly 
that "for nearly a generation the profession has been guided 
conceptually and philosophically by the teachings of Freeman 
Tilden, through his classic, Interpreting Our Heritage"
(Sharpe xi).
9 In the field of higher education, some ten years 
later, the same sort of gender inequality still obtains. 
According to a study reported recently in The Chronicle of
49
Higher Education, women make up 41 percent of new higher 
education faculty overall. But women are "far more likely 
to be employed in non-tenure track positions than males," 
and at research institutions approximately two men are hired 
for every woman (Magner 18).
For more information (and a sampling of opinions) on 
the renaming of the Little Bighorn National Monument, see 
"Winners" 33; Lynch 11; Ward 76-87; Will 6B; and Kilpatrick 
6B. Since the renaming, archaeologists have employed 
sophisticated technology for reinterpreting the Little 
Bighorn site. See Amato 293; Fox, Archaeology; and Fox, "A 
New View" 30-37, 64-66.
11 For details of this controversy, see Lockhart 11A.
12 Pack 58. "Anecdote of the Jar" may well be the most 
frequently analyzed of Stevens's poems. The most persistent 
theme in its readings is that "a wild and disorderly 
landscape is transformed into order" by the "presence" of 
the jar. That order is not natural, however; it is wholly 
"a product of the human consciousness," and "acts in the 
imagination" (Baker 127). Order does not originate in 
nature, but is the effect of "man’s desire for wholeness," 
which "leads . . . toward sur-roundness" (Riddel 43). One 
critic writes that one of the poem's "critical points is 
that the jar, while it may reflect the hill on which it 
stands . . .  is not nature" but a reflection, and "[o]nce 
nature is reflected, it is art— the domain of the 
imagination and not of the real world" (Perlis 47).
Yvor Winters disagreed with this prevailing view of the 
poem, finding it "a purely romantic performance," "an 
expression of the corrupting effect of the intellect upon 
natural beauty":
The jar is the product of the human mind . . . and 
it dominates the wilderness; but it does not give 
order to the wilderness— it is vulgar and sterile, 
and it transforms the wilderness into the 
semblance of a deserted picnic ground. (229)
13 Tu Wei-Ming 19. Another contributor to Worldviews 
and Ecology, Thomas Berry, writes:
General ecological studies can be too abstract or 
too theoretical to constitute a recognized 
scientific discipline. Biological and geological 
studies can be too specialized. Environmental 
ethics is a much needed study, yet it cannot 
proceed in any effective manner without a larger 
understanding of the natural world. The . . . 
realm[s] of poetry and the natural history essay
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are important to establish the emotional-aesthetic 
feeling for the w o n d e r s  of the natural world and 
to awaken the psychic energies needed. . . . But 
these humanistic insights are themselves mightily 
enhanced by a more thorough understanding of the 
identifying features and intimate modes of 
functioning of bioregions.
None of these studies can be done in 
isolation from the others. . . . The relationship 
of humans to the earth requires all these modes of 
inquiry, all these modes of expression. (236)
And Tu Wei-Ming writes: "Far-sighted ecologists, engineers, 
economists, and earth scientists, intent on developing a 
communal critical self-consciousness for 'saving spaceship 
earth,' have made an appeal to poets, priests, artists, and 
philosophers" (20).
14 Foucault xv. Of course, some people have never 
found environmentalist discourse to make much sense; one 
thinks here of the irreducibility of the differences 
explored in John McPhee's Encounters with the Archdruid. in 
which, as the title suggests, one of the protagonists seems 
to find environmentalism utterly alien as a system of 
thought.
15 To demonstrate the extent to which my approach is 
indebted to Said, I quote the following from Orientalism, 
and invite the reader to substitute, more or less freely, 
"environment" for "Orient," "literary environmentalism" for 
"Orientalism,1 and so on:
[I]t needs to be made clear about cultural 
discourse and exchange within a culture that what 
is commonly circulated by it is not "truth" but 
representations. . . .  In any instance of at 
least written language, there is no such thing as 
a delivered presence, but a re-presence. or a 
representation. The value, efficacy, strength, 
apparent veracity of a statement about the Orient 
therefore relies very little, and cannot instru­
ment ally depend, on the Orient as such. On the 
contrary, the written statement is a presence to 
the reader by virtue of its having excluded, 
displaced, made supererogatory any such "real 
thing" as "the Orient." Thus all of Orientalism 
stands forth and away from the Orient: that 
Orientalism makes sense at all depends more on the 
West than on the Orient, and this sense is 
directly indebted to various Western techniques of 
representation that make the Orient visible, 
clear, "there" in discourse about it. And these
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representations rely upon institutions, 
traditions, conventions, agreed-upon codes of 
understanding for their effects . . . "  (21-22).
CHAPTER TWO 
Acts of Environment
The discussion thus far has repeatedly suggested the 
contingency of environmentalism's object, the environment. 
The environment is never freely constructed but rather is 
shaped by the needs that prompt its invocation and the 
processes involved in its representation. The environment 
is first of all a word, an element in a discourse, and thus 
"populated," as Mikhail Bakhtin has it, "with the intentions 
of others" (294). It is also a narrated fiction, and thus 
shares formal properties common to all narrative. Finally, 
as a product of the imagination it is both limited and 
enabled by specific psychological processes, the workings of 
anxiety and desire. I wish now to take up these matters of 
etymology, typology, and psychology— all preparatory to 
reading John Underhill's 1638 promotional pamphlet, Newes 
from America, and Mary White Rowlandson's captivity 
narrative, The Soveraiantv and Goodness of God, as 
paradigmatic exercises of literary environmentalism at 
specific and formative moments in American environmental 
history.
Etymology
A root verb plus a suffix, "environment" once quite 
straightforwardly denoted "the action of environing": 
environment (OED). But with the obsolescence of the verb 
"to environ," meaning to "encircle" or "surround," this
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active sense has been lost, so that we no longer hear it the 
way we do in nouns such as judgement and government— words 
that still resonate with the senses of the judges who judge 
and the governors who govern, and that immediately recall 
the legal and political structures which empower those 
judges and governors. Even when we use such terms as mere 
nouns, and despite the work of ideology to cast them as 
natural and inevitable, we still sense in them their 
constructedness, their historicity and mutability and 
politicization. Judgments and governments are easily seen 
to be not merely found, but enunciated, made, and imposed—  
products of human will and activity, backed up, in the final 
analysis, by the specter of violence.
What remains of our sense of environment, by contrast, 
is not any action but a simple thing, not a fiction that has 
been made but a fact that has been discovered. Thanks to a 
nominalizing process that effaces both act and actor, we no 
longer speak of what environs us, but of what our 
environment is. This is not a trivial distinction, for 
restoring to environment the sense of its originary action 
allows us to inquire into not only what environs us, but how 
it came to do so, and by means of what agency— questions 
crucial to the discussion that follows.
If, as the OED suggests, environment originates in 
action, what is the nature of the act, and who is the actor? 
Put another way, is there a concrete noun that can be cast 
as both agent and grammatical subject in a simple sentence 
directly describing this originary, performative sort of 
environment? The OED is of little help in disentangling
today's environment-as-noun from the earlier environment-as- 
verb, circularly defining the former as "that which 
environs." This circle is not broken when the dictionary 
attempts a definition-by-enumeration, by defining the 
environment is "the objects or region surrounding anything," 
for this simply yokes the noun to a substitute verb, 
surround, which though not obsolete is more or less 
synonymous with environ. This is a mere deferral that does 
not solve but merely disguises the problem of the 
definition's essential circularity. It seems clear that 
whatever the concrete entities enumerated by the dictionary, 
they do not comprise environment-as-noun until and unless 
they perform environment-as-action; we are no closer than 
before to knowing what the environment is. in the absence of 
such action— or, to put it in two different but related 
ways, what ontological immanence or absolute presence it 
possesses that allows us to utter it as a noun plain and 
simple.
The way out of this circle, I believe, is to uncover 
the agency at work in acts of environment. We must shift 
our attention from the merely grammatical subject— the 
elusive environment-as-noun— to something whose agency is as 
real in fact as we assume the environment to be in speech.
We need to focus on the speaker who is environed, on 
precisely that element which, suggestively enough, is left 
out of the dictionary definition. Bearing in mind the 
political valence of the question, the identity politics 
implied by its plural pronoun, we need to stop asking what 
the environment is, stop trying to enumerate its defining
elements, and ask instead, "How is it that these enumerated 
elements have come to environ us?" The answer lies in the 
presumption of the presence of, and ultimately in the act of 
entry by, the speakers who can sensibly say, "our 
environment." It is not any action on the part of our 
surroundings that has made them our surroundings, but the 
onset of and the continuation of our being here: a matter 
not of ontology, but of politics and history. The originary 
and defining environment-as-action, to which environment-as- 
noun always points and from which, however remote, it is 
logically inseparable, points in turn to specifiable acts of 
entry and occupation. It is these that account for our 
being environed, and hence of "having" an "environment" that 
we can, in an anthropocentric and self-effacing and 
depoliticizing shorthand, deploy as a noun.
We speak of "the environment," of environment-as-noun, 
as some sort of genuine (as opposed to merely grammatical) 
agent that "environs" "us," native, conqueror, and immigrant 
alike, as if all shared the same history of environment-as- 
action. Why this strange construction in which fully 
agentive human actors are grammatically cast as passive and 
undifferentiated objects? As noted above, when people first 
enter a region they have not previously known and begin to 
speak of it as their surroundings, the region itself has 
done nothing in particular to metamorphose from terra 
incognita to environment. What precipitates environment is 
entry. Environment corresponds to, is the inverted 
expression of, a simultaneous and logically complementary 
penetration— a word I use now consciously to introduce an
analogy between environmental and sexual discourses. As a 
variety of feminist critics have pointed out, coitus can be 
thought of not only as a penetration but also as, say, an 
incorporation (as above, the two actions can be thought of 
as logically complementary), yet the hegemonic term is 
nonetheless penetration, privileged precisely because it 
foregrounds a dominating, masculine sexual agency. Use of a 
term such as incorporation, with its ascription of sexual 
agency to the female, is proscribed by a phallic code that 
effaces female sexuality generally.! In its complementarity 
to originary acts of penetration, environment is clearly 
analogous to incorporation. Yet within environmentalist 
discourse, penetration is not foregrounded but effaced: 
agency is ascribed exclusively to what is in fact its 
inescapably passive correlate. Given that this discourse is 
otherwise unmistakably phallic, such a construction seems 
odd indeed, until we notice that it has the rhetorical 
effect of purging environmental discourse of that 
discomfiting history of colonialist and capitalist 
"penetrations"— discovery and exploration, conquest and 
commodification, the now-nameable environment-as-action, the 
"rape of the land"— which precipitated the Euro-American 
environment in the first place, a history which, in the 
performative sense I have been trying to develop here, may 
now be viewed as that environment. The code shifts 
attention from palpable actions and intentions and focuses 
it upon an abstraction which not only lacks agency and 
presence, but whose very conjuring is a mystification.
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Typology
The OED defines the environment— in its contemporary 
usage in the discourse of environmentalism, that is, as 
environment-as-noun— as the "sum total" of "that which 
environs; the objects or region surrounding anything." I 
dealt earlier with the implications of the environment' s 
putative totality; here I wish to focus on the definitional 
primacy of the externality that is implied in this 
definition, on the way the very idea of environment divides 
the world into insides and outsides. The terms here suggest 
a way of theorizing "the environment" as it is represented 
in and as it performs in the narratives of literary 
environmentalism, specifically, in terms of Jurij Lotman's 
theory of narrative plot typology. According to Lotman, the 
mythic narrative features at root just two types of 
characters,
those who are mobile, who enjoy freedom with 
respect to plot-space, who can change their place 
in the structure of the artistic world and cross 
the frontier, the basic topological feature of 
this space, and those who are immobile, who rep­
resent, in fact, a function of this space. . . . 
[A] certain plot space is divided by a single 
boundary into an external and an internal sphere, 
and a single character has the opportunity to 
cross that boundary. (167)
On the most fundamental narrative level there are, as Donna 
Haraway puts it in adumbrating this passage, only two 
characters: "the hero and the limit of his action or the 
space through which he moves" (234). Haraway deliberately 
uses "he" in this formulation because the narrative hero is 
the "creator of differences," the one who differentiates his 
interior from his exterior and as such is "structurally
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male." The female is "both the space for and the resistance 
to" such marking (234). She is "an element of plot-space," 
in the words now of Teresa de Lauretis, "a topos, a 
resistance, matrix and matter" (44).
Though Lotman wrote specifically of myth, de Lauretis 
of Hollywood cinema, and Haraway of the deep structure of 
scientific thought and research, it is not hard to recognize 
in this pre-gendered "matrix and matter" the environment as 
generally represented: ahistorical, ontologically stable, 
utterly objectified, like any other feminized object in 
patriarchal discourse "fixed in the position of icon, 
spectacle, the one looked at, in which the subject sees the 
objectification of his action and subjectivity" (Haraway 
234). The "fixing" of the environment in this position will 
prove to be a sort of environmental exploitation in its own 
right— not the obvious sort of physical destruction that 
might appear to motivate the environmentalist narrative, but 
the more fundamental conceptual appropriation, by the very 
locating of its boundaries and identification of its 
properties, of environment as raw cultural material. Like 
"Woman," this material is not only endlessly reconstructed, 
but proves to have as one of its primary attractions its 
endless availability for such reconstruction, as a sort of 
renewable resource for constructing the masculine subject on 
both the individual and the national level, through the 




We have yet to recognize the full implication of 
the mother as a primary landscape.
— Paul Shepard (98)
Environment's implicit differentiation between that 
which surrounds and that which is surrounded, between self 
and other, is a process not solely semantic and narrative, 
but also psychosocial. In examining the way that "America's 
oldest and most cherished fantasy" has been that of "the 
land as woman, the total female principal of gratification- 
enclosing r environing 1 the individual in an environment of 
receptivity, repose, and painless and integral satisfaction" 
(Lav 4), Annette Kolodny critiques the demarcation of the 
(male) self and the environment in terms congenial to this 
study, most particularly in the way her model contextualizes 
the psychological and links it directly to the literary. In 
the seventeenth century, Kolodny demonstrates, such quasi­
environment al images as "Eden, Paradise, the Golden Age, and 
the idyllic garden" were recast in response to contingent 
historical and social realities, "subsumed in the image of 
an America promising material ease without labor or 
hardship, as opposed to the grinding poverty of previous 
European existence." The New World promised the European
a resurrection of the lost state of innocence that 
the adult abandons when he joins the world of 
competitive self-assertion; and all this possible 
because, at the deepest psychological level, the 
move to America was experienced as the daily 
reality of what has become its single dominating 
metaphor: regression from the cares of adult life 
and a return to the primal warmth of womb or 
breast in a feminine landscape. And when America 
finally produced a pastoral literature of her own, 
that literature hailed the essential femininity of 
the terrain in a way European pastoral had never
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dared, and, from the first, took its metaphors as 
literal truths. (6)
Material history here becomes psychologically grounded
metaphor, which then underwrites a naturalized gendered
"reality." Though there may be an "instinctual drive
embedded in" this fantasy of a feminine landscape (7), it is
determined not solely "by personal psychology" but also "by
social context" (Land xii). What Kolodny terms "regression"
here in fact seems shaped less by some universal desire to
escape from adulthood than by a fully contextual wish to
escape the rigors of an early capitalism, with its
competition and poverty, and into a fantasized and idealized
precapitalist Eden. But of course there could be no such
escape; Kolodny stresses that the dynamics of an
expansionist colonialism ensured that "the suppressed
infantile desires unleashed in the promise of a primal
garden were inevitably frustrated,"
thwarted by the equally pressing need to turn 
nature into wealth. In a capital-accumulating 
economy, this demanded, on the one hand, 
competition . . . and, on the other, a willingness 
to violate the very generosity that had once 
promised an end to such patterns.2
The specifically psychological component of Kolodny's 
model is worth elaborating in some detail. This could be 
done in several ways, but most useful to my purposes— not 
least because literary environmentalism comes to rely so 
much upon the gendered discourses of science— is the object- 
relations approach taken by Evelyn Fox Keller in her 
analysis of the scientific construction of nature. For the 
infant, Keller writes, "[b]oundaries have not yet been drawn 
to distinguish the child's internal from external
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environment" (81). At this early time, the external 
environment consists "primarily" of the mother, who is 
"experienced as an extension of the child" until, via the 
experiential stages outlined by Jean Piaget, the child 
"learns to distinguish between self and other, between 
subject and object." This ability to perceive self as 
separate from environment in turn "allows for the 
recognition of an external reality to which the child can 
relate— at first magically, and ultimately objectively." (I 
am using "environment" here as Keller uses it, to refer 
generally to the "not-me" of the developing subject, rather 
than to the more specific, operationally defined environment 
of environmentalist discourse.)
This process, "fraught with intense emotional
conflict," is often described teleologically as
"development," but in fact does not lead unambiguously from
an inferior state to a superior one, since
along with the emergence of the mother as a 
separate being comes the child's painful recog­
nition of his/her own separate existence. Anxiety 
is unleashed, and longing is born. . . . Out of 
the demarcation between self and mother arises a 
longing to undo that differentiation, an urge to 
reestablish the original unity. At the same time, 
there is also a growing enjoyment of autonomy, 
which itself comes to feel threatened by the lure 
of an earlier state. (81)
Maturity in this model is not achieved by attaining the 
highest possible level of autonomy, but by successfully 
negotiating the contradictory forces of autonomy and desire, 
by becoming "sufficiently secure to permit momentary 
relaxation of the boundary" between self and other (82).
This is the final but difficult step "of reintroducing
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ambiguity into one's relation to the world" (82-83).
This ambiguity, this "blurring of the boundary between
subject and object," inevitably "tend[s] to be associated
with the feminine" (87). Keller quotes Hans Loewald:
Against the threatening possibility of remaining 
in or sinking back into the structureless unity 
from which the ego emerged, stands the powerful 
paternal force. . . . While the primary
narcissistic identity with the mother forever 
constitutes the deepest unconscious origin and 
structural layer of ego and reality . . . this
primary identity is also the source of the deepest
dread, which promotes, in identification with the 
father, the ego's progressive differentiation and 
structuralization of reality. (86-87)
Thus in addition to the familiar gendering of the 
environment itself as feminine, this model predicts a 
gendering of the ways of relating to that environment. For 
the masculine subject especially, the already difficult step 
of "reintroducing ambiguity into one's relation to the 
world" is made more difficult to the extent that it requires 
a voluntary assumption of gender ambiguity in a society that 
compels gender clarity. As we will see more specifically in
my discussion of John James Audubon and James Fenimore
Cooper, relating to nature becomes a matter of gender 
politics.
In the early stages of development, the difficulty of 
moving from unity to autonomy is eased by an intermediary 
between self and other that the British psychoanalyst D. W. 
Winnicott terms the "transitional object." (Winnicott's 
example is the baby's blanket.) As a signifier, this 
transitional object is unmotivated, that is, it does not 
intrinsically signify the mother, but does so only because 
such a meaning has somehow been assigned to it, as a trope
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in the fluid signifying system of the maturing child.
Though the blanket itself is eventually given up, it is 
neither forgotten nor repressed, as Winnicott stresses, but 
rather "loses meaning" (5). It simply ceases to signify, as 
other objects displace it in a mediative system that changes 
but continues unabated, since the need for mediation never 
disappears. The "transitional phenomena," in this model, 
"become diffused . . . spread out over the whole 
intermediate territory between 'inner psychic reality' and 
'the external world as perceived by two persons in common,' 
that is to say, over the whole cultural field" (5).
At least part of the tremendous power of the "natural" 
environment to signify within the cultural field owes to its 
continuing ability, as trope rather than "real" object, to 
negotiate the tense boundary between interdependence and 
autonomy. That it will, as the "natural" portion of 
Winnicott's cultural field, be strongly gendered is almost 
inevitable, since (regardless of the specific shape it takes 
as signifier) its raison d'etre, its collective and earliest 
signified, remains the mother. This environment-as- 
transitional-object is not the "reality" of the world whose 
welfare is ostensibly environmentalism's concern, no more 
than the blanket is the mother. It is a construct serving 
not its own preservation but psychosociological need.
How can any of this help us read environment in a 
specific historical and textual instance? The theoretical 
discussion suggests that literary environmentalism will 
represent nominal environments via the effacement of 
performed environments, specifically, via the misnaming of
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penetration as environment. Such representations will 
collapse time and action into space and place, reducing the 
complexities and politics of the historical to the compara­
tive simplicity and apparent neutrality of the geographical. 
In the process, they will also mark off a feminized 
narrative space within which a masculinized subject can 
recognize, to repeat Haraway's formulation, "his action and 
subjectivity." Finally, as displaced object of desire, as 
that whose delimitation both produces the self and threatens 
to subsume it, this putatively agentive and feminine space 
will be ambiguously constructed, something toward which the 
subject is drawn yet also fears.
John Underhill's 1638 pamphlet Newes from America 
illustrates these processes so well that it is almost 
paradigmatic. As a description of both the Pequot War and 
the Connecticut landscape, it exemplifies the collapsing of 
an antecedent environment-as-action onto environment-as- 
noun, in the process revealing the origins of a gendered and 
racialized trope of landscape that will be accessed over and 
over again in American literary environmentalism.
Warre-like Proceedings and Speciall Places
We know today— indeed it was known in 1876, but was 
hushed up— that George Armstrong Custer and his men were not 
ambushed at the Little Bighorn. They were, however, quite 
literally and fatally environed, and I think Walt Whitman's 
use of the term in his "Death-Sonnet for Custer" is 
instructive, invoking as it does the older and explicitly 
military sense of environment even as it silences the 
activity of history into the passivity of landscape— into
the "wild ravines" and "lonesome stretches" that would 
eventually be canonized in the National Park system. The 
enduring fascination with Custer's "fatal environment," as 
Richard Slotkin has argued, owes not only to the way it 
rattled an apparently smug nation, but also to its apparent 
reification of the notion of a powerful Native American 
people whose renewed "aggression" could rationalize the 
continuing seizure of their lands. Though by far the best 
known, the Custer myth was not the first to accomplish this 
self-serving transformation of history into landscape-text. 
The pattern had been set more than two centuries earlier, in 
the Pequot War of 1637.
Originating in the desire of British colonists for 
Pequot territory in what is now Connecticut, this conflict's 
casus belli was a series of reciprocal kidnappings, murders, 
and skirmishes involving English and Dutch colonists as well 
as Pequot, Niantic, and Narragansett Indians— though it was 
specifically against the Pequots that the General Court of 
Massachusetts declared war. An expeditionary force was 
quickly drawn up, consisting of approximately a hundred 
Englishmen and a backup force of Mohegans and Narragansetts, 
led by John Mason and John Underhill. This expedition 
sailed out of Saybrook and cruised eastward along the coast 
toward the Pequots' fortified village on the Mystic River. 
Instead of attacking directly, the colonial force sailed 
right on by to the east, "deluding" the Pequot warriors in a 
way that "bred in them a securitie" (Underhill 36). The 
Puritan force then turned northward into Narragansett Bay, 
landed secretly, and marched south and west overland— in
order, as Mason wrote, to "come upon their Backs" (2) and 
storm the lightly guarded fort where the Pequot women, 
children, and other noncombatants had been sequestered. 
Completely fooled by these tactics, the Pequot guards were 
still asleep when the Englishmen attacked at dawn, Mason at 
one entrance of the fort and Underhill at the other. Waking 
amidst the slaughter, the Indians recovered quickly and 
began to drive the Puritans back. Mason and Underhill, at 
opposite entrances to the-village, then set fire to the 
wigwams and retreated outside, watching as the fires, "both 
meeting in the centre of the fort, blazed most terribly, and 
burnt all in the space of halfe an houre . . . many were 
burnt in the Fort, both men, women, and children" (Underhill 
39). The fort had held at least four hundred people, and 
Underhill noted that "so many soules lie gasping on the 
ground so thicke in some places, that you could hardly passe 
along" (39-40). Those who did manage to escape the fire 
were picked off by the soldiers outside, and by Underhill's 
estimate, not more than five got out alive. All but broken 
after this massacre, the remaining Connecticut Pequots were 
quickly dispersed, captured, or killed, and English 
colonists immediately began occupying their newly conquered 
territory.3
For a "civilized" author writing for a "civilized" 
audience, the chronicling of such "savage" events posed an 
obvious problem. As Underhill summed it up: "It may bee 
demanded, Why should you be so furious? (as some have said) 
should not Christians have more mercy and compassion?" (40). 
Both Mason and Underhill, in their separate accounts of the
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war, respond with a similar rhetorical strategy, a
displacement of agency and responsibility that was crude but
well calculated to satisfy a Puritan audience: "God was
above them," wrote Mason of the Pequots, "making them as a
fiery Oven . . . Thus did the Lord judge among the Heathen,
filling the Place with dead Bodies!" (9-10). The massacre
was not the Puritans' own work, but "the LORD'S DOINGS"
(14). Both authors repeatedly cast themselves and their men
as passive, mere "feeble instruments" in the hands of God,
contrasting their own passivity against the fictional agency
of the victims, whose putative actions are deemed to justify
both the magnitude and the indiscriminacy of the slaughter:
[W]hen a people is growne to such a height of 
bloude, and sinne against God and man, and all 
confederates in the action, there hee hath no 
respect to persons, but harrowes them, and sawes 
them, and puts them to the sword, and the most 
terriblest death that may bee: sometimes the 
Scripture declareth women and children must perish 
with their parents. (Underhill 40)
The rhetoric here displaces agency onto an undifferentiated 
Other ("all confederates in the action"), shifting 
responsibility for the action onto God and mystifying any 
worldly motives for the massacre. The discourse bonds 
action with thing in an obfuscating manner that will prove 
characteristic of later literary environmentalism. The 
Puritans, writes Mason, "got not the Land in Possession by 
their own Sword," but rather because the "LORD was pleased 
to smite our Enemies . . . and to give us their Land for
an Inheritance" (front.; 21). Underhill makes the same 
linkage, promising the reader in the very first sentence of 
his own account that he will "performe these two things,
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first give a true narration, of the warre-like proceedings 
that hath been in New England these two years past," and 
second "discover to the Reader divers places in New England, 
that would afford speciall accommodations to such persons as 
will Plant upon them." He immediately reiterates: in the 
"Relation of our warre-like proceedings" he will "interweave 
the speciall places fit for New Plantations. with their 
description" (1). He will entangle "proceedings" and 
"places," action and noun, the two facets whose interweaving 
it was our purpose, in the etymological discussion above, to 
disentangle. With events and their narration thus beginning 
to be subsumed into place and its description, Underhill 
writes precisely of "the scenic Connecticut countryside" 
(Nelson 12)— of the "scene" of history and aesthetic 
attraction both, of "scenery" in the dual sense that still 
reverberates confusedly in the discourse of environment.
The Dangers that Hedge It About
Underhill's text is particularly instructive in the way 
it conflates event and place in an explicitly feminized 
landscape that visibly encodes its narrative and 
psychological groundings. This is most evident in the map 
(figure 6) included in Newes from America, immediately after 
the title page, as a sort of preface to the verbal text 
following it. This figure's sexual symbolism has been ably 
analyzed by Anne Kibbey, who first noted both that the 
"illustration of the Puritan men attacking the Pequot fort 
is also a drawing of a vagina" and that the massacre itself 
"was the culminating fusion of sexuality and violence," 
closely linked to the concurrent persecution of Anne
Fig. 6. "A culminating fusion of sexuality and violence." 
From John Underhill, Newes from America (London: Peter Cole, 
1638): frontispiece.
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Hutchinson (110). What remains to be discussed is the way 
the figure's houses and palisades have been drawn to 
resemble teeth, which is to say, the use the figure makes of 
the motif of the vagina dentata.
Found in one form or another in the mythology of many 
c u l t u r e s ,4 this image, with its recasting of penetration as 
an aggressive incorporation, its projection of male sexual 
violence onto a castrating female sexual "appetite," bears 
psychological and cultural overtones significant to our 
understanding of gender, violence, and the American 
environment. Kibbey argues that Underhill's drawing 
signifies in a fashion that is "subverbal" and "dissociated 
from language" (110), expressing not only its manifest 
content but also the very degree of its repression, the 
degree to which it is verbally inexpressible. I suggest 
here that the content itself, the particular metanarrative 
inscribed by the drawing upon the paradigmatic environment 
of Mystic, is a version of the myth of the culture-hero 
known as Toothbreaker. One version of this story describes 
how ”[t]he first men in the world were unable to have sexual 
relationship^] with their wives until the culture hero 
broke the teeth of the women's vaginas."5 Whether it is the 
persecuted Anne Hutchinson or the pictorially feminized 
Pequot Indians, violence and misogyny— the woman palizado, 
or beaten, as Underhill labels her on the map— is claimed as 
a prerequisite to the establishment of the Puritan faith in 
the New World. His mission at Mystic being to secure the 
conditions for a new establishment of Puritan culture, 
Underhill casts himself as Toothbreaker: "Hear Entters
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Captayne Underhill," the sexual pun being not just about 
penetration but what is perceived as the foundational act of 
begetting culture upon nature, an act performed in faithful 
Aristotelian style by the self-defining masculine subject 
upon a feminine environment.
Parallelling this narrative model of the vagina dentata 
motif is a psychological model, outlined by the psycho­
analyst and critic Marie Bonaparte in her reading of Edgar 
Allan Poe's novel, Berenice. Bonaparte, "elaborating a 
remark by Freud" in light of Poe's peculiar anxieties, 
stresses
the equation of mouth and vagina and considers the 
notion of the vagina dentata and its accompanying 
threat as 'a factor with roots deep in infantile 
experience.' At first it was the infant who 
displayed aggressive, i.e., occasionally biting 
behavior towards his [sic] mother's breast. Later 
it is the adult who, due to a sense of guilt 
stemming from his infantile behavior, feels 
threatened by a mother who intends to castrate 
him. (Malotki 206)
Vagina dentata imagery is thus "interpreted as a projection 
of the unconscious anxiety of castration and is associated 
with male impotence" (206). Bonaparte characterizes Poe’s 
sexuality as an irreducible complex of love and hate, "both 
sadistic destruction and necrophilia" (218), as a splitting 
between action and object, violence toward and yearning for 
the same thing, destruction and nostalgia— certainly 
familiar pairings in both environmentalist and colonialist 
discourse.
Whether in the "subverbal" language of Underhill's map 
or the displaced anxieties of Poe's character Egaeus, "the 
danger of sexuality, the punishment that threatens all who
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yield," finds expression in an obsession with teeth,
specifically in
the notion of the female vagina being furnished 
with teeth, and thus a source of danger in being 
able to bite and castrate. . . . when Egaeus 
yields to the morbid impulse to draw Berenice's 
teeth, he yields both to the yearning for the 
mother's organ and to be revenged upon it, since 
the dangers that hedge it about make him sexually 
avoid all women as too menacing. His act is 
therefore a sort of retributive castration 
inflicted on the mother whom he loves, and yet 
hates. (Bonaparte 218)
This oedipality finds its echo in the feminized landscape 
whose penetration and occupation are keenly desired but 
threatened by, in Bonaparte's words, "the dangers that hedge 
it about." The writer of the colonialist environment must 
work to maintain this love and this hatred in some 
psychologically tenable relation, whether crudely, as in 
Underhill's tale of "warre-like proceedings" and "speciall 
places," or with the greater sophistication of later 
environmental narratives.
This Wilderness Condition: Mary Rowlandson's Narrative 
Immediately after setting foot on the soil of "New 
England," William Bradford described that contested 
territory as "a hidious and desolate wildernes," drawing in 
his account upon the biblical narrative of the Forty Years' 
Wandering and the conquest of Canaan, invoking one invasion 
to authorize another. Spinning out this conceit in his 
History of Plymouth Plantation. Bradford laments that his 
own people could not "as it were, goe up to the tope of 
Pisgah, to vew from this willdernes a more goodly cuntrie." 
Not only was there no such mountain near Plymouth, there was 
no such "goodly cuntrie" to see from it. There was nothing,
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Bradford makes clear, but wilderness. More accurately, that 
"nothing" was the wilderness, for the term as he is using it 
refers not to any palpable reality, but quite pointedly to 
an absence, to absence itself. This wilderness is 
perfunctorily described as full of "wild beasts and willd 
men," but when Bradford's description shifts from such stock 
generalities to the concrete and specific, it necessarily 
reverts to the negative: "they had now no freinds to 
Wellcome them, nor inns to entertaine or refresh their 
weatherbeaten bodys, no houses or much less townes to repair 
too" (96). It is the same emptiness that John Eliot would 
describe as the "wilderness where nothing appeareth but hard 
labor and wants" (qtd. in Nash 26), a place devoid of 
materiality and signification, where nothing appeareth and 
whose only positivity is its provocation of human action: 
"labor" engendered by "wants," the latter term being 
readable as absence and as wish, as the machinery of desire.
This is precisely the wilderness of that earliest of
American frontier classics, Mary Rowlandson's 1682 captivity
narrative The Soveraiantv and Goodness of God. It is a
wilderness posited almost exclusively by circumlocution, in
the unmistakeable language of lack:
[M]y thoughts ran upon my losses and sad bereaved 
condition. All was gone, my husband gone . . .  my 
children gone, my relations and friends gone, our 
house and home and all our comforts within doors, 
and without, all was gone (except my life) and I 
knew not but the next moment that might go too. 
(326)
We had husband and father, and children, and 
sisters, and friends, and relations, and house, 
and home, and many comforts of this life: but now 
we may say, as Job, "Naked I came out of mv 
mother's womb, and naked shall I return." (336)
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The wilderness is where Rowlandson has "no Christian friend 
near" (327), where she loses her child— which loss, rather 
than any positive characteristic of her physical 
surroundings, renders her in "this wilderness condition" 
(329). It is never the sort of landscape that subsequent 
travelers might recognize by her descriptions of it; it is 
precisely "the wilderness where there was nothing to be 
seen" (359).
The terror of this defining blankness can be more fully 
appreciated in terms of the Puritan habit of grounding both 
personal experience and social order in a pervasive 
textuality, in the belief that there was nothing, as 
Adrienne Rich put it, "so trivial that it could not speak a 
divine message." The high stakes and uncertainty of 
salvation made the Puritans eager and anxious readers of 
their surroundings, a people for whom even the "piecemeal 
thoughts of a woman stirring her pot" were "clues to her 
'justification' in Christ" (x). Such readerly introspection 
played a key role in Puritan ideology and governance, even 
during the best of times, and in the aftermath of a 
tremendous public trauma such as King Philip's Wax it was 
partly through acts of revision, a reassignment of meanings 
in this saturating social text, that "Puritanism could once 
again govern, by virtue of explanatory cogency, the entire 
range of human experience" (Breitweiser 8).
There was nothing in the Puritan universe that did not, 
or at least could not, signify. But by virtue of what 
interpretive code? Like any reader confronted with a 
seemingly unreadable text, Rowlandson's mission in the
75
•wilderness becomes a hermeneutic one, that of creating and 
justifying an interpretive stance and practice. Rich quotes 
Anne Bradstreet on the importance and difficulty of such a 
mission:
[A]dmit this be the true God whom we worship, and 
that be his word, yet why may not the Popish 
religion be the right? They have the same God, 
the same Christ, the same word: they only 
interpret it one way, we another." (xi)
For the seventeenth-century Puritan, the difficulty here is 
not just individual and idiosyncratic, but communal and 
doctrinal. It is not merely the justification of the 
individual in Christ that was at stake, that demanded 
closure; the justification of the "wilderness errand" itself 
demanded not polysemy but a particular and authoritative 
interpretation, for "if Archbishop Laud and the Hierarchists 
back in England were right," as Rich put it, "what was one 
doing, after all, on that stretch of intemperate coast?"
(xi).
What, indeed, was one doing there? For the captive 
Mary Rowlandson, frightened, hungry, freezing, and bereaved, 
that question would have taken on an even greater urgency, 
and she would by habit have attempted to read her surround­
ings, her wilderness environment, in search of an answer.
As she herself put it, her "earnest and unfeigned desire" 
was for a "token" or "sign" (329-330)— but that was 
precisely what the wilderness could not, by definition, 
provide.
It was when confronted with this sort of "vast 
blankness," writes Nash of the New England coast's earliest 
white settlers, that "couraged failed and imagination
multiplied fears" (26). And it is indeed the imagination 
that populates the otherwise empty Puritan wilderness, that 
makes it teem, if not with tangible rivers and mountains and 
trees, at least with the innumerable "troubles" and "diffi­
culties" and "afflictions" (Rowlandson 2) that make it as 
allegorical as the landscapes of Pilgrim's Progress or the 
Inferno— in Rowlandson's words, a "lively resemblance of 
Hell" (326), the "valley of the shadow of death" (363), a 
"horrible pit" (364)— an inscription of the "real" landscape 
of New England into an imported cultural landscape. More 
particularly, Rowlandson's narrative can be read (as I read 
that of John Underhill) as an inscription of the 
psychosexual dynamics of environment as manifested at a 
particular historical moment, in this case King Philip's War.
Rowlandson's task differed somewhat from that faced by 
Underhill in chronicling the events at Mystic. Where the 
Pequot War was naked white aggression, the events of 1675-76 
constituted a genuine and substantial native resistance— the 
most effective of the entire colonial period. Philip's 
Wampanoags, the Narragansetts, and other allied tribes 
attacked some ninety settlements, completely destroying 
twelve of them and killing several thousand colonists. In 
proportion to the white population of the time, it was the 
worst war in Anglo-American history, claiming the lives of 
one in sixteen colonial combatants and severely disrupting 
commerce and trade. To many back in England it called into 
question the viability of the colonial endeavor itself.6
The defeat of the Indians in 1676 helped allay such 
doubts. But the psychological specter of environment, which
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this war may be said to have embodied, would continue to
haunt representations of the event. Where John Underhill
had employed the trope of the toothed vagina to project
white penetration and aggression onto a feminized and
potentially castrating Indian environment, cartographically
figured as vagina dentata, Puritan accounts of King Philip's
War tended to signify the native threat via an even more
active and specific imagery, quite freely characterizing the
conflict in terms of an improper and unrestrained female
sexuality that threatened masculine power, as in this
description of how King Philip cemented his "conspiracy":
[H]is first Errand is to a Squaw Sachem (i.e. a 
Woman Prince, or Queen) who is the Widow of a 
Brother to King Philip, deceased, he promising her 
great rewards if she would joyn with him in this 
Conspiracy, (for she is as Potent a Prince as any 
round about her, and hath as much Corn, Land, and 
Men, at her Command) she willingly consented, and 
was much more forward in the Design, and had 
greater Success than King Philip himself. (Present 
State [1])
This Indian queen— named only by the "unnatural" conjunction 
of her sex and her power ("Squaw Sachem," "Woman Prince")—  
at once genders and demonizes the resisting native. It is 
utterly "vain," as we read elsewhere, "to expect any thing 
but the most barbarous usages from such a people amongst 
whom the most milde and gentle sex delight in cruelties, and 
have utterly abandoned at once the two proper Virtues of 
Womankinde, Pity and Modesty." The castration anxiety 
underlying this construct is at times explicit. What 
Underhill's map had merely implied is in this account 
performed:
[T]wo men coming from Malbury to Sudbury, were set 
upon in the Woods by a Great Number of Indian 
Women. armed with clubs, pieces of Swords, and the
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like, who by their numbers having over-mastered 
the two poor Travellers, that had nothing but 
small sticks to defend themselves with, beat out 
their brains, and cut off their privy members, 
which they carried away with them in triumph. (New 
and Further 4)
Thus does the motif of the vagina dentata reappear in
the guise of penis captivus. I wish now to read The
Soveraiantv and Goodness of God in terms of the loss and
retrieval of the phallus— of what would have been deemed Mr.
Rowlandson's, of Mrs. Rowlandson as she had functioned for
her husband in Lancaster society. He had been the parish's
first minister, while she was the daughter of the village's
wealthiest resident and largest landholder. She thus
"completes" him not only sexually but socially and
economically, and what is held captive is, among other
things, the status and economic power that he had gained
through her. Cotton Mather described the situation thus:
Mr. Rowlandson (the faithful Pastor of the Church 
there) had his House, Goods, Books, all burned; 
his Wife and all his Children led away Captive 
before the Enemy. Himself (as God would have it) 
was not at home, whence his own person was 
delivered, which otherwise (without a Miracle) 
would have been endangered, (qtd. in Howe 92)
Mary Rowlandson's captivity here becomes just one loss, 
among others, suffered by her husband. This loss in turn 
stands in for that unnamed loss which would have presumably 
been inflicted upon his own person, with the bodily imagery 
of an endangered "person" subtly but continually figuring 
captivity of the wife as potential castration of the 
husband.
Predictably, then, the captive narrator functions to 
"shelter the masculine covenant" (Howe 97). This function
becomes clearer after the Third Remove, when Rowlandson 
comes into possession of a plundered bible. This is a 
crucial turning point in the story, and I would suggest that 
part of the suspense now centers on the return of not just 
Rowlandson but of the bible itself. It becomes a narrative 
of the captivity of the sacred word, and it is this primal 
word, injected where previously there was none, that begins 
the transformation of what had been "an unmarked 
Christianography" (99) into the sort of legible wilderness 
we will find in The Last of the Mohicans. In this view, 
Rowlandson functions not as independent writing subject but 
as bearer of the phallus, a writer by proxy, shepherding the 
logos through an as-yet uncoded space.
Rowlandson begins her sojourn in a wilderness like that 
described by Bradford, a wilderness that is no positive 
landscape at all but a condition, the mere site of her 
bewilderment. It is a place where she literally does not 
know how to respond or what to do, even with her most basic 
emotions: "Although I had met with so much affliction, and 
my heart was many times ready to break, yet could I not shed 
one tear in their sight: but rather had been all this while 
in a maze, and like one astonished" (336). Trapped where 
there are no signs, Rowlandson longs for one. Her "earnest 
and unfeigned desire" is for nothing more than a "token," a 
"sign" (329-330). But how can the wilderness be made to 
signify? It is the bible that now, like the jar in 
Tennessee, begins to systematize and encode the space around 
it. Once Rowlandson is able to advert to this text, she can 
alleviate her bewilderment. Her account up to this point
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has offered absolutely no description of the landscape as a
presence, but that landscape now becomes, in lockstep with a
mediating and authorizing scriptural gloss, the object of a
recognizeable description:
[QJuickly we came to wade over the river, and 
passed some tiresome and wearisome hills. One 
hill was so steep that I was fain to creep up upon 
my knees, and to hold by the twiggs and bushes to 
keep myself from falling backward. My head also 
was so light that I usually reeled as I went, but 
I hope all these wearisome steps that I have taken 
are but a forewarning to me of heavenly rest. "I 
know, O Lord, that thy judgements are right, and 
that Thou in faithfulness hast afflicted me,"
Psalm 119:75. (340)
For virtually every description of this nascent geography,
Rowlandson evokes a biblical landscape to match. To read
and describe the landscape, she must simultaneously read her
Bible, in which the real landscape is to be found— the real
landscape of which the merely physical landscape through
which she travels is but a type, a comparatively
inconsequential manifestation:
We began this remove with wading over Baquag 
river: the water was up to the knees, and the 
stream very swift, and so cold that I thought it 
would have cut me in sunder. . . . [B]ut in my 
distress the Lord gave me experience of the truth, 
and goodness of that promise, Iaiah 43:2. When 
thou passest through the waters, I will be with 
thee, and through the rivers, they shall not 
overflow thee. (348)
At last, after many weary steps, I saw Wachusett 
hills, but many miles off. Then we came to a 
great swamp, through which we travelled, up to the 
knees, in mud and water. . . .  I thought I should 
have sunk down at last, and never gat out; but I 
may say, as in Psalm 94:18, When mv foot slipped, 
thv mercy. 0 Lord, held me up. (350-351)
Here, perhaps, is the beginning of an environmental
interpretation, of the enlistment of the physical landscape
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in a legitimating master narrative— the initial writing of a
landscape that the Euro-American would be able to read in
order to justify her presence within that landscape. And
while from a modern standpoint it may seem difficult to view
The Soveraiantv and Goodness of God as "nature writing” or
"environmental literature," it is nonetheless important to
our understanding of those genres because it so clearly
thematizes the gendered and historically responsive
practices that this study terms literary environmentalism.
The Wilderness Where There Was Nothing to Be Seen
Mary Rowlandson saw what she did not see said 
what she did not say.
—  Susan Howe (128)
Rowlandson's early characterization of wilderness-as- 
absence sounds like nothing so much as the Western discourse 
of "Woman," that fictional sex which, as Luce Irigaray put 
it, "is not one," which "has nothing to show" and whose 
"sexual organ represents the horror of nothing to see"
(352). Wilderness and Woman are both predicated on their 
own negation, on a refusal to "see" them as anything but 
what they are not. In the first instance this is 
accomplished by means of a profoundly anti-ecological vision 
of a disorderly nature and an ethnocentric dismissal of 
native culture qua culture, in the second via androcentric 
hierarchies in which "[f]emale sexuality has always been 
conceptualized on the basis of masculine parameters" (350). 
Also negated in each case is an entire realm of speech and 
writing. Rowlandson repeatedly posits wilderness as the 
site of a sort of un-speech, an unintelligible "din," the 
"noise and hooping" (330) of a feminized native Other.
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Shifting and confusing, as unreadable as the wilderness in 
which it is found and of which it is, really, just another 
"bewildering" component, this is the speech of those who are 
"unstable" and "mad" (352), the complete antithesis of a 
trustworthy speech: "there is not one of them that makes the 
least conscience of speaking the truth" (342), "[s]o like 
were these barbarous creatures to him who was a liar from 
the beginning" (344).
Thus figured as predating the Fall and the onset of the 
Law— "a liar from the beginning"— this is a surviving (hence 
also a resisting) speech, one that has not yet, if I may 
make explicit now the analogy I have been drawing with 
ecriture feminine by citing the words of Helene Cixous, been 
"called in by the cops of the signifier." Rowlandson's 
typologizing wilderness discourse functions to bring this 
wild din "into the line of order," assigning each of its 
elements "to a precise place in the chain that's always 
formed for a privileged signifier," piecing it "to the 
string which leads back, if not to the Name-of-the-Father" 
then, in a "twist" that would seem to apply to the activity 
of the bible-toting female captive, "to the place of the 
phal1ic-mother" (347).
In thus encoding what had previously been defined as 
uncoded and indescribeable, Rowlandson is not so much 
objectively describing the wilderness as she is beginning to 
replace it with something else, with a new discursive 
formation that will be called (and still is called) by the 
same name, but whose effects will prove entirely different.
As a crucial term in the dialectic of civilization and
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savagery, wilderness is to be subjected to what Cixous terms 
the "phallologocentric sublation" (341), canceled but also 
preserved and elevated within a larger synthesis.
Wilderness as the disorienting, chaotic, and inexplicable is 
to be sublated into a reified hueristic, an unabashedly 
explanatory construct.7
In this new discourse, wilderness becomes less and less 
Other and more and more "at one with the phallocentric 
tradition" (Cixous 337). It is in this sense no longer 
"wilderness" at all, and the ease with which it can continue 
to pass under the same name may owe in part to the 
deployment of the phallic mother to reinscribe it— just 
another instance, perhaps, of the phallocracy deploying 
women "to mobilize their immense strength against 
themselves," to be the "executants" of men's "virile needs" 
(336). Rowlandson is enlisted as the mystifying agent of a 
new literary environmentalism, as the nominal agent through 
which patriarchy apostrophizes the wilderness with a version 
of Cixous's facetious admonition: "Hold still, we're going 
to do your portrait, so that you can begin looking like it 
right away" (347).
If this emerging literary-environmentalist discourse is 
in this way sublative, writing and elevating wilderness only 
by simultaneously negating and misnaming it, how can it be 
thought of as the discursive vehicle for a future wilderness 
preservation? What kind of preservation is it that is thus 
predicated on a cancellation? Environmentalism would indeed 
later preserve landscapes physically more or less unaltered, 
but only by means of an incessant and increasingly
84
institutionalized teaching and stabilizing of what those 
landscapes mean, a radical alteration of the destabilizing 
character that would once have defined those lands as 
wilderness.
Is there, perhaps, an alternative to this preservation 
that is simultaneously an erasure, a possibility for a 
preservation that would mean more than simply keeping an 
expanse of land untrammeled, a praxis that would include 
such preservation but also exceed it, challenging rather 
than reinforcing the codes that negate the earlier notion of 
the "wild"? Taking my cue from Cixous ’ s reference to the 
unconscious as "that other limitless country," "the place 
where the repressed manage to stay alive" (337), I suggest 
that such a praxis would take seriously the old idea of 
wilderness as both a geographical place and a psychic and 
cultural condition while refusing the earlier characterizing 
of wilderness as lack. It would be analagous to an ecriture 
feminine. a writing that "un-thinks" the negating 
phallogocentric order (339), that breaks the codes which 
otherwise reign in the wild and make it speak for something 
else. It would preserve wilderness as difference rather 
than alienating it from its own wildness and fashioning it 
into a mystified outlier of civilization. Reconstructed in 
a discourse that is, in Irigaray's words, "somewhat mad from 
the standpoint of reason" and "inaudible for whoever listens 
. . . with ready-made grids, with a fully elaborated code in 
hand" (353), this wilderness would be as foreign to a modern 
environmentalist as today's "environment" or "global 
ecology" might have been to a seventeenth-century Puritan.
In the particular case of Mary Rowlandson, this other 
wilderness writing would be the expression of a thoroughly 
disoriented body rather than a putatively satisfied soul, a 
writing from a wilderness experienced as difference. For 
Rowlandson, certainly, the conditions for such a writing 
were in place, with the tremendous emotional disruption of 
her losses and captivity recalling what Cixous speaks of as 
the moment when a feminine writing becomes possible, "that 
radical mutation of things brought on by a material upheaval 
when every structure is for a moment thrown off balance and 
an ephemeral wildness sweeps order away" (337).
Rowlandson's experience must have palpably outstripped 
the language in which she was constrained to relate it, and 
Mitchell Breitwieser has remarked on the ubiquitous and 
irreducible excess in her narrative, about how, in "a kind 
of ideological misfire," thoughts "come forward that do not 
reduce entirely to exemplary status" (8). Instead, 
Rowlandson repeatedly encounters "intensities of memory that 
resist rather than aid exemplary reduction," and such 
"intrusive dissonances" contribute to a "ruination of 
meaning that allows various anomalous glimpses" of 
"interdicted subjective presences otherwise almost 
completely absent from the seventeenth-century New England 
archive" (9). Refusing or unable to ignore completely what 
"experience did to comprehension" (12), her text "breaks 
through or outdistances her own and her culture's dominant 
means of representation" (10) to become "a transcription of 
reality's astonishing and at least discursively hurtful 
impact on systems of coherent representation" (11).
This excess is foregrounded in the Narrative at least 
partly because of the conjunction of particular cultural and 
historical imperatives. There was, for example, the 
political necessity, always present but heightened following 
King Philip's War, of reassuring those who doubted the 
wisdom of the colonial enterprise. Counterposed to this was 
the theological necessity of producing and maintaining that 
state of acute anxiety over salvation so central to New 
England Puritanism. The first of these demanded a certain 
closure in the interpretation of the local history and 
geography, while the second thrived in a textual atmosphere 
of polysemy and deferral in which one could read those 
places and events incessantly, but could never be sure of 
their meaning, any more than one could be sure of one's own 
election. It is in general difficult enough for texts to 
smooth over what Lukacs has called the "discrepancy between 
intention and performance" (qtd. in Breitwieser 13); in 
Rowlandson's Narrative, the intentions themselves operate at 
cross-purposes. The text repeatedly arrives at impasses 
created by the dichotomies that structure it, oppositions 
between anxiety and reassurance, deferral and closure, the 
personal and the political, the individual and the communal, 
alienation and integration, experience and ideology, and 
(Breitwieser's particular topic) grieving and exemplifi­
cation.
Thus as Rowlandson tries to fit her experience into the 
dominant discourse she finds that discourse's language, with 
its typological conventions, to be woefully inadequate. She 
encounters irreducible dichotomies that repeatedly drive her
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narrative into a mode of de-pense, of un-thinking a
totalizing and communalizing framework of representation
unable to do justice to her specific experience and her
personal, psychological need. The result is a double edge
that is at times haunting:
I can remember the time, when I used to sleep 
quietly without workings in my thoughts, whole 
nights together, but now it is other ways with me. 
When all are fast about me, and no eye open, but 
His who ever waketh, my thoughts are upon things 
past . . .  I remember in the night season, how 
the other day I was in the midst of thousands of 
enemies, and nothing but death before me: it is 
then hard work to persuade myself, that ever I 
should be satisfied with bread again. But now we 
are fed with the finest of the wheat, and, as I 
may say, with honey out of the rock: instead of 
the husk, we have the fatted calf: the thoughts of 
these things in the particulars of them, and of 
the love and goodness of God towards us, make it 
true of me, what David said of himself, Psalms 
6.6. I watered my couch with mv tears. Oh! the 
wonderful power of God that mine eyes have seen, 
affording matter enough for my thoughts to run in, 
that when others are sleeping mine are weeping. 
(365)
Audible in this passage are the resistances and refusals 
that keep open the possibility of a "wildness" which her 
narrative functions more generally to foreclose. It 
foregrounds, first of all, Rowlandson's continuing 
alienation rather than her integration into the communal: 
while the others are sleeping, she is weeping. Mentioning 
"God's goodness to us" but stressing what is "true of me." 
it relativizes even as it universalizes, refusing, finally, 
to subserve personal experience to political exemplification.
In a mode that is decidedly "un-thinking," Rowlandson 
posits in this passage a temporal frame that juxtaposes the 
elements of experience and exemplification, yoking them
together in ways that highlight their irreducibility. She 
does not assign her bewilderment and pain to some distant 
past, which would allow her to deploy the immediate present 
as a separate and more mature site of reassurance and 
comfort. Instead she replaces that logical temporality with 
an asynchrony in which a season is compressed into a night 
and the events of years past can be said to have occurred 
just "the other day." This living past does not prefigure 
the present but rather actively contests it; thus Rowlandson 
insists that "it is," not "was," "hard work" to wring any 
assurances out of her experience.
Because it sustains the sort of anxiety that fueled 
Puritan zeal, this acuteness of memory can be viewed as 
having a certain theological efficacy. But it also alienates 
Rowlandson from her peers and disrupts any communal agreement 
on the meaning of her experiences. This aspect of the text, 
this disruption of the drive toward closure and stabilization, 
is foregrounded and epitomized where one might least expect 
it to be— in the psalm quoted in the passage above. This 
biblical allusion might appear to be an appeal of the same 
sort that putatively grounds Rowlandson's descriptions of 
the New England wilderness, a finalizing referral to 
biblical authority. But the psalm itself expresses not so 
much David's suffering, and the meaning of that suffering, 
as it does his bewilderment. his inability to understand his 
suffering and make it exemplify. Not merely his "bones," as 
he puts it, but also his "soul" is "sore vexed" (KJV Psalms 
6:2-3). It is not his physical suffering but precisely this 
vexation of the soul from which he asks deliverance, and no
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such resolution in sight: "[B]ut thou, 0 Lord, how long?" 
(6:3). The psalm's subject is not suffering but deferral, 
and it is no accident that, while David insists "[t]he Lord 
hath heard my supplication" and "will receive my prayer" 
(6:9), he nowhere gives the least indication that God has 
answered or even will answer that prayer. It is significant 
that at such a moment of personal crisis Rowlandson refers 
her readers to a psalm whose subjects are precisely 
bewilderment and the longing for and deferral of closure.
At certain key points, Rowlandson's Narrative refuses
even the stark dichotomy of presence and absence in terms of
which the wilderness at first had been constructed.
Commenting on "the extreme vanity of this world," she notes
how "one hour I have been in health, and wealth, wanting
nothing: but the next hour in sickness and wounds, and
death, having nothing but sorrow and affliction" (365, my
emphases). She juxtaposes the most apparently inassimilable
opposites: one hour it is presence, the next it is absence
that structures her existence. But the two terms do not
remain wholly distinct, and Rowlandson underscores their
interpenetration, characterizing "presence," the putatively
positive and self-sufficient term, by means of a double
negative, "wanting nothing"— lacking lack, as it were, but
also, as she soon makes clear, desiring lack. Reciprocally,
the negative term is formulated as a sort of positive, as a
having of nothing. Rowlandson moves immediately to exploit
the ambiguity of "wanting" as both lack and desire:
Before I knew what affliction meant, I was ready 
sometimes to wish for it. When I lived in pros­
perity . . . and yet seeing many, whom I preferred 
before myself, under many trials and afflictions, 
in sickness, weakness, poverty, losses, crosses,
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and cares of this world, I should be sometimes 
jealous lest I should not have my portion in this 
life. . . . But now I see the Lord had his time 
to scourge and chasten me. The portion of some is 
to have their afflictions by drops, now one drop 
and then another; but the dregs of the cup, the 
wine of astonishment, like a sweeping rain that 
leaveth no food, did the Lord prepare to be my 
portion. Affliction I wanted, and affliction I 
had, full measure (I thought) pressed down and 
running over. (365-366)
In a mixing of categories that leaves all ultimately
confused, absence becomes a "sweeping" plenitude, a "full
measure" "running over," and so on. Such paradoxes create
an impasse that the text highlights but refuses to resolve.
At the end of the narrative, where we might expect an
attempt at closure, we find instead this reopening, this
preference for the disorienting "wine of astonishment" over
the sobering milk of exemplification. Rowlandson preserves
her experience of wilderness in a de-pense. a refusal of the
writing by which that wilderness is more generally sublated,
and faintly audible in this refusal is the language with
which the wilderness might have been written.
Wildness and Wilderness
[W]hat a splendid contemplation . . .  a magnifi­
cent park, where the world could see for ages to 
come, the native Indian in his classic attire, 
galloping his wild horse, with sinewy bow, and 
shield and lance, amid the fleeting herds of elks 
and buffaloes. What a beautiful and thrilling 
specimen for America to preserve and hold up to 
the view of her refined citizens and the world, in 
future ages! A nation's Park. containing man and 
beast, in all the wild and freshness of their 
nature1s beauty!
— George Catlin (261-262)
"Wilderness," writes Roderick Nash, is a term "heavily
freighted with meaning of a personal, symbolic, and changing
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kind." It is not an easy term to define, however, even on 
the most practical level, where "land managers and poli­
ticians have struggled without marked success to formulate a 
workable definition."8 As with environment, wilderness 
cannot be defined down simply by enumerating its components; 
instead "the number of attributes of wild country" seems to 
be "almost as great as the number of observers." This 
relativity and subjectivity, which preclude any "universally 
acceptable definition," stem from the fact that
while the word is a noun it acts like an adjec­
tive. There is no specific material object that 
is wilderness. The term designates a quality (as 
the "-ness" suggests) that produces a certain mood 
or feeling in an individual and, as a consequence, 
may be assigned by that person to a specific 
place. (Nash 1)
Just as an environment points to an action of environing, 
and ultimately to a speaker whose environment is a misnaming 
of a penetration, so too does wilderness point to both 
action and speaker. It is said to produce a certain mood or 
feeling, but this action of "bewildering" cannot reasonably 
be said to originate with the landscape, to constitute part 
of its ontology; instead it reflects a mood of the speaker—  
initially induced by an inability to read the landscape—  
that is projected back onto the environment. Wilderness is 
a misnaming of an anxiety as a geography.
For the Puritans, as we have seen, the mood that 
traditionally characterized wilderness was one of 
uncertainty and lack. To be bewildered was to find oneself 
without the means to choose between a confusing array of 
"conflicting situations, objects, or statements" and the 
danger of bewilderment is the possibility that, lacking
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proper guidance, one might stray (OE wilder  ̂ from the proper 
path. (In addition to Rowlandson, one thinks here of 
Hawthorne's "Young Goodman Brown.") "[Cjonceived as a 
region where a person was likely to get into a disordered, 
confused, or 'wild' condition," writes Nash, the key image 
was "that of a man in an alien environment where the 
civilization that normally orders and controls his life is 
absent" (2). This early conception thus relates wilderness 
to power, for its defining absence is precisely the absence 
of that pervasive complex of signs and institutions which 
order and control and establish norms— power more or less as 
it came to be understood since Foucault.
People native to and living in the wilderness, to the 
extent that they were perceived as disordered and 
uncontrolled, were themselves considered wild, and to the 
extent that they threatened to disorder the lives of the 
"civilized" Europeans with whom they came in contact, they 
were functionally equivalent to the wilderness and readily 
conflatable with it. The close conceptual link between 
"wild" landscapes and "wild" people, that is, was not one of 
simple equivalence— -the Puritan did not think of Indians 
simply as wild animals— but rather stemmed from their 
functional alignment in the Euro-American dialectic of 
wilderness and civilization. It should not be surprising, 
then, to find scholars ascribing parallel roles to both 
Native Americans and to wilderness. In The Savages of 
America, for example, Roy Harvey Pearce examines "what it 
meant for civilized men to believe that in the savage . . . 
there was manifest all that they had long grown away from"
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(ix). In America, he concludes, such men "could survive
only if they believed in themselves," and up until the
middle of the nineteenth century,
that belief was most often defined negatively— in 
terms of the savage Indians who, as stubborn 
obstacles to progress, forced Americans to 
consider and reconsider what it was to be civil­
ized and what it took to build a civilization. 
Studying the savage, trying to civilize him, 
destroying him, in the end they had only studied 
themselves, strengthened their own civilization, 
and given those who were coming after them an 
enlarged certitude . . .  in the progress of 
American civilization over all obstacles, (ix)
This is the Indian as savage, as one term in a dialectic
through which the American might define (notably) himself as
civilized. But it was not alone in serving such a function.
There was also the wilderness, about which Roderick Nash
makes much the same claim:
Wilderness was the basic ingredient of American 
civilization. From the raw materials of the 
physical wilderness Americans built a civiliza­
tion; with the idea or symbol of wilderness they 
sought to give that civilization identity and 
meaning. (xv)
Pearce and Nash both distinguish between, on the one hand, 
"real" Indians and their "real" lands, and on the other hand 
the idealized Other, the scripted actor in a psycho- 
historical drama of American identity. In wildness is not 
so much the preservation of the world, as Thoreau would have 
us believe, as of the self. And any tangible, prediscursive 
"realities" of native peoples and landscapes are more or 
less irrelevant in this process, are perhaps even obstacles, 
to be overcome not with guns and plows but with words, 
through the discursive construction of an Other with the 
required attributes— of a savage and a wilderness
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intertwined into a savage wilderness- Like the Orient and 
the Oriental within Orientalism, this wilderness came to be 
viewed as both a source of civilization and as that 
civilization's "cultural contestant," in Said's words, as 
"one of its deepest and most recurring images of the Other," 
the "contrasting image" against which it may define itself 
(1-2), "a sort of surrogate and even underground self" by 
means of which "it gained in strength and identity" (3).
By the time George Catlin issued his call for a 
"nation’s Park,” the wilderness and the Indian were parting 
ways in Euro-American thought. Only the one was destined 
for preservation; the other would be forced onto the 
reservation. The wilderness that had begun only as a 
negative term demarcating the positive attributes of 
civilization was becoming less of a resistant and dangerous 
opponent and more and more securely a possession, an 
attribute, a source of pride that could be subsumed into 
civilization and begin to take on a positivity of its own.
It could be fashioned into an object whose proper 
appreciation was a mark of the civilized individual, and 
whose preservation was the mark of a refined civilization. 
This reconfiguration can readily be situated in the history 
of the early United States republic. Following the 
Revolution, Nash notes, ”[i]t was widely assumed that 
America's primary task was the justification of its newly 
won freedom" (67); Americans therefore "sought something 
uniquely 'American, ' yet valuable enough to transform 
embarrassed provincials into proud and confident citizens." 
Their problem was that the "nation's short history, weak
95
traditions, and minor literary and artistic achievements
seemed negligible compared to those of Europe." The
solution lay in the fact that "wilderness had no counterpart
in the Old World":
nationalists argued that . . . wilderness was 
actually an American asset. Of course, pride 
continued to stem from the conquest of wild 
country, but by the middle decades of the nine­
teenth century wilderness was recognized as a 
cultural and moral resource and a basis for 
national self-esteem. (67)
A certain problem had been posed by the founding and 
stabilizing of a national identity upon processes of 
destruction that, as white Americans were coming to realize, 
could not go on forever. Catlin's early environmentalism 
offered a neat solution: a wilderness that no longer had to 
be opposed but could be assimilated and deployed by its very 
preservation, as Italy might do with the Sistine Chapel, and 
whose deployment could be made all the more effective by a 
discursive inflation of the wilderness's value— a task which 
would require that the sparely described, almost blank 
Puritan wilderness of a Mary Rowlandson be replaced by the 
richly textured, endlessly readable romantic landscapes of a 
James Fenimore Cooper.
Notes to Chapter Two
1 See Penelope 186-187. Instead of "incorporation" one 
might use other terms denoting the obverse of "penetration," 
but, reflecting the asymmetry of a patriarchal lexicon, no 
such term seems exactly complementary in the full range of 
its connotations. Marie Bonaparte uses the term 
"incorporating" in her own discussion of female sexual 
pleasure (Female Sexuality 105).
2 Land 4. Even at the most literal of levels, this 
desire to escape a burdensome history and society was 
conditioned by the capitalism one wished to escape, for the
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fantasies in question were circulated most widely by the 
colonial promoters themselves (Land 9).
3 For details and a range of recent interpretations of 
the Pequot War, see Drinnon 35-57, Kibbey 92-94, and Nelson 
12-16.
4 See Leach 1152. See also Legman 429-434 and Thompson 
164, 213.
5 Leach 1152. Leach writes of this motif only as part 
of Native American folklore; Jay Mechling, in an analysis of 
contemporary alligator jokes, demonstrates that "the image 
of a toothed vagina" also circulates much more widely and is 
"still powerful in [Euro-]American male folk materials"
(79).
6 For detailed accounts of King Philip's War see 
Douglas Edward Leach, Flintlock and Tomahawk: New England in 
Kina Philip's War (New York: Macmillan, 1966) and Francis 
Jennings, The Invasion of America: Indians, Colonialism, and 
the Cant of Conquest (Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina P, 
1975) .
7 For the Puritan, wilderness was not "natural" in 
today's sense of being "governed" solely by the "laws of 
nature"; it was thought of, rather, as ungoverned, chaotic. 
We cannot "believe" in wilderness in this earlier sense any 
longer, no more than we can conceive of a place in the 
universe that is not subject to the "laws of nature." Even 
the chaotic is now considered to follow the predictable 
patterning described in modern chaos theory.
8 Nash 5. There has been a working definition of 
wilderness in this country ever since the Wilderness Act of 
1964 fully codified the term. "A wilderness," according to 
the act, "in contrast with those areas where man and his 
works dominate the landscape, is hereby recognized as an 
area where the earth and its community of life are 
untrammeled by man, where man himself is a visitor who does 
not remain" (qtd. in Grumbine 377). Four elements of this 
formulation will prove important in this study. Its stress 
on wilderness as uninhabited land, where "man" only 
"visits," effaces the history of early nonwhite presences on 
the land. Its universalization of "man" as denoting all of 
humankind similarly effaces a set of nonmasculine presences 
on and interpretations of the land. Its binarism— the 
contrast it draws between the natural and the humanly 
altered landscape, and the sharp boundary that is thereby 
implied— helps reify the notion of a "natural" or "divine" 
inscription. Finally, the legislation's use of the classic 
form of the speech act— the way it declares that wilderness
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is "hereby recognized," created through the perlocutionary 
force of its enunciation— links it to the imperialist 
performativity of the Spanish requerimiento, discussed at 
length in Chapter Three.
CHAPTER THREE 
Performing Wilderness in The Last of the Mohicans
He slew them, at surprising distances, 
with his gun.
Over a body held in his hand, his head 
was bowed low,
But not in grief.
He put them where they are, and there 
we see them:
In our imagination.
— Robert Penn Warren, Audubon: A Vision (3)
Literary environmentalism traditionally views nature, 
and in particular nature's idealization, the "wilderness," 
as intrinsic and prediscursive, as an original, readable 
body, a natural inscription whose legibility is logically 
prior to any cultural marking.. In this chapter I want to 
critique this "wild" natural body along the same lines as 
Judith Butler's critique of the prediscursive human body. 
Following Butler, I wish to examine nature as a body 
"described through the language of surface and force" and 
"weakened through a 'single drama' of domination, 
inscription, and creation." Just as a sort of "corporeal 
destruction" is required "to produce the speaking subject" 
(130), I want to examine how, in order for nature to 
"speak," to signify "itself" through an apparently 
unmediated textuality, nature "itself" must be similarly 
dominated, inscribed, created— in short, destroyed.i And I 
can think of no better introduction to such a seemingly
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paradoxical project than the paradoxical career of John 
James Audubon, that great lover of and prodigious destroyer 
of natural bodies.
Prologue: Shooting as Writing
Longing for the preservation in words of what he knew 
was to disappear in reality, Audubon pinned his hopes at 
first on the art of his contemporary, the famed novelist Sir 
Walter Scott. "How many times I have longed for him to come 
to my beloved country," wrote Audubon in his journal in 
1826,
that he might describe, as no one else ever can, 
the stream, the swamp, the river, the mountain, 
for the sake of future ages. A century hence they 
will not be here as I see them, Nature will have 
been robbed of many brilliant charms, the rivers 
will have been tormented and turned astray from 
their primitive courses, the hills will be leveled 
with the swamps, and perhaps the swamps will have 
become a mound surmounted by a fortress of a 
thousand guns. Scarce a magnolia will Louisiana 
possess, the timid Deer will exist nowhere, fish 
will no longer abound in the rivers, the Eagle 
scarce ever alight, and these millions of lovely 
songsters be driven away or slain by man. Without 
Sir Walter Scott these beauties must perish 
unknown to the world. (182)
I quote this passage partly to demonstrate the prescience of 
Audubon's early environmentalist sensibility— his sympathies 
seem modern enough, even if some of his specific predictions 
are off the mark— and partly to highlight his own anxiety as 
a writer, his conviction that his own work was somehow 
inadequate to the task of representing and memorializing the 
American wilderness. As it turned out, that anxiety was 
unfounded. Audubon was no Sir Walter Scott, yet he could 
write well enough when he chose to, and for several
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generations now his work has been routinely included in 
anthologies of nature writing.
Audubon had a paradoxical sense of his own 
environmentalism as both discursive and economic, as both 
idealist and stubbornly materialist. Remarking in 1835 that 
America was still inadequately chronicling its vanishing 
wilderness, he wrote that this was not "because no one in 
America is able to accomplish such an undertaking." He may 
still have considered himself inadequate in this regard, but 
he conceded that authors such as Washington Irving and James 
Fenimore Cooper had proved themselves quite capable. The 
problem, rather, was that in spite of the work of such 
writers the loss of nature was proceeding "with such 
rapidity, as almost to rival the movement of their pen[s]" 
(Audubon, Delineations 5). The image here is of an almost 
direct transmutation of disappearing things into newly 
appearing words, of a discursive economic engine that mixes 
labor ("the movement of their pens") with natural raw 
material to produce the cultural commodity of text.
It was perhaps inevitable that Audubon would thus 
associate the representation of nature with its consumption. 
He had already done a good deal of work in taxidermy— a form 
of nature writing that directly and visibly transforms 
referent into signifier— and later in life he would support 
himself through the sale of his famed paintings, each of 
which had cost the life of not just one but several, 
sometimes hundreds, of birds. Throughout his life, that is, 
Audubon participated in an economy that quite consumptively 
commodified and traded in various aspects of wild nature, in
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a system in which the destruction of nature was quite 
clearly not going to be prevented— Audubon never saw that as 
a genuine possibility— but could at least be compensated for 
by the concomitant production of valuable artifacts.
Driven by his own sometimes dire financial 
circumstances, Audubon almost singlehandedly took the 
emerging literary-environmental economy of his time to a new 
level. A financial failure earlier in life, he turned his 
fortunes around with his elephant-folio edition of Birds of 
North America, selling nearly two hundred copies at $1,000 
per set. In convincing publishers and patrons of the value 
of what we recognize as a forerunner of the large-format, 
"coffee-table" nature book, Audubon was doing more than 
helping inaugurate a practice that still flourishes today.
He was also demonstrating that, via the mediation of art, 
nature could participate in a new and more direct way in 
culture— not, as in the Puritan conception of wilderness, as 
the irreducibly Other accessible only via a troubled and 
sometimes traumatic confrontation, but as an object directly 
exchangeable for, and thus commensurate with, other objects 
in the marketplace.2
Philosophically, Audubon would appear to have been a 
neoplatonist. He was so famously prolific with his gun 
precisely because he wished to make each of his 
representations true to an ideal type that was not to be 
found in any single bird but could only be inferred from the 
collectivity.3 In so doing, he "'typified' nature," in the 
words of Donna Haraway; he "made nature true to type,"
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deploying his gun to reduce nature's unruly individual 
variation to an imagined underlying structure (38). This 
reliance upon the typifying gun makes particularly manifest 
the way that the "real" "body" of nature is transmuted and 
made to participate directly in the cultural order, a realm 
to which— in a thoroughgoing mystification— it is still held 
by definition to be opposed.4
In Audubon's taxidermy and in the paintings based upon 
it, the body of nature is quite literally emptied out and 
made to signify on its surface. In this specific instance 
the writing instrument that accomplishes this, that destroys 
the body and allows it to re-emerge as cultural artifact, is 
figured most strongly not as the paintbrush or pen but as 
the gun. Positioned as it is at the very beginning of that 
chain in which a living bird becomes first a stuffed figure 
and only secondarily a painted image— first a surface and 
then an image of a surface— it is the rifle and not the 
paintbrush that first mediates between the "real," 
"prediscursive" body of nature and its destruction and 
inscription. And inasmuch as destroying a target implies 
the previous existence of that target, the act of shooting 
provides a powerful figure for the reification of a 
prediscursive natural body.5 
Sadly Abused by Man
Given Audubon's eventual successes, why would he have 
felt that without the particular aid of Sir Walter Scott the 
beauties of the wilderness "must perish unknown to the 
world"? It is tempting to answer that Audubon saw in Scott
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a figure who could popularize an environmental movement—  
someone whose literary skill (like that of John Muir later 
in the century) could charm and motivate the public, whose 
fame could popularize the movement, and whose cultural 
authority could legitimate it. But to say this is to 
project the goals and strategies of a later environmentalism 
onto a time when they didn't exist. For Audubon, the danger 
seems to have been not that the wilderness would perish 
"unknown," but simply, as I suggested above, that there 
would be little in the way of cultural accomplishment to 
show for its loss. It would never be exchanged for anything 
possessing the sort of perpetual circulability traditionally 
secured only in the marketplace of the high-cultural 
artifact. In 1826, he might have had little inkling of his 
own eventual stature; he would indeed have had little reason 
to think that "nature writing" would become a form of belles 
lettres at all. But by that time the cultural ascendancy of 
fiction, and of the novel in particular, was perfectly 
evident, and Scott was perhaps the most prominent novelist 
then taking a direct interest in landscape.
It is not really surprising, then, that Audubon would 
have wished particularly for Sir Walter Scott to take on the 
job of immortalizing the wilderness. Nor is it surprising 
that Audubon would eventually pronounce James Fenimore 
Cooper a capable substitute, for Cooper shared with Audubon 
both an admiration of Scott and an early environmentalist 
sensibility. In his environmentalism, in fact— in the 
intensity of his response to the destruction of the 
wilderness and in his fictional modeling of a specific
stance toward that destruction— he clearly outstripped 
Audubon. As John F. Lynen put it, in economic terms that 
echo Audubon's own formulation, Cooper's regret at the loss 
of wilderness was not mere "sentimental nostalgia," but 
arose "from the agonizing doubt whether civilization is 
worth the terrible price men pay for it," and his novels are 
driven partly by "the quest for some solid reality which 
justifies the settlement of the wilderness" (174). Audubon, 
as late as 1835, could still question "[w]hether these 
changes are for the better or for the worse" (Delineations 
5); Cooper by this time seems far less ambivalent. In 
Nash’s words, Cooper "held no brief for exploitation," and 
in Natty Bumppo he created a character who not only "honored 
the wilderness and used it respectfully" but also could 
serve as the author's mouthpiece in a repeated "condemnation 
of the exploiter" (76-77).
In this view, it is Cooper himself speaking when Natty 
Bumppo laments how "the beauty of the wilderness [has] been 
deformed" by settlers who "scourge the very 'arth with their 
axes," or of how "natur is sadly abused by man, once he gets 
the mastery."6 That such environmentalist sentiments are 
indeed Cooper's own is suggested by their universalization 
within the Leatherstocking series— particularly in The Last 
of the Mohicans, where, instead of being associated with a 
particular character or social or racial group, they are 
articulated through a variety of voices, both savage and 
civilized, both narrated and narratorial.7 In The Last of 
the Mohicans, it is only a certain semi-civilized type that
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does not share this basic environmental sensibility: a white 
American implicitly figured as merely transitional, as too 
advanced to possess the natural wisdom of the savage but not 
yet refined enough to possess the aesthetic sophistication 
of the fully cultured. In the novel's otherwise Manichean 
world, a love of wild nature occupies both poles, being 
absent only in this presumably transitional middle realm 
that will eventually, one supposes, be eliminated by a 
civilizing and aestheticizing process— a process in which 
Cooper would perhaps have seen his own novels as 
participating.
Cooper would also have realized that -this sort of 
American, closer to Audubon's ambivalence than to Natty 
Bumppo's platitudinous assurance, was more typical of his 
readership. He would not have wanted to delineate the 
character of the exploiter sharply enough for readers to 
recognize themselves— or for Cooper to recognize himself— as 
the object of the novel's condemnation. The exploiter has 
therefore only a vague and shifting presence, never being 
depicted in detail or explicitly named. Unlike the nature- 
loving proto-environmentalist, who speaks confidently 
through a universalizing range of identifiable voices, the 
exploiter in Mohicans is camouflaged in passive construc­
tions— as when the woods mysteriously "are gotten rid of"—  
or in misplacements of agency— as when it is not people who 
damage Glenn's Falls but simply "the application of the 
water to the uses of civilized life" (55-56). The result is 
a faux dialectic in which the environmentalist viewpoint 
circulates as a fully embodied position, that of the
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exploiter as a shadowy foil. In ways such as these, the 
genre of fiction afforded Cooper certain literary- 
environmental strategies that Audubon's environmentalist 
nonfiction could not. In particular it allowed Cooper to 
create a space within which to posit an environmentalist 
sensibility unfettered by the contemporary colonialist and 
capitalist realities that would have considerably 
complicated its expression.
Human Values and Natural Forms
To understand The Last of the Mohicans specifically as 
literary environmentalism— and not merely a novel informed 
by a recognizeably environmentalist sensibility--I want to 
turn first to Cooper's novelistic technique. The one aspect 
of that technique which relates him most directly to Sir 
Walter Scott, from whom he borrowed it, is his handling of 
the convention of the picturesque. More particularly, as 
Blake Nevius has shown, Cooper learned from Scott how to 
"combine picturesque action with picturesque scenery" (2), 
and here the student may be said to have outdone the master, 
for with Scott, "after a lapse of time we can recall his 
characters and actions more vividly than his physical 
settings," while with Cooper what we tend to remember is not 
any action but a set of brilliantly evoked wilderness 
tableaux (4). In thus adapting and intensifying this 
particular aspect of Scott's technique, Cooper made a 
decisive move toward literary environmentalism— whose 
primary effect, after all, is to naturalize narratives by 
writing them as landscapes, and to do so convincingly enough 
that, as Nevius says, we forget the originary action.
Arguing in similar terms for the primacy of Cooper’s 
scenery over his plots, John F. Lynen has suggested how and 
why Cooper's fiction might have taken this turn. In 
particular, Lynen suggests how the literary-environmental 
qualities of Cooper's work hinge on questions of technique, 
how they spring from the author's choices in handling such 
basic formal challenges as plotting and characterization. 
Foremost among Cooper's shortcomings as a novelist, 
according to Lynen, "is the static quality of [his] 
characters," it being "representative of Cooper's method" 
that his "personages cannot change or grow" (178). This 
rules out the usual handling of plot, for in a novel "whose 
situation remains unchanging, action is most completely a 
matter of finding things out" (183), and the only "real" 
plot consists "in the reader's and characters' understanding 
of facts which remain constant" (176). Instead of 
developing in the usual sense, changing in response to the 
action, Cooper's characters are simply "seen in the process 
of discovering the truths of their situation" (178).
To formulate action and characterization as such a 
process of discovery poses the problem of how the reader is 
to find out what the characters are to find out, and how to 
replicate in the reader the sense that "the truths of their 
situation"— the emphasized pronoun here referring both to 
characters and to readers— were there to be discovered all 
along. In order for Cooper to "manage" his novel's "real 
action," it becomes necessary that "the landscape should 
contain in its visible elements all the social and 
psychological truths the story will bring into view."3 The
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adventures themselves do little more than "provide the
occasion for beautifully realized tableaux" (183), while the
novel's "true action" proceeds somewhere behind the surface
events, in the form of a constant implication and
suggestion. It is
the movement of the author's thought, as he 
describes the landscape, [that] foreshadows the 
pattern of the story he will tell. . . . The 
process of perception in which Cooper engages the 
reader through his description of the setting 
enacts in brief the process by which the narrative 
will develop. (172-73)
The key to the action, the truth that is to be discovered, 
remains "always an inference, always something intuited from 
the tableau of the presently visible world" (175).
An example of such a tableaux and such an inference is
this deceptively objective-sounding description of a
wilderness landscape, offered up by the narrator in the
quiet lull that succeeds the gun battle at Glenn's Falls:
The uproar which had lately echoed through the 
vaults of the forest was gone, leaving the rush of 
the waters to swell and sink on the currents of 
the air, in the unmingled sweetness of nature. A 
fish-hawk, which, secure on the topmost branches 
of a dead pine, had been a distant spectator of 
the fray, now stooped from his high and ragged 
perch, and soared, in wide sweeps, above his prey; 
while a jay, whose noisy voice had been stilled by 
the hoarser cries of the savages, ventured again 
to open his discordant throat, as though once more 
in undisturbed possession of his wild domains.
(81)
This scene provokes in the admiring Heyward "a glimmering of 
hope,” a "reviving confidence of success" that will rally 
him "to renewed exertions." It is thus not only picturesque 
but also inspiring— but inspiring of what, exactly? We know
as readers what Heyward cannot know as a character: that
while it is indeed the "undisturbed possession" of America's 
"wild domains" that is at issue, those domains are to be 
wrested not only from the Indians and the French but also, 
soon enough, from the British. We can readily sense in this 
passage a patriotic history rewritten as a description, a 
thinly veiled picture of the American colonies following 
"the uproar" of the French and Indian War itself. The 
victorious British crown, which maintains a shadowy presence 
throughout the novel as one of the "distant monarchs of 
Europe" (15), is written into this particular scene as the 
fishhawk, "a distant spectator of the fray," perched 
securely at the apex of a now-quiet empire. Indeed it was 
that very security— the fact that the colonists no longer 
needed Britain to defend them against the French and Indian 
threat— which had enabled the drive toward independence: no 
longer "stilled by the hoarser cries of the savages," the 
"noisy voice" and "discordant" notes of colonial discontent 
make themselves heard immediately in the silence.
Exceeding the plotting function identified by Lynen, 
such "descriptive" passages narrate and gloss mythic 
passages in American history, presaging the later work of 
the National Park Service interpreter. For the ranger as 
for the novelist, the process of managing such "plots" is 
one of naturalizing key elements of a national ideology. 
Indeed, as Lynen stresses, Cooper's "main problem in shaping 
his narrative" is "to manage the revelations naturally, so 
that the hidden essentials of the situation seem to rise to 
the surface of consciousness as if they had always been 
there and are now in the process of being noticed" (179-80).
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This is, significantly, a matter of implicating the reader, 
for the trick lies in the "action of the reader's mind as 
[notably] he comes to recognize the social scene through the 
natural scene," thereby realizing, consciously or otherwise, 
"that a single order underlies both society and nature"
(174).
The inscribing of particular colonial histories into 
Cooper's wilderness landscape is underwritten by narratives 
of gender and race that are themselves coded into that 
landscape. As has proved to be consistently the case with 
the literary-environmental object, the wilderness of The 
Last of the Mohicans is constructed by collapsing verb into 
noun, history into place, narration into description— all 
via tropes of sexualized violence directed against a 
racialized Other. Lying always beyond some "impervious" but 
nonetheless always permeated "boundary" (1), Cooper's 
wilderness is probed and explored until, as the narrator 
summarizes, there is "no recess of the woods so dark, nor 
any secret place so lovely, that it might claim exemption 
from the inroads" of Europeans (11). Figurations of just 
this sort of coitus-writ-large (eerily repeating John 
Underhill's earlier troping of the wilderness as a female 
body to which has been ascribed the pseudo-agency of 
"environing") are ubiquitous in the novel. "After 
penetrating through the brush," says the narrator of Natty 
Bumppo, "matted as it was with briars, for a few hundred 
feet, he entered an open space" (125); elsewhere we read of 
a silence in the adventurer's camp "as deep as that which 
reigned in the vast forest by which it was environed" (15),
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of an "impenetrable darkness" "[w]ithin the bosom of the 
encircling hills" (190). Such imagery replicates the 
castration anxiety so prominent in News from America: "the 
forest at length appeared to swallow up the living mass [of 
armed troops] which had slowly entered its bosom" (15).
Neatly linking tropes of gender and race, Cooper writes 
his wilderness as a womb whose fertility will ensure a 
posterity for whites but not for Indians. Early in the 
novel, Heyward's party "enter[s] under the high, but dark 
arches of the forest" (22), then "penetrate[s] still deeper" 
(28) to arrive at Glenn's Falls, where Uncas and 
Chingachgook expose "the much prized secret of the place" 
(52). That prized secret, predictably enough, turns out to 
be a cave, a sort of primitive Ur-womb which, in sheltering 
the English couple, Duncan Heyward and Alice Munro, shelters 
the symbolic progenitors of an as-yet unborn white nation.
In this context, the word "prized" is particularly 
multivalent, becoming readable not just as "highly valued," 
but also as "seized," and again as "pried open" (OED)— the 
single term collapsing the tropes of both virgin and whore, 
the much-prized and the much-pried, in a context of violence 
and warfare that is very much about both the seizing and the 
future (racially pure) repeopling of the wilderness.
Part of the viciousness of the virgin/whore dichotomy—  
invoked in The Last of the Mohicans as it usually is, as a 
totalizing binarism— is that it leaves no room for 
conceptualizing rape, a figure that might more appropriately 
represent colonial acquisition of native land. The novel's 
caves do, nonetheless, recall John Underhill's mapping of
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the violated Indian palizado at Mystic. As at Mystic, for 
example, each of Cooper's caves features an anatomically 
correct set of openings, front and back. But in Cooper's 
case the accompanying narrative is thoroughly mystifying, 
lacking the unabashed honesty of Underhill's account.
Indeed, Cooper turns the Pequot story on its head, for now 
it is a white lineage that is threatened by Indians, via a 
dual forced entry that replicates exactly the assault by 
Mason and Underhill at Mystic: "the cavern was entered at 
both its extremities" (88).
The genocidal subtext in such scenes is not hard to 
uncover. An emblematized white reproductive capability 
survives the Hurons's sexual/military assault; Alice is 
"delivered" from the cave, captive but alive, just as she is 
"delivered" a second time from the book's other symbolic 
womb, the cave at the Huron village (263). Her survival in 
this second instance stands in contrast to the death of the 
ailing young Indian woman, whom Heyward, pretending to be "a 
great medicine" (246), has been charged with curing and who 
clearly serves as a foil for the young, marriage-bound white 
woman.9 (Notably, Alice is thus "born" in a sort of trans- 
racial drag, passing herself off as the ill Indian maiden 
whose very life Alice seems to appropriate even as she 
performs it— one of the many links between drag and 
performance I will explore later in this chapter.) In a 
combined racial and sexual politics, the landscape becomes 
the vehicle for selectively breeding a future for whites but 
not for Indians, a strategy of naturalizing— landscaping—  
genocide as a simple failure to reproduce.
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Cooper relies heavily on this sort of literary-
environmental poetics in his handling of characterization as
well as plot. Lynen notes how Natty Bumppo's static and
shallow "wisdom" amounts to little more than "vague
Unitarian pieties" and quite reasonably asks, "[How can]
such a bundle of received ideas and attitudes amount to a
personality?" (187). The answer is by developing an
illusion of genuine character for Natty in what might be
called the novel's ideological, as opposed to physical,
space, "in the affinity between human values and natural
forms." It is thus
the landscape [that] creates him, just as he, in 
turn, interprets it. . . . [G]uided by Cooper's 
statements, we unconsciously transfer to Leather- 
stocking our own responses to the novel1s land­
scape. His behavior as a person acting within the 
landscape seems to spring from such thoughts and 
feelings as we ourselves have in merely looking at 
the scene. Leatherstocking’s identity is the
product of our novelistically controlled view of
nature; he becomes a person because his response 
to nature is validated by our own. (187-88)
But our own responses, which supposedly validate Natty's, 
are themselves conditioned by a long tradition of literary- 
environmental interpretations, among whose precursors we 
might place those of Natty himself. This interdependence 
points not to a logical circularity but to a dialectical 
interaction between writer and reader, interpreter and 
interpretee. Interpretive speech is expected and designed 
to enact or awaken some state— new yet already present— in 
an interlocutor; it is necessarily directed toward someone, 
and in The Last of the Mohicans that someone is preeminently 
Duncan Heyward. If it is in Natty that Cooper delineates
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the figure and activity of the environmental interpreter, it 
is Duncan whom he casts as the prototypical interpretee, the 
American type for whom interpretation is to be performed.
Following the initial battle at Glenn's Falls, the
narrator explains how the "sudden and almost magical change"
from the stirring incidents of the combat, to the 
stillness that now reigned around him, acted on 
the heated imagination of Heyward like some excit­
ing dream. While all the images and events he had 
witnessed remained deeply impressed on his memory, 
he felt a difficulty in persuading himself of 
their truth. . . . [EJvery sign of the adventurers 
had been lost, leaving him in total uncertainty. 
(81)
This "magical change" that links events and images, 
replacing an active combat with a passive, surrounding 
stillness, neatly evokes literary environmentalism's 
mystified writing of violent history as peaceful 
environment. This environment cannot signify itself, 
however; it must be interpreted, a process temporarily 
blocked by the contrived absence of the interpreter, Natty. 
And as Lynen argued, it is this narratorial management of 
interpretation— of the discovery of the fixed truths of the 
landscape— that constitutes the novel's "real" plot.
Heyward is left looking about him in bewilderment and 
awe, like a Puritan captive waiting for a sign from God, or 
an uninitiated tourist in a national park waiting for the 
ranger in the green uniform to tell him what it's all about. 
Scenes such as this establish a particular relationship 
between Natty and Duncan in their respective roles as 
interpreter and interpretee, a relationship replicated 
between narrator and reader. Such scenes emphasize in
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particular the opacity of the landscape to the uninitiated, 
the utter dependence of the interpretee upon the 
interpreter. When Natty leaves the scene at Glenn's Falls, 
Duncan's problem is cast explicitly as a fundamental problem 
in knowing, "a difficulty in persuading himself of [the] 
truth" of things, a problem in the interpretation of images 
that have impressed themselves onto his memory but cannot by 
themselves signify any definite meaning. Mediation becomes 
crucial: without the interpreter, Duncan is left "in total 
uncertainty"; devoid of the "signs" that have been "lost," 
the wilderness simply ceases to signify.
It is for Duncan, more than any other character, that 
the book's formative interpretation of the American 
environment is to be performed— and through him, on behalf 
of its contemporary readers. As Nina Baym has pointed out, 
it is Duncan and not Natty whose presence dominates the 
novel: he is the only character to appear in every scene; 
his is the "line of sight [that] organizes the action," even 
though "some awkward plotting . . .  is required to carry 
this through"; and virtually all of the action is "viewed 
from his perspective.” Heyward functions "as the reader's 
surrogate, the position from which readers would view the 
action if they were in the action" (73). He is more than 
just a surrogate, however, for the novel also figures him as 
patriarch and progenitor. As the aristocratic southerner 
and ambitious officer getting an intense education in the 
harsh realities of wilderness warfare, exhibiting his 
heroism and fortifying his character in the French and 
Indian War, he is readily recognizeable as a youthful George
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Washington, a fictionalized father-to-be of his country. 10 
As such, his union with the racially pure and properly 
feminine Alice— and his pointed rejection of the racially 
"tainted" Cora— assures in advance the racial and gender 
purity of not only the idealized American citizen but also 
the future model of the interpretee. Duncan and Alice 
become prototypes of all those whose character and 
citizenship are to be perfected, just as Freeman Tilden 
would have it a century later, through the guidance of 
environmental interpretation.
The novel's interpretation is in this sense both 
present- and future-oriented, shaping not just Duncan 
Heyward but also his descendants, Cooper's idealized 
American readers. This blurs a certain distinction that 
might otherwise be set up between a narrator who interprets 
for the reader and a character (Natty) who interprets for 
other characters. Instead, interpretation at both levels 
can finally be seen as directed to readers, the one working 
to perfect them through a direct interpellation in the 
present, the other working indirectly, positing readers as 
hereditarily already-perfected by virtue of their figurative 
descent from their "father." As Duncan's descendants, we 
are to discover as already existing in ourselves the truths 
that the characters are to discover as already existing in 
the landscape. Lynen's argument must thus be taken a step 
further, for it is not merely the novel's characters that 
are treated as static, but also its readers. The American 
environmental narrative is discoverable not only in the 
landscape, but also in our own fictive ancestry.
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A Singular and 111 Concealed Disdain
"Book!" repeated Hawk-eye, with singular and ill- 
concealed disdain; "do you take me for a whimper­
ing boy, at the apron string of one of your old 
gals; and this good rifle on my knee.for the 
feather of a goose's wing, my ox's horn for a 
bottle of ink . . . ? Book! What have such as I, 
who am a warrior of the wilderness, though a man 
without a cross, to do with books? I never read 
but in one, and the words that are written there 
are too simple and too plain to need much school­
ing; though I may boast that of forty long and 
hard working years."
— James Fenimore Cooper (117)
There remains to be written a history of this 
metaphor . . . that systematically contrasts 
divine or natural writing and the human and 
laborious, finite and artificial inscription. It 
remains to . . . follow the theme of God's book 
(nature or law, indeed natural law) through all 
its modifications.
— Jacques Derrida (602)
Propounded by an illiterate eccentric with no formal 
education, with no institutional affiliation, with none of 
the usual accoutrements of authority beyond his white race 
and male sex, the environmental interpretations of someone 
like Natty Bumppo might strike readers as at least a little 
suspect. And to the extent that they are directed to a 
particular interlocutor in a particular time, place, and 
situation, they should strike us not as universal but as 
local and situated. How does The Last of the Mohicans work 
to overcome these handi-caps, to establish Natty's authority 
as an interpreter of the wilderness? More fundamentally, 
how does the novel establish that there is anything "there" 
in the wilderness to interpret in the first place?
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In the first of the epigraphs above, figuring the New 
World wilderness as a stable text, as "God's book," Natty 
valorizes and masculinizes the old notion of a preexisting, 
"natural" writing and marginalizes and feminizes that of a 
secondary and "artificial" human inscription. He claims to 
read only in the book of nature, which in its divine 
transparency can speak immediately and truthfully to all.
But this contemptuous and sweeping avowal— a claim made 
emphatically enough to betray some nervousness— is at once 
qualified by Natty's offhanded admission of all those years 
of study. If the book of nature is in fact so transparent, 
just what has he been working so hard at? Evidently, 
reading even a natural inscription can be laborious. This 
casual admission wrecks the otherwise neat binarisms that 
would at first seem to bound and structure Natty's textual 
wilderness, reinserting the artificial into the natural, the 
opaque into the transparent, the human into the divine.11
Aligned with Natty's privileging of a natural over an
artificial inscription is his privileging of speech over
writing, and this avowal also runs immediately aground. In
Chapter 3, where the proudly phonocentric woodsman expounds
upon the "ways, of which . . .  I can't approve," he ranks
the literacy of his own culture among them:
It is one of their customs to write in books what 
they have done and seen, instead of telling them 
in their villages, where the lie can be given to 
the face of a cowardly boaster, and the brave 
soldier can call on his comrades to witness for 
the truth of his words. In consequence of this 
bad fashion, a man who is too conscientious to 
misspend his days among the women, in learning the 
names of black marks, may never hear of the deeds 
of his fathers. (31)
Perhaps this is in part a mere psychological defense, the 
blustering of an otherwise proud character inwardly troubled 
by his illiteracy. Regardless of how it is intended, it 
succinctly outlines nearly the whole of the phonocentric 
pose, positing writing as feminine, mediated, distanced from 
its referent, and unreliable— as absence and deferral— and 
speech as masculine, direct, close to its referent, and 
authoritative— as presence and identity. This seemingly 
simple formulation is riven with contradictions, however, 
not the least of which is the way it identifies a putatively 
superior reliance upon speech with a putatively inferior 
race. For it is "the pale faces," as Magua puts it in a 
formulation similar to Natty's own, who do not have true 
speech; whites "have two words for each thing, while a red 
skin will make the sound of his voice speak for him" (91). 
Even more disruptive is Natty's admission that writing 
sustains the very privileges to which he opposes it, that 
his illiteracy denies him access to that racist and 
masculinist cultural heritage referenced here as "the deeds 
of his fathers."
I want now to trace out the novel's thematizing of its 
own "nature writing" via a sustained reading of two closely 
related tropes: that of a divine inscription, which is 
manifested variously as the inscribed body of the Indian and 
the inscribed body of wild nature, and that of a fully 
present speech, figured most powerfully and revealingly by 
what Natty terms the "speech" of his rifle, Kill-deer. In 
Mary Rowlandson's narrative it is the Bible whose 
circulation both initiates and works to stabilize the
wilderness's textuality; in The Last of the Mohicans it is 
the phallic rifle, la longue carabine, that tropes this 
fundamental literary-environmental activity. Deployed in 
parallel functions, the categories of a present speech and a 
natural writing are both posited by their binaric opposition 
to the notion of an artificial inscription, to writing in 
the popular sense of the word. And the novel will thematize 
the failure of both categories as a locus of stable and 
self-evident "nature." The Last of the Mohicans, in a way 
that correlates closely with Butler's conception of 
performativity, concludes by locating a radically 
textualized wilderness neither in speech nor writing, but in 
performance, or rather coperformance, that enlists the 
reader in the ongoing cultural production of the 
environment.
What Say Your Old Men?
Natty's phonocentrism can be seen as clumsily enacting 
the paradoxical way that books, in Barbara Johnson's words, 
"rebel against their own stated intention to say that speech 
is better than writing" (43), as just another "modification" 
of the general "theme of God's book." But his pose falters 
in much more politically charged ways within the colonial 
context of the novel. Natty laments his ignorance of the 
deeds of his fathers during an overtly political argument 
with Chingachgook over the justice of England's taking of 
Delaware land; the scene dramatizes the native contestation 
of a self-serving imperialist narrative even as it points up 
the role of literary environmentalism in defusing and 
containing such contestation.
Defending the ethics of white conquest, Natty maintains 
that his own people's activities have been no worse than 
those of the Mohicans. Chingachgook, suspecting that the 
white people's own histories would undermine that claim, 
challenges Natty to back up his assertions by citing his own 
tradition. "You have the story told by your fathers," the 
Delaware chief points out. "What say your old men?" (30). 
This certainly appears to be a decisive move, for the story 
recorded by his fathers is precisely what Natty must now 
admit he does not know; thus pressed, he can only point up 
his illiteracy. Put to the test by a member of a genuinely 
speech-centered culture, Natty's own phonocentricity is 
exposed as a wholly figurative stance without any real 
contestatory force. As a mere inability to read and write, 
illiteracy can at best be only a figure for the positivities 
of orality and phonocentricity which Natty pretends to 
privilege. The immediate result is that Natty finds his 
entire position negated, and he is forced into a series of 
embarrassing admissions— that "there is reason in an Indian"
(30), that "every story has its two sides," and that 
Chingachgook's "traditions" are "true" (31).
Chingachgook, by contrast, is able to access the deeds 
of his fathers, and it is precisely on that account that he 
takes charge of the conversation, narrating "what my fathers 
have said, and what the Mohicans have done" (31): a history 
of his own people that justifies their claim to the 
territory taken by the whites. This counternarrative cannot 
be refuted in any obvious way, for its pathos depends upon 
its being true. Instead of being refuted, it is merely
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interrupted and contained, first by having the conversation 
bleed off into a discussion of the cause of the tides (31— 
32)— a rewriting of politics as natural science— and then, 
when Chingachgook resumes his narrative, by the timely 
arrival of Uncas (33).
There is, however, a crucial sense in which Natty does 
manage to access and deploy his own heritage, and in the 
genuine imperial contestation which this chapter only 
dramatizes, this deployment proves decisive after all. 
Illiterate though he is, Natty does know at least one thing 
about his fathers, for he knows that he is "genuine white." 
And he knows at least one thing more, "that all the Bumppos 
could shoot; for I have a natural turn with a rifle, which 
must have been handed down from generation to generation"
(31). In contrast to Chingachgook's rich oral heritage,
Natty's illiteracy leaves him with only a bare genetic 
legacy, the "fact" of his race and an inherited skill in 
shooting, upon which to base his own claim to the land. The 
novel— mystifying the real primacy of literacy in 
colonialist ideology— boils the ethics of conquest down to 
the notion of a superior race, and the fact of a superior 
firepower.
I Will Tell/Kill You
"Words built the world and words can destroy 
the world. . . . "
"Well, you take the words; I'll take the 
rifle. That's the only word I need. R-i-f-l-e."
— Ishmael Reed (81)
Pressed by Chingachgook to relate the story told by his 
fathers, Natty suggests that his rifle can somehow speak for
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him. But this is hardly the only time the novel invokes 
shooting as a figure for speech. Elsewhere, for example, 
Natty refers to a gun battle as a "conversation," in which 
he offers to "let 'kill-deer' take a part" (208); during 
another battle he requests of his comrades that until he 
signals otherwise, "nothing speaks but the rifle" (328).
Thus when Tamenund asks "Which of my prisoners is la Longue 
Carabine?" and Heyward answers, "Give us arms. . . . Our 
deeds shall speak for us!" (295), we are invited to read the 
ensuing shooting contest as a sort of debate, and Natty's 
superior shooting as a sort of eloquence, a great oration 
comparable to those delivered in the same scene by Tamenund, 
Magua, and Cora.
But what sort of words are spoken by a firearm?
However one might choose to translate such speech— "I hereby 
declare you a corpse," perhaps, or in the more specific 
colonial context of the novel, "I hereby pronounce you a 
subject of my king"— it obviously does more than merely 
convey information. The pronouncements of the rifle are not 
mere constantives, that is, but performatives in the classic 
sense, speech acts that instantiate by means of their very 
utterance a genuine change in the status of their 
interlocutors.
Deconstructed by Chingachgook, Natty's phonocentrism 
does not simply vanish; rather it is driven underground, as 
it were, to lodge in this figure of the speaking gun. 
Resurrecting itself there as a performative speech, it can 
revive the old dream of a full presence in which word, 
intention, and result— locution, illocution, and
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perlocution— are one. The novel seems fascinated by such 
speech and allegorizes it repeatedly, perhaps most notably 
in the suspenseful shooting contest of Chapter 29 and at the 
moment of Magua's demise in Chapter 32.
The performativity of the speaking gun parallels that 
of another imperialist speech act, the Spanish 
Recruerimiento, or "requirement." Drafted in its "classic 
form" in 1512 by Palacios Rubios, this formal document was 
intended to address "the wide range of perplexing problems" 
posed by the discovery of the Indies (Dickinson 300). 
Spaniards such as Rubios worried in particular about two 
things: the questionable ethics of conquest and 
colonization, and the possibility that "civilized" men might 
revert to "savagery" during lengthy sojourns among utterly 
foreign peoples. In response, the Spanish imperial 
bureaucracy required its agents to read the Recruerimiento 
aloud to native populations upon first contact, reasoning 
that such a performance would, at that crucial moment, both 
affirm the conquerors in their own European identity and 
legitimate the conquest itself. More precisely, the reading 
was itself considered the act of subjugation: by declaring 
natives to be subjects of the Crown, it was held to make 
them subjects of the Crown.12
The speaking gun similarly subjugates the native as it
sustains the identity of the colonial. In Newes from
America, John Underhill records that
wee had an Indian with us that was an interpreter, 
being in English cloathes, and a Gunne in his 
hands, was spied by the Ilanders [members of the 
Block Island tribe], which called out to him, what 
are you an Indian or an English-man: come hither,
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saith he, and I will tell you, he pulls up his 
cocke and let fly at one of them, and without 
question was the death of him. (7)
In the midst of this fluidity— signaled by an Indian 
speaking a white man's language, dressed in a white man's 
clothing, and carrying a white man’s weapon— Underhill 
assigns to the gun the power of stabilization, the ability 
to accurately name the speaker's race, to answer the 
question, "What are you?" even as it subjugates its native 
interlocutor: "I will tell/kill you." Notably, the 
speaker's name is never actually mentioned; the passage 
concerns not the name itself but the act of naming. This 
image of a man in a cross-racial drag, irrefutably 
identifying himself in a virtuoso performance— and thereby 
suggesting the performativity rather than any "natural" 
fixity of identity— reappears much later as the 
Leatherstocking, Cooper's white man in Indian clothing. 
Underhill's Indian here anticipates the way that Natty and 
other characters in The Last of the Mohicans will perform—  
as Indians, as animals, as "nature"— in what Marjorie Garber 
has termed narrative transvestism (13). And the 
interpreter's fatally stabilizing speech anticipates (right 
down to the seemingly obligatory sexual pun) how the 
speaking gun is to function in Cooper's novel.
No End to His Loping
In contrast to the sweeping formality of the 
Reouerimiento— ritualistic, mediated, embedded in a 
universalizing hierarchy— the performative speech of the 
woodsman's rifle seems decidedly informal, personal, direct,
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and ad hoc. 13 But the two practices function in much the 
same way, and I want now to read the shooting match in 
Chapter 29 of The Last of the Mohicans as a fictional 
equivalent of the Reouerimiento. Natty's shooting is 
performed as part of a first-contact scenario, before an 
assemblage of native people at the brink of subjugation; it 
is also, as in the episode from Newes from America, prompted 
by a crisis of identity— by Duncan Heyward's impersonation 
of Natty. And it is again a violent and patently sexual 
exchange, in this case between the rifle and the two 
(notably) domestic utensils that are its targets— an earthen 
vessel (297) and a hollow gourd (299).
Natty sees his own identity most securely fixed in his 
race, in his sense of himself as "genuine white," "a man 
without a cross" (though he repeats these phrases frequently 
enough to betray some anxiety about the matter). But at 
this crucial point in the novel, his identity hinges 
literally on his inherited skill with the rifle. It is not 
as a white man that he is most renowned, but as la loncrue 
carabine, as a great shot, and when Duncan challenges his 
identity, it seems perfectly logical that a shooting match 
should be proposed as a foolproof way to settle the issue. 
Natty's final shot does indeed appear to secure his claim 
once and for all. With this shot his "word" is made "good," 
and the scene would seem rather straightforwardly to 
emblematize stability in naming and authority in speech—  
both who has it (the white male colonial), and how it is 
attained (through a violent negation of the sexual and 
racial Other). The narrator figures Natty's impressive
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performance as a grounding of language, an end to deferral: 
"It decided the question, and effectually established Hawk- 
eye in the possession of his dangerous reputation" (300).
The episode seems to undo the metaphysical damage sustained 
in Natty's ill-fated argument with Chingachgook back in 
Chapter 3, successfully substituting his inherited shooting 
ability for his inaccessible written heritage.
But more is at stake here than just Natty's identity.
Also at issue is the fixity of identity itself, and it is
certainly suggestive that the rifle so frequently fails to
speak unambiguously. Even in this seemingly straightforward
shooting contest, Natty does not reestablish his identity
until the univocality of the rifle has first been brought
into some doubt. For reasons not made very clear—
apparently to express his contempt for Heyward's challenge—
Natty lets off his first shot without appearing so much as
to aim. He does this apparently casually but actually, as
the narrator makes clear, quite calculatedly: Natty intends
his shot to be not only more accurate than Heyward' s, but
also more expressive. and to the extent that it thus
signifies on two levels at once it is no longer a
transparent speech but one requiring interpretation. It is
paradoxically because Natty's performance is so convincing
that his audience is divided on whether to attribute the
rifle shot to skill or chance:
The first impression of so strange a scene was 
engrossing admiration. Then a low, but increasing 
murmur, ran through the multitude, and finally 
swelled into sounds, that denoted lively opposi­
tion in the sentiments of the spectators. While 
some openly testified their satisfaction at so 
unexampled dexterity, by far the larger portion of
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the tribe were inclined to believe the success of 
the shot was the result of accident. (298)
Rather than pinning down identity and meaning, the rifle's 
speech simply fuels another round of contestation within an 
interpretive community. Faced with this deferral, we would 
do well to ask just what, precisely, we are to take as 
Natty's "unexampled dexterity": his shooting or his acting?
When Underhill's native marksman fires at his enemy, 
the narrator assures us that he "without question was the 
death of him." But in The Last of the Mohicans we find no 
such assurances. Instead we find just the opposite, acts of 
marksmanship that repeatedly prove at the most crucial 
moments to be ambiguous. This is most notably the case with 
the shooting of Natty's great nemesis, the one target he 
cannot seem to pin down, the ultimate test of la lonaue 
carabine's stabilizing power: Magua. It is Magua who seems 
to epitomize deferral itself, who repeatedly evades the 
significations alloted him. ”[T]here never will be an end 
to his loping," as Natty puts it, using a word that aptly 
suggests the perpetual sliding of the signifier, "till 
'kill-deer' has said a friendly word to him" (186), and 
Magua does indeed seem to escape every effort made to 
contain him.
Even at the novel's climactic death scene there is no 
certain closure, for the cause of Magua's death is left 
unclear even here. Circumstances certainly imply that the 
Huron is finished off by a "word from ’kill-deer,1" but the 
question is rather pointedly left open. Just where we might 
expect certainty, the story foregrounds images of fluidity
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and indeterminacy, leaving the shooting of even such a great
marksman as Natty to fail as the trope of a present speech.
"A form stood at the brow of the mountain," says the
narrator in the novel's penultimate scene, "on the very edge
of the giddy height, with uplifted arms, in an awful
attitude of menace." Surely this menacing form must belong
to Magua, and "[w].ithout stopping to consider his person,
the rifle of Hawkeye was raised" (338). But just before
firing Natty realizes he is aiming not at Magua, the novel's
personification of evil, but at Magua's utter opposite, the
"glowing countenance" of David Gamut. A second later, the
real Magua "lopes" into view and attempts, once again, to
dodge the bullet that would name him:
[H]e made a desperate leap, and fell short of his 
mark; though his hands grasped a shrub on the 
verge of the height. The form of Hawk-eye had
crouched like a beast about to take its spring,
and his frame trembled so violently with 
eagerness, that the muzzle of the half raised 
rifle played like a leaf fluttering in the wind.
One might here repeat the words of Underhill's interpreter 
and ask of Natty, "What are you, an Indian or an 
Englishman?" It is again a moment of extreme instability, 
with the signifiers of racial and sexual identity sliding 
out of control, leaving the putatively civilized white man 
"crouched" like a "beast"— bestial in his crouched posture 
and eagerness for the kill, impotent in his inability to 
make his half-erect gun "speak."
When Natty finally does fire, the actual utterance is
played down, camouflaged in subordinate clauses:
Without exhausting himself with fruitless efforts, 
the cunning Magua suffered his body to drop to the 
length of his arms, and found a fragment for his
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feet to rest upon. Then summoning all his powers, 
he renewed the a'ttempt, and so far succeeded, as 
to draw his knees on the edge of the mountain. It 
was now, when the body of his enemy was most 
collected together, that the agitated weapon of 
the scout was drawn to his shoulder. The 
surrounding rocks, themselves, were not steadier 
than the piece became for the single instant that 
it poured out its contents.
Thus does the rifle speak— but to what effect?
The arms of the Huron relaxed, and his body fell 
back a little, while his knees still kept their 
position. Turning a relentless look on his enemy, 
he shook his hand in grim defiance. But his hold 
loosened, and his dark person was seen cutting the 
air with its head downwards, for a fleeting 
instant, until it glided past the shrubbery which 
clung to the mountain, in its rapid flight to 
destruction. (338)
Here the reader cannot say of Magua that Natty "without
question was the death of him"; the narrator juxtaposes
Natty's rifle shot and Magua's apparently fatal fall but
refuses to link them in any causal relationship. If Magua
indeed had to summon "all his powers" just to "draw his
knees on the edge of the mountain," might he not have
dropped off through sheer exhaustion? There is no real
evidence that Natty has in fact killed Magua; except for the
single word "destruction," there is no evidence to suggest
even that Magua has died. We do know that Magua has escaped
every previous attempt to contain him; why not this one as
well? Before passing judgment, we would do well to file for
habeas corpus. Where indeed is the body? The novel's final
chapter does show us the bodies of Cora and Uncas; we can
say with certainty that Cora is killed by one of Magua's
"assistants," and Uncas by Magua himself (337). But the
body of Magua is withheld from us.14
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Even if we accept that Magua has died, we still cannot 
say how. By Natty's bullet? By simple exhaustion? There 
is in the end no way to decide; just where we might expect 
closure, the novel presents us with an enigma, an imaging of 
the end of deferral as itself a deferral. During its most 
crucial performance— when this most powerful figure of a 
fully present speech might most securely ground its claims—  
the rifle speaks loudly yet seems strangely silent. 15 
A Natural Inscription?
Early in the novel, spying the antlers of a deer just 
visible through the dense foliage of the forest, Natty brags 
to Uncas that he will take the buck "atwixt the eyes, and 
nearer to the right than to the left." Uncas finds this 
hard to believe:
"It cannot be! . . . all but the tips of his 
horns are hid!"
"He's a boy!" said the white man, shaking his 
head while he spoke, and addressing the father. 
"Does he think when a hunter sees a part of the 
creatur, he can't tell where the rest of him 
should be!" (34)
The "marksman's aiming" has here become, in John Lynen's 
words, an exercise in "mak[ing] the mind conform exactly to 
the conditions of nature" (188)— and among the conditions 
implied by this passage is a regular and predictable 
structure, a system of formal relationships that allows the 
tips of the horns to locate the rest of the animal. The 
ability to access this structure is not claimed by Natty for 
himself alone, but for any skilled hunter, and his claim is 
held to be true not just of this particular deer, but of any 
such creature. The ability is neither idiosyncratic nor
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contextual, that is, but general, not parole but lanque. It 
is a function of that structure by means of which signs on 
the surface of nature can indicate the realities underneath. 
Shooting here tropes the reading— and by implication the 
very existence— of the divine inscription itself, of the 
preexisting system without which the wilderness cannot be 
thought of as both natural and readable.16
But is this structure truly "divine" or "natural"? Can 
a "pure" or "virgin" nature exist that is also transparently 
legible? That is, can the term "wilderness" as it is used 
in The Last of the Mohicans have any sensible referent? The 
novel repeatedly raises these questions but rather pointedly 
refuses to answer them. In the scene above, for example, 
Natty makes a constative claim— about nothing less than 
nature's very structure— and offers to prove it by hitting 
the buck in a precisely predicted spot. But before he can 
be put to the test Chingachgook intervenes, reminding Natty 
that firing would reveal their position to their enemies.
The "typifying" power of the rifle is asserted, but never 
tested. Thus let off the hook, Natty need no longer prove 
his assertion; instead he merely authorizes it. His 
response to Uncas's argument is reduced to an ad hominem 
dismissal— "He's a boy!"— and an attempt to align himself 
with the authority of the boy's father (who notably refuses 
to take sides). The shift is from a neoplatonic claim of an 
absolute formal structure to the strategic utterances of the 
sophist, to "mere" rhetoric, a shift reminding us that the 
antlers themselves, from the moment they are invoked as a 
signifier, are no longer natural but rhetorical. As such,
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like any other signifier, they are no longer connected 
either physically or semantically to what Natty must now 
merely assert as their signified. Natty cannot know that 
the antlers are not in fact connected to a human being 
rather than a deer— a distinct possibility in a novel which, 
as we shall see, repeatedly has its human characters 
performing a cross-species drag.
In The Last of the Mohicans, Natty shoots neither at 
white people nor at such "good" Indians as the Delawares, 
but rather at animals and such "bad" Indians as the Hurons. 
This pattern limns the readable body of the wilderness at 
which he takes aim, which his rifle is to "typify." It 
manifests and objectifies this body in what for Natty are 
two not-so-distinct loci: the body of the "wild" Indian as 
well as that of the wild landscape.-7 These bodies are 
presented as naturally inscribed, but key passages in the 
novel undermine this presentation, suggesting instead that 
we may think of them, in Judith Butler's terms, as having 
been made to signify on their surfaces.
The body of the wilderness is presented (and 
simultaneously problematized) as part of a natural 
inscription that preexists any reading of it and is held to
be always distinguishable from any merely human writing.
Every time the fleeing Magua tries to cover his tracks, for 
example, altering the signs of his passage by laboriously 
writing a human landscape that mimics the "natural" one, the
woodsmen are consistently able to follow the trail.
Tracking becomes reading, a matter of tracing out a string 
of differences, and the fact that Natty eventually does hunt
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Magua down is not so much a vindication of his pathfinding 
skills as a reification of the divine inscription, of the 
notion that there is a preexisting text to be found in 
nature in the first place (which in turn is perhaps the 
enabling presupposition of "nature writing").
The emblematic activity here is the close reading of 
the artful writing of nature. Notably it is the doomed 
Uncas, "quick of sight and keen of wit" (213) who ultimately 
proves the best reader, able to pick out the trail even when 
Natty and Chingachgook have lost it.is Natty explicitly and 
favorably contrasts this pathfinding prowess to the reading 
ability of "the young white, who gathers his learning from 
books, and can measure what he knows by the page" (213). 
Magua's great skill, by contrast, is writing "realistically," 
consciously arranging the marks that signify his presence so 
that they will be indistiguishable from what is held by his 
readers to be the preexisting field of natural signifiers. 
Whenever possible, he traverses "a rock, or a rivulet, or a 
bit of earth harder than common," any place where his 
passage will not create difference, will not alter 
significantly the natural configuration of the wilderness. 
Nonetheless the woodsmen, reading with an extreme 
skepticism, consistently manage to pick out the human from 
the natural signifier: whenever Magua's artifice "severed 
the links of the clue they followed, the true eye of the 
scout recovered them at a distance, and seldom rendered the 
delay of a single moment necessary" (214).
At length, however, Magua's nature writing does come 
close to succeeding. "The trail appeared to suddenly have
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ended" (214), and even though the foresters "applied
themselves to their task in good earnest," their
"examination resulted in no discovery" (215). They try
again, this time "going over the ground by inches":
Not a leaf was left unturned. The sticks were 
removed, and the stones lifted— for Indian cunning 
was known frequently to adopt these objects as 
covers, labouring with the utmost patience and 
industry, to conceal each footstep as they pro­
ceeded. . . .  At length Uncas . . . raked the 
earth across the turbid little rill from the 
spring, and diverted its course into another 
channel. So soon as its narrow bed below the dam 
was dry, he stooped over it with keen and curious 
eyes [and] pointed out the impression of a 
moccasin in the moist alluvion. (215-16)
Fleshing out the implications of this clue, the landscape- 
readers quickly establish that David Gamut, with the largest 
feet in Magua's party, had been made to go first; carrying 
Cora and Alice, the Hurons had then followed precisely in 
his footsteps, leaving just the one print concealed by the 
water. "I can now read the whole of it," exclaims Natty, 
choosing this moment to make explicit the trope of the 
wilderness-as-book (216, my emphasis).
The critical practice of the adventurers is to 
diligently seek out the human signifier. But how can they 
recognize it when they see it? They can do so only by its 
difference from the natural signifier, by the difference 
between the bent twig and the straight one, the moccasin 
print and the undisturbed mud. From Saussure we know that 
it is only out of such differences that meaning itself may 
arise; more importantly, we know that in such a system 
"there are only differences," and while "a difference 
generally implies positive terms between which the
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difference is set up," Saussure emphasizes that "in language 
there are only differences without positive terms" (120).
The novel's opposition of a natural to a human inscription—  
as two separate, opposable systems, each with its own 
independent positivity— is therefore illusory, for the very 
comparison of the natural and the human— the very 
observation of their difference— inscribes them in a single 
system of differences. This system can be considered 
neither "natural" nor "cultural," for that very distinction 
arises within the system and cannot precede it.
Uncas's discovery of this human footprint reprises that 
moment so crucial to western meta-physics, the "emergence" 
of "man." It is the mythic moment of origin, the 
"discovery" of that initial difference which makes it 
possible for "culture" to differentiate itself from its 
foundational Other, "nature"— the sort of moment replayed in 
contemporary discourses by such events as the discovery of 
an early hominid fossil, or the teaching of a chimpanzee to 
sign. "A cry of exultation immediately announced the 
success of the young warrior," says the narrator, and the 
"the whole party crowded to the spot," with Natty regarding 
the moccasin print "with as much admiration as a naturalist 
would expend on the tusk of a mammoth or the rib of a 
mastodon" (216).
But why must this moment be reprised here, at this 
particular juncture of this particular novel? The aim of 
the close reading is to locate the white maidens—  
particularly Alice, the imperiled future of a civilization 
that will fade back into savagery if, as its symbolic
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progenitor, she is suffered to bear the children of a 
"natural" race. Haunting the novel on the one hand is this 
specter of miscegnation, whose mere biological possibility 
challenges the racialist notion of fundamentally separate 
orders of humanity. But in addition there is the gradual 
erosion of the nature/culture distinction itself, as the 
adventurers' closer and closer reading of the landscape-text 
uncovers that distinction's artificiality. In order to 
sustain a literary-environmental discourse that opposes 
"civilization" to "wilderness" (and white to red, male to 
female, and so on) the adventurers must sustain the 
nature/culture system; to maintain that system they must 
rescue Alice, whose purity alone can (symbolically) 
reproduce it; to rescue Alice they must follow her trail, 
and to trace out her trail they must parse ever-finer 
distinctions between nature and culture. It is Magua, 
always profoundly troublesome, who threatens to expose this 
circularity, this lack of any genuine origin. It is Magua 
who drives them to the borderland where difference and 
meaning seem to disappear, and it is precisely there that 
the mythic origin of culture must be asserted and celebrated 
anew.
Along with the human trail, of course, is rediscovered 
the wilderness through which it leads and against which it 
is conceptualized. It is only through the recognition of 
the not-quite-effaced "human" signifier, the trace of 
Magua's earlier passage and intention, that wilderness-as- 
natural-inscription once again becomes conceivable. In this 
sense Natty Bumppo is never in an uninflected or untrammeled
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"wilderness" at all, nor can he be. The writer of nature—  
Magua or his equivalent— is always and must always be one 
step ahead of the "discoverer" of nature. Of course, 
literary-environmental discourse can continue to treat its 
object as natural only through the banishment of that prior 
human marking; just as environmentalist discourse will 
generally efface the early presence of native Americans in 
order to conceive of a "virgin" American wilderness 
preservable in a "pure" state, so Natty must hunt down and 
eliminate Magua and his "polluting" human mark.
Yet without that mark, the wilderness fades into 
illegibility— another reason, perhaps, why The Last of the 
Mohicans becomes so strangely silent at the moment of 
Magua's long-anticipated "destruction" (338). When Natty 
has his peripatetic antagonist where he wants him, clinging 
precariously to the cliffside, ready to drop any moment 
under the strain, it is, as we have seen, a moment of 
intense liminality. Natty has just moments ago mistaken the 
gentle David Gamut for the evil Magua, while the narrator 
uncharacteristically figures the white hero not as savvy 
woodsman but as bloodthirsty animal, "crouched like a beast 
about to take its spring" while "the muzzle of the half­
raised rifle played like a leaf fluttering in the wind"
(338). It is difficult, finally, to know what to make of 
this image of semi-erection, of a wavering phallus which 
confounds the nature/culture boundary rather than clarifying 
it. Natty does, however, manage to raise his rifle. He 
shoots, Magua falls, but we still do not know whether it is 
a bullet from Kill-deer that brings the Huron down, or
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simple exhaustion. At this most crucial point, has the
typifying power of the rifle again been merely asserted,
without being proved? A glance at Magua's corpse, a reading
of his transfigured body, might settle the matter, but that
body is never seen again— perhaps, as I prefer to believe,
because finally it could not be tracked down.
A Performance Worth Regarding
[T]he compelling force of transvestism in 
literature and culture comes . . . from its 
instatement of metaphor itself, not as that for 
which a literal meaning must be found, but 
precisely as that without which there would be no 
such thing as meaning in the first place.
— Marjorie Garber (390)
"Long ago," wrote Anne Sexton in "Red Riding Hood," 
"there was a strange deception / a wolf dressed in frills, / 
a kind of transvestite." When Marjorie Garber quotes from 
this poem in her Vested Interests: Cross-Dressing and 
Cultural Anxiety (375), we most readily assume that what is 
"strange" about the "deception" is the image of a male wolf 
in female attire, the crossing of the boundaries of sex and 
gender. Yet is it not also disconcerting to ponder the 
crossing of species boundaries, to view this durable image 
of the nonhuman dressed up as the human? I want now to 
treat cross-species drag and performance as a form of 
transvestism in its own right, a confounding of the natural 
in the accoutrements of the cultural (and vice-versa).
Always an index of broader cultural crises, 
transvestism invites the contextualizing and historicizing 
of texts that foreground it. Transvestism "puts in question 
identities previously conceived as stable, unchallengeable,
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grounded, and 'known,'" and "this disruptive act of putting 
in question" is "precisely the place, and the role, of the 
transvestite" (13). In particular, transvestism points to a 
"category crisis," a "failure of definitional distinction, a 
borderline that becomes permeable" (16). Parallelling 
Judith Butler’s claims for the performativity of sex and 
gender, Garber argues for "the extraordinary power of 
transvestism to disrupt . . . the very notion of the 
'original.'" Category crisis itself is seen ultimately as
"not the exception but rather the ground of culture"; by
forcing and negotiating such crisis, transvestism in fact 
"creates culture" (16, my emphasis).
Shirley Samuels has suggested that in writing The Last
of the Mohicans, Cooper may have been influenced by a Leni-
Lenape origin myth in which
the drawing of human beings into culture is 
accomplished by the pursuit and consumption of the
natural. . . . The emergence of persons is thus
linked to the marking of the difference between 
what's natural and what's cultural: nature worship 
only becomes possible once the separation between 
persons and nature has been violently effected.19
Any blurring of this "violently effected" separation raises 
the specter of the submergence of persons, in a sort of 
"miscegnation between nature and culture" (89), and the 
latter half of Cooper's novel thematizes just this threat. 
Beyond the merely personal interests of the white men who 
seek the two white women out, the motivation is as much to 
frustrate Magua's sexual claim on Cora as it is to 
facilitate the courtship of Alice and Duncan. This 
obsession with racial stability is just one facet of the
141
broader aim of effecting and maintaining separation 
generally; it is necessarily bound up with the fixing of 
other threatened categories, such as those of gender and 
class, that are also seen as natural. Near the conclusion 
of the novel, for example, the liberal Munro makes a plea 
for a general equality of gender, class, and race, hoping 
that, if only in the afterlife, "the time shall not be
distant, when we may assemble . . . without distinction of
sex, or rank, or colour." Natty does not simply reject this
plea, but stabilizes "sex, rank, and color" all at once by
subsuming them in the arche-category, nature: "To tell them 
this," he says, "would be to tell them that the snows come 
not in the winter, or that the sun shines fiercest when the 
trees are stripped of their leaves!" (347).
But despite such conservative pronouncements of a 
naturally fixed cultural order, the plot shift from chase to 
rescue in The Last of the Mohicans occasions a discursive 
shift from a foundationalist to a relativist and 
performative worldview. Before, the heroes' strategy hinged 
upon the correct "close reading" of the wild body, a 
strategy predicated upon a traditional view of Truth and 
epitomized by the ability of careful reading to expose 
Magua's artificial inscription— his artifice— by 
distinguishing it from the seemingly natural inscription of 
the wilderness. Once the two women have been located, 
however, the heroes rely almost wholly on artifices of their 
own, on rhetoric and performance, on the contextualized 
understanding of signifying practices seen as strategic 
rather than simply "true" or "false." As the novel
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approaches its finale, its groundings move away from Natty's 
notion of a stable nature and toward the fluidity of 
performance— suggesting that nature is not "natural" at all 
but performative.
Critics have long complained of how Cooper's always- 
shaky plotting threatens to break down entirely toward the 
end of The Last of the Mohicans, and of how this threat 
necessitates the absurd substitutions which end up carrying 
the plot— Heyward's impersonation of a native healer,
Natty's performance of a bear, Uncas's decidedly superior 
performance of that bear, Chingachgook's performance of a 
beaver, and so on. But it is not just the plot that is 
breaking down by this point: in addition, the crucial 
silences of the speaking gun and the persistent insinuation 
of human rhetoric into the putatively natural inscription of 
the wild body precipitate a sense of category crisis, of a 
breakdown in the very structures by means of which nature 
and culture have been separated in the first place. In the 
wake of these twin failures, the book's drag scenes are not 
ludicrous at all, but predictable attempts to reinstate the 
threatened categories via another strategy.
Traveling deep in enemy territory, Duncan Heyward is
brought up short by what he will later discover to be a
beaver pond, but at first takes to be an Indian village:
The water fell out of this wide basin, in a 
cataract so regular and gentle, that it appeared 
rather to be the work of human hands, than 
fashioned by nature. A hundred earthen dwellings 
stood on the margin of the lake. . . . Their 
rounded roofs, admirably moulded for defence 
against the weather, denoted more of industry and 
foresight, than the natives were wont to bestow on 
their regular habitations. . . . [T]ne whole
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village or town, which ever it might be termed, 
possessed more of method and neatness of execu­
tion, than the white men had been accustomed to 
believe belonged, ordinarily, to the Indian 
habits. (218-219)
Heyward ponders this scene for several minutes, then sees
the "suspicious and inexplicable movements" of what he takes
to be natives but are really animals. He next spies a human
form which he and Natty both take for an Indian but is
really a white man, David Gamut. When all is revealed a
moment later, the narrator explicitly implicates his readers
in these unwitting performances, as usual aligning their
point of view with Heyward's:
The reader may better imagine, than we describe, 
the surprise of Heyward. His lurking Indians were 
suddenly converted into four-footed beasts; his 
lake into a beaver pond; his cataract into a dam, 
constructed by those industrious and ingenious 
quadrupeds; and a suspected enemy into a true 
friend. (222)
Neither Gamut nor the beavers have been consciously 
performing here; they have not been wearing masks which they 
suddenly doff so as to reveal the "true" significations of 
their "natural" surfaces. The "converting" is accomplished 
rather by the narrator, who disguises his own activity in 
the passive voice ("were suddenly converted"). Occupying 
the position of grammatical subject that is thereby emptied 
out we find various manifestations of "nature": the lake, 
the cataract, the putatively "natural" Indians, and the 
Other more generally: the "enemy." The narrator further 
effaces his own agency by subordinating his descriptions and 
manipulations to the imaginations of his readers. Yet the 
effect— the reader's surprise— is the same as the shock that
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would have been effected by a consciously performed drag. 
This little parable of misrecognition "acts" just like a 
performance, yet appears "natural," a mere mistake on 
Duncan's part.
Even after this naturalized performance has been 
revealed, after the confused categories have supposedly been 
clarified, there remains a certain residue of confusion.
The narrator leaves us not quite sure whether beavers are 
wild (undomesticated animals) or civilized (intelligent and 
industrious beings who construct well ordered communities). 
The cultural continues to feel strangely natural, even as 
the wild (cataract and lake) remains oddly artifactual and 
human (dam and pond).
Later, at this same spot, Chingachgook dons the mask of
a beaver and affords readers a "real" performance of nature.
The spectacle this time is not that of a white man taking
animals for humans but of an Indian taking a human for an
animal. As a party of Huron warriors file past the pond,
they pause to allow a member of the party to address this
"beaver" as his totemic kinsmen. The warrior speaks "as if
he were addressing more intelligent beings" (284); as the
Hurons proceed into the forest, we readers find out what '
they never do: that they had been observing a more
intelligent being.
Had any of the Hurons turned to look behind them, 
they would have seen the animal watching their 
movements with an interest and sagacity that might 
easily have been mistaken for reason. Indeed, so 
very distinct and intelligible were the devices of 
the quadruped, that even the most experienced 
observer would have been at a loss to account for 
its actions, until . . . the party entered the 
forest, when the whole would have been explained,
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by seeing the entire animal issue from the lodge, 
uncasing, by the act, the grave features of
Chingachgook from his mask of fur. (285)
Unlike Duncan, the novice woodsman, the experienced Hurons 
should not have been so easily taken in. The narrator makes 
it sound simple enough: all they had to do was turn around 
and look. The plot, however, requires that they not look—  
doing so would disconcert the adventurers' battle plan— and 
so they do not. In this scene the success of Chingachgook's 
performance is notably not attributable to his skill; his 
performance is marred by "distinct and intelligible"
"devices" that might easily have tipped off the observer.
The ability to detect the original beneath the mask— to limn 
the wilderness by separating the natural from the cultural—
is no longer seen as a matter of acuteness of perception, of
the sort of "close reading" performed upon the landscape 
earlier by Uncas and Natty; it has instead become just 
another narratorial device.
There is a certain playfulness in the way Cooper 
highlights his narrator's and his readers' complicity in 
these performances, but the question they raise is serious 
enough: How are we to know that any object presented to
readers as natural or original— right on up to that object 
viewed as the most natural, that sine qua non of nature, the 
wilderness— is not itself performed, a performance that a 
self-effacing narrator chooses not to reveal to us in the 
same way Cooper's narrator refuses to reveal Chingachgook to 
the Hurons? Significantly, I think, this question arises at 
just the spot where Heyward was himself taken in. If the
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novel interpellates us as Heyward’s symbolic descendants, 
the legatees of his readerly skills and weaknesses, it also 
warns us to read with caution, to keep in mind the 
possibility that beneath the surface of the signifiers of 
the wild lay not some wild essence or foundation, but merely 
the "grave features" of a human intention esconced in a 
"mask of fur."20
According to Judith Butler, what is parodied in
transvestism is not any particular identity, but the very
"notion of an original . . . identity" (138). At the Huron
camp, Duncan praises Natty's performance of the bear in
terms that similarly privilege performance over original,
noting that "the animal itself might have been shamed by the
representation" (257). Natty responds that he
should be a poor scholar, for one who has studied 
so long in the wilderness, did I not know how to 
set forth the movements and natur of such a beast! 
Had it been now a catamount, or even a full sized 
painter [panther], I would have embellished a 
performance, for you, worth regarding! But it is 
no such marvellous feat to exhibit the feats of so 
dull a beast; though, for that matter too, a bear 
may be over acted! Yes, yes; it is not every 
imitator that knows natur may be outdone easier 
than she is equalled. (257-258)
Reappearing in this parody is the figure of the book, of 
Natty's years of reading of the natural inscription. But 
here, reading is only a sort of hueristic, no longer an 
attainment of Truth but a prelude to performance. Before, 
Natty's scholarship had consisted of reading nature, 
learning to aim, making his mind "conform" to the wilder­
ness, and it culminated in shooting, in proving out the 
truths inherent in nature's preexisting structure. Here,
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however, nature study culminates in drag and performance, in 
the active creation of surface significations whose truth or 
accuracy is contingent, ultimately ascertainable only in the 
local efficacy of a performance.21
The emphasis on drag in The Last of the Mohicans 
thoroughly undermines the earlier notion of the wilderness 
"as mute, prior to culture, awaiting the inscription-as- 
incision of the masculine signifier for entrance into 
language and culture" (Butler 147-148). Like the human 
body, the "body" of "nature" must be seen as "not a 'being,' 
but a variable boundary, a surface whose permeability is 
politically regulated, a signifying practice within a 
cultural field" ( 139).22 To introduce this episode that so 
tellingly interweaves the themes of nature, culture, gender, 
and performance, Cooper quotes from A Midsummer Night's 
Dream, and the allusion neatly foreshadows the chapter's 
theme of the play within the play, preparing us for the 
dizzily nested performances to follow. It also succinctly 
emblematizes what I have taken to be the very "meaning of 
this masquerade" (256), the performativity of wilderness 
"itself." "Have you the lion's part written?" asks Snug in 
this epigraph, linking one of our most potent symbols of 
wildness to the thoroughly human realm of discourse and 
performance. Answers Quince: "You may do it extempore, for 
it is nothing but roaring" (255).
Notes to Chapter Three
1 I want to examine "by what enigmatic means" the 
wilderness has "been accepted as a prima facie given that 
admits of no genealogy." Butler writes that
[e]ven within Foucault's essay on the very theme 
of genealogy, the body is figured as a surface and
148
the scene of a cultural inscription: "the body is 
the inscribed surface of events." The task of 
genealogy, he claims, is "to expose a body totally 
imprinted by history." (129)
Noting, however, the way that Foucault referred to "the goal 
of 'history'" as the "'destruction of the body,'" Butler 
continues:
As 'a volume in perpetual disintegration,' the 
body is always under siege, suffering destruction 
by the very terms of history. And history is the 
creation of values and meanings by a signifying 
practice that requires the subjection of the body.
2 This sort of commodification of nature was not unique 
to Audubon, but in his case it is acutely obvious, if only 
because he personally participated in the entire process.
He observed and shot the birds; he then represented them, 
via the arts of taxidermy and writing as well as painting; 
he then sought out and developed a market for those 
representations; and he finally supervised their material 
reproduction and distribution. It is in Audubon's case 
particularly easy to see the literary environmentalist's 
activities not as a break from but as continuous with the 
earlier, more obviously economic activities of the sawmill 
owner and the taxidermist.
3 Audubon's love of hunting has been widely noted. I 
would add here an incident, detailed in Audubon's letters, 
that very curiously links the gun to issues of gender, 
representation, and identity. In February of 1821, when 
Audubon was in New Orleans, a woman secretively commissioned 
him to draw a nude portrait of her. Upon returning to this 
job each day, Audubon found that the woman herself had 
worked on the drawing, "not, she explained, because she was 
dissatisfied, but because she wanted to mingle her own 
talents with his." The portrait finished, the woman then 
"signed it as though it had been her own," placing Audubon's 
name "in a dark corner where it would be difficult to find" 
(Adams 232). As payment she purchased an expensive gun 
Audubon had picked out earlier and which she had engraved 
with an emblem of her own design.
Not long after, along with hundreds of other men and 
presumably with his new gun in tow, Audubon spent a day 
hunting the golden plovers then arriving in huge flocks in 
Louisiana. His own take is unreported, but he estimated the 
kill that day alone at 144,000. His biographer, Alexander 
Adams, writes cagily of Audubon that "[t]he adventure with 
the erotic woman had done much to raise his spirits and so 
had the sight of the golden plovers" (234).
4 Elaborating on the "historical mode of signification" 
that has produced gender, Butler has theorized the dynamics
149
of this mystification. If "the creation of values . . . 
requires the destruction of’the body," then that very 
destruction implies that "there must be a body prior to that 
inscription, stable and self-identical, subject to that 
sacrificial destruction," so that the very fact of inscription 
seems to point to and to valorize (for we only "sacrifice" 
what we value) some prediscursive natural body. Butler 
continues with the observation that "cultural values emerge 
as the result of an inscription on the body, understood as a 
medium, indeed, a blank page." But
in order for this inscription to signify . . . 
that medium must itself be destroyed— that is, 
fully transvaluated into a sublimated domain of 
values. Within the metaphorics of this notion of 
cultural values is the figure of history as a 
relentless writing instrument, and the body as the 
medium which must be destroyed and transfigured in 
order for "culture" to emerge. (130)
5 I will examine in detail the operation of this figure 
in Cooper's violent wilderness novel, The Last of the 
Mohicans, but it could be traced as well through other texts 
in what might be considered a distinct genre of "nature 
writing" that emanates, like Audubon's, from the barrel of a 
gun: the trophies and essays of the noted conservationist 
Teddy Roosevelt, for example, or (as Haraway has so vividly 
shown) the dioramas created for the American Museum of 
Natural History by Carl Akeley (26-54). Audubon in this 
sense should not be seen as a "minor" nature writer, but as 
one of the creators of the very object and medium of nature 
writing, as an inventor of nature "itself."
6 Pioneers 80, 290; Mohicans 121. All subsequent 
Cooper quotations are from Mohicans.
7 Even such a demonized character as Magua, presented 
more generally as an inveterate liar, is perceived as 
speaking a truth when he says of the exploitative, land- 
hungry "white man" that "his gluttony makes him sick," that 
"God gave him enough, and yet he wants all" (301). In a 
novel that more generally condemns the crossing of racial 
boundaries, this universalized appreciation of nature is one 
of few points on which voices both white and red find common 
ground.
8 It is only when the novelist cannot have his story 
thus "directly conjured from the natural scenery" that he 
resorts to his sometimes absurd plots: "Cooper tends to an 
excess of action because, in a more fundamental sense, he 
can portray no action at all. Since his characters cannot 
develop, their deeds" function mainly to create "visual 
panoramas rather than a coherent story" (Lynen 179).
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9 This exemplary maiden and her partner, one of the 
Hurons1 "bravest young men" (256), are the only Indian 
couple put forth by the novel, as are Alice and Duncan, as a 
procreative link to a racially unmixed future. Heyward is 
spared the burden of any responsibility for figuratively 
dooming an entire race by his failure to cure this woman:
"A single look was sufficient to apprise the pretended 
leech, that the invalid was far beyond his powers of heal­
ing"; the "slight qualm of conscience which had been excited 
by the intended deception, was instantly appeased" (253).
10 Heyward's foil here is the aged Tamenund, regarded, 
like Washington, as the father "of a nation" (Mohicans 305). 
A figure "deeply venerated" and "well beloved," Tamenund has 
"the dignity of a monarch, and the air of a father" (294). 
The similarity of the two names is obvious enough, each with 
three syllables, each syllable of the one retaining a 
phonological correlate of the other: Wash/Tam, ing/en, 
ton/und. It is significant that the elderly chief's star is 
fading as that of the young white officer is rising.
11 My argument in this section draws upon Eric 
Cheyfitz's "Literally White, Figuratively Red," especially 
his comments on The Last of the Mohicans1 figures of the 
book, writing, and orality (91-92 n. 17).
12 According both Spaniard and native a precise place 
in a global teleology, the Requerimiento fixes identities 
for both speaker and auditor, reaffirming the colonial in 
his familiar heritage and completely reconstructing the 
Indian into a "religious and legal fiction," in Cheyfitz's 
words, a "pure figure" whose own specificities are "formally 
denied" (74). The document's narration of the deeds of the 
(Church) fathers subsumes native histories into an all- 
encompassing patrilineage, claiming thereby a preexisting 
and eternal dominion over both native peoples and their 
lands.
13 These differing stresses on ritual and iconoclasm 
might be seen as corresponding to contemporary Catholic and 
Protestant theological styles. See Kibbey 42-64.
14 Mohicans features two extended episodes that 
foreshadow Magua's demise, and in each the narrator is 
ambiguous as to the efficacy of the rifle and fails to 
"produce the body." During the battle at Glenn's Falls, a 
Huron sniper is wounded and dislodged from his perch in an 
oak tree. Duncan Heyward calls for a shot that would end 
the man's suffering, but Natty refuses to fire again, citing 
the need to preserve powder. Then, contravening his own 
advice, he makes as if to fire anyway. "Three several times 
the scout raised his piece in mercy, and as often prudence
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getting the better of his intention, it was again silently 
lowered."
At length, one hand of the Huron lost its hold, 
and dropped exhausted to his side. A desperate 
and fruitless struggle to recover the branch 
succeeded, and then the savage was seen for a 
fleeting instant, grasping wildly at the empty 
air. The lightning is not quicker than was the 
flame from the rifle of Hawk-eye; the limbs of the 
victim trembled and contracted, the head fell to 
the bosom, and the body parted the foaming waters 
. . . and every vestige of the unhappy Huron was 
lost forever. (75, my emphasis)
15 This studied silence can be compared to the way, 
following an earlier battle scene, Natty goes around making 
sure his Huron victims have in fact been dispatched, making 
a "circuit of the dead, into whose senseless bosoms he 
thrust his long knife, with as much coolness, as if they had 
been so many brute carcasses" (114). Natty has reason for 
this brutality. Just moments earlier, Magua had been 
engaged in a furious and seemingly fatal struggle with 
Chingachgook. Natty tried to pick off the Huron with Kill- 
deer, but— in yet another image of a category crisis, an 
extreme fluidity, that occasions a figurative impotency— he 
found the two Indian bodies indistinguishable, too tightly 
intertwined to get a sure aim. Chingachgook finally gets 
the upper hand and manages to stab his foe, apparently 
killing him. "Magua suddenly relinquished his grasp," we 
read, "and fell backward, without motion, and, seemingly, 
without life." Natty, "elevating the butt of the long and 
fatal rifle," then wishes to settle the matter with a blow 
to Magua's skull.
But, at the very moment when the dangerous weapon 
was in the act of descending, the subtle Huron 
rolled swiftly from beneath the danger, over the 
edge of the precipice, and falling on his feet, 
was seen leaping, with a single bound, into the 
center of a thicket of low bushes, which clung 
along its sides. The Delawares, who had believed 
their enemy dead, uttered their exclamation of 
surprise, and were following with speed and 
clamour . . . when a shrill and peculiar cry of 
the scout, instantly changed their purpose, and 
recalled them to the summit of the hill. (114)
The precipice, the falling, the last-minute failure of the 
rifle— all these prefigure the circumstances of the novel's 
climax and warn us that rumors of Magua's death ought always 
to be considered premature.
16 My argument in this section elaborates on Cheyfitz's 
characterization of Natty Bumppo as a "consummate 'reader'" 
of nature (66).
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Throughout The Last of the Mohicans, the Indian body 
is assumed to be as transparently readable as the wilderness 
of which it is figured as a part. Consider the narrator's 
comments on the shooting of the Oneida sniper in Chapter 19. 
"In place of that eager and garrulous narration, with which 
a white youth would have endeavoured to communicate" such a 
triumph, Uncas prefers "to let his deeds speak for themselves" 
by "quietly expos[ing] the fatal tuft of hair, which he bore 
as the symbol of victory" (195). Chingachgook performs a 
close reading of this fragment of a body, placing "his hand 
on the scalp, and consider[ing] it for a moment with deep 
attention" before proclaiming: "Oneida!" (195-6).
Natty proceeds to explain to Duncan that while "to 
white eyes there is no difference between this bit of skin 
and that of any other Indian," Chingachgook can read it 
"with as much ease as if the scalp was the leaf of a book, 
and each hair a letter" (196). The palpability of the scalp 
approximates and figures the sort of presence that western 
metaphysics associates with speech, and Natty attempts to 
infuse that presence into his own figures of writing and the 
book. It is notable— but by now should not be surprising—  
that this linguistic parable is occasioned by the shooting 
of the Oneida. See Cheyfitz 92.
18 The novel posits no successor to the skilled readers 
Natty, Chingachgook, and Uncas. The future belongs instead 
to Heyward, whose notions of language are quite different 
from Natty's. When, for example, Magua questions Heyward 
about the whereabouts of Uncas, whom Magua is hotly 
pursuing, Heyward's linguistic sophistication allows him to 
turn deferral into delay:
"Le Cerf Agile is not here?"
"I know not whom you call the 'nimble deer,'" 
said Duncan, gladly profiting by any excuse to 
create delay.
"Uncas," returned Magua, pronouncing the 
Delaware name with even greater difficulty than he 
spoke his English words. "'Bounding Elk' is what 
the white man says when he calls to the young 
Mohican."
"Here is some confusion of names between us, 
le Renard," said Duncan, hoping to provoke a 
discussion. "Daim is the French for deer, and 
cerf for stag; elan is the true term, when one 
would speak of an elk."
"Yes," muttered the Indian in his native 
tongue; "the pale faces are prattling women! they 
have two words for each thing, while a red skin 
will make the sound of his voice speak for him." 
Then changing his language, he continued, adhering 
to the imperfect nomenclature of his provincial 
instructors, "The deer is swift, but weak; the elk 
is swift, but strong; and the son of 'le serpent'
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is 'le cerf agile.' Has he leaped the river to 
the woods?"
"If you mean the younger Delaware, he too is 
gone down with the water." (91)
The signifier slides endlessly and the exchange ends not 
with an absolute but with a conditional: "If you mean . . ." 
As Magua tries to pin it down, the signified literally gets 
away from him. Heyward's strategy exemplifies Cheyfitz's 
notion of colonial figuration as a way of "precisely not 
understanding the other" (74).
19 Samuels 89. In its arguments concerning gender and 
performance, this chapter is indebted to Samuels's insights 
in "Generation through Violence."
20 The coperformances at the beaver pond reaffirm John 
Lynen's contention that Cooper's wilderness landscapes, just 
like his plots and his characters, are completely dependent 
for any force they may have on our active cooperation as 
readers. The reifying traffic between "human values and 
natural forms" is for Lynen rooted in our desire to make 
sense of the inconsistencies and gaps in the text. In 
Butler's terms, such "[c]oherence is desired, wished for, 
idealized," and "this idealization is an effect of a 
corporeal signification"— of a mask of fur, in this case, an 
outside that signifies but does not reliably correspond with 
an inside.
21 The overwhelming sense of a "natural" body is an 
effect, writes Butler, with "no ontological status apart 
from the various acts which constitute its reality" (136). 
And, as with cross-gender drag, the cross-species drag that 
so engages the reader of The Last of the Mohicans "implicitly 
reveals" a completely "imitative structure." Indeed,
part of the pleasure, the giddiness of the 
performance is in the recognition of a radical 
contingency . . . [This notion of] parody does 
not assume that there is an original which such 
parodic identities imitate. Indeed, the parody is 
of the very notion of an original, . . .  a fantasy 
of a fantasy, the transfiguration of an Other who 
is always already a "figure" in that double sense. 
The "original" is revealed as "an imitation without an 
origin," and what "postures as an imitation" is a 
"production," part of a "perpetual displacement" (138).
22 Certainly the novel portrays its wild performances 
as culturally situated, directed toward specific interloc­
utors rather than any "universal." In order for Heyward to 
perform the Huron healer, for example, Chingachgook must 
reinscribe his civilized body as "savage," a process 
compared, appropriately enough, to landscape painting (228).
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"[T]he Sagamore can . . . make a natural fool of you," 
through a practice figured as fully artifactual, as an 
oxymoronic "making" "natural" that cannot be assimilated 
into any foundational notion of an un-made nature.
Chingachgook, "long practised in all the subtle arts of 
his race," proceeds to draw upon Heyward "the fantastic 
shadow that the natives were accustomed to consider as the 
evidence of a friendly and jocular disposition," making sure 
that "[e]very line that could possibly be interpreted into a 
secret inclination for war, was carefully avoided" (229).
The Indian body that was earlier as transparent as its twin, 
the body of the wilderness, is now to be signified by an 
intentional alignment, not with any universal inscription, 
but with the customs and codes of a specific interpretive 
community.
CHAPTER FOUR
Writing the "Nation's Park": Three Views of Yosemite
Yosemite's early history has been recounted several 
times, most recently by Rebecca Solnit in Savage Dreams, and 
I will review the story only briefly here.1 For centuries, 
Native Americans of California's Miwok tribe had lived in 
and around the valley, creating a history of their own 
which, like the Miwok people themselves, still disrupts the 
"official" historical narrative of the region.2 That 
official history, the Euro-American "written record," began 
late in the fall of 1833, when Joseph Reddeford Walker tried 
to lead a party of fur trappers across the Sierra Nevada to 
the Pacific Ocean and got bogged down in the snows of the 
Sierra Nevada, somewhere along the high mountain divide 
between the Merced and Tuolumne rivers. According to the 
memoir of Zenas Leonard, it was while searching for a way 
off of this divide that he found himself looking down upon 
huge waterfalls that would, as he put it, "precipitate 
themselves from one lofty precipice to another, until they 
are exhausted in rain below," and upon cliffs that seemed 
"to be more than a mile high." This was almost certainly 
the "first white sighting" of Yosemite Valley. But because 
Leonard's account was not widely circulated at the time and 
generated no public interest in the region, historians have 
generally declined to credit him with the valley's
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discovery. In order to "count," a discovery must be more 
than a first white sight; it must also introduce the object 
into discourse, and Leonard's account almost immediately 
fell into obscurity. There is no evidence that the Walker 
party exercised even the most perfunctory of the discursive 
privileges of the "first white man to see," that of naming 
what has been seen.
The white men who finally did exercise this Adamic 
prerogative were members of the Mariposa Battallion, 
participants in the so-called Mariposa Indian War of 1851- 
1853. The excuse advanced for this lopsided "war" was the 
killing of three men at a trading post owned by James 
Savage, an opportunistic and extraordinarily successful 
miner, trader, and frontiersman whom Rebecca Solnit has 
aptly compared to Joseph Conrad's Mr. Kurtz (338). Savage's 
main concern in the events appears to have been to shore up 
his sagging trading empire, which had been based largely on 
his personal initiative and authority; the war may, in fact, 
have begun as little more than "a personal vendetta" (272). 
But Savage managed to convince local authorities that this 
isolated incident at the trading post might spark a mass 
uprising, and he was authorized to form a militia unit, the 
Mariposa Battallion, and to place himself in charge.
The war itself was neither spectacular nor particularly 
successful. Tracking a group of Miwok families led by Chief 
Tenaya into Yosemite Valley in March of 1851, the battallion 
found only one Indian among the abandoned villages— an 
elderly woman who had been unable to flee with the rest. 
Rather than pursue and engage the absent Miwoks, Savage and
157
his men spent the next three days systematically searching 
the valley floor, torching every dwelling and all the food 
stores they could find— a scorched-earth policy that 
eventually brought many of Tenaya's followers, if only 
temporarily, to the reservation. It was during this brief 
initial foray that the soldiers decided to christen the 
valley "Yosemity," apparently in the mistaken belief that 
this was its native designation. A second Mariposa 
expedition followed in May, pursuing and capturing Tenaya 
and several dozen followers who had slipped away from the 
reservation. In 1852, responding to a report that Miwok 
tribesmen had killed two white miners at Bridalveil Meadows, 
federal troops invaded the valley, where they found and 
summarily executed five Indians. Tenaya, meanwhile, had 
left the reservation a second time and crossed the mountains 
to live with a group of Paiute Indians in eastern 
California. He was never recaptured, and died in 1853— not, 
apparently, doing battle with the whites but as the result 
of an argument with some Paiutes.3
As newspaper accounts of the Mariposa War filtered to 
the outside world, attention shifted from the fighting to 
Yosemite itself. Public interest in the valley grew 
exponentially, and by 1863 the movement was afoot to 
preserve it as a park. The details of this crucial 
institutionalization, unfortunately, are still not clearly 
understood. California's Senator John Conness, who 
introduced the Yosemite park bill in Congress in the spring 
of 1864, claimed later that the idea had been presented to 
him by several "gentlemen . . .  of fortune, of taste, and of
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refinement," but he did not name them. Future park 
superintendent Fredrick Law Olmsted may or may not have been 
among them; other likely candidates include Thomas Starr 
King, who was the author of a popular book on New England's 
White Mountains and who was then planning a book on the 
Sierra Nevada, and Israel Ward Raymond, a representative of 
the Central American Steamship Transit Company (which stood 
to benefit from increased tourist travel to California).
This first park bill was not prompted by any organized 
popular movement; unlike most later environmental 
legislation, it sparked no public debate and was approved 
rapidly and quietly in Congress. President Lincoln, 
preoccupied with Civil War matters, signed it into law in 
the summer of 1864.4
First View: Lafayette Bunnell and "The Best Prospect Yet"
[T]o aestheticize morality is to make it ideolog­
ically effective. . . .  If the aesthetic comes 
. . .  to assume the significance it does, it is 
because the word is shorthand for a whole project 
of hegemony, the massive introjection of abstract 
reason by the life of the senses. What matters is 
not in the first place art, but this process of 
refashioning the human subject from the inside, 
informing its subtlest affections and bodily 
responses with this law that is not a law.
— Terry Eagleton (40, 42-43)
Little would be known of the Mariposa War, and even 
less about the Mariposa Battallion's "discovery" of 
Yosemite, were it not for the participation of Lafayette 
Bunnell, who recorded the events in his Discovery of the 
Yosemite and the Indian War of 1851 Which Led to that Event.
Bunnell was born in Rochester, New York in 1824 "and carried
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to Western wilds in 1833," the same year that Zenas Leonard 
had peered down into the valley from its snowbound 
perimeter. In the West, as Bunnell rather apologetically 
wrote, his "opportunities for culture were limited"; in 
particular he "found that the experiences of frontier life" 
had not provided him with "the best preparations for 
literary effort" (ix). His Yosemite book, "his first 
attempt at authorship," was also his last; no one has ever 
called The Discovery of the Yosemite a literary masterpiece.
Why did Bunnell write the book at all? Like Zenas 
Leonard before him, he was the most literate member of his 
party and may on that account have felt a special 
responsibility for chronicling events. He claimed that the 
many secondhand accounts of the war were "so mutilated or 
blended with fiction" as to warrant "a renewed and full 
statement of facts," and he did not deem it "just" that 
readers "should forget the deeds of [the] men who had 
subdued her savages, and discovered her most sublime 
scenery" (ix). On the other hand, he waited nearly thirty 
years before publishing his own version of those events; it 
seems likely his real motivation was a desire to link his 
name and fortunes retroactively to what had become a world- 
famous locale.
Neither Bunnell's timeliness nor his accuracy concerns 
me here, however. Much more interesting is The Discovery of 
the Yosemite's literary-environmental structure, its casual 
and ubiquitous linkage of "subdued savages" and "sublime 
scenery." Representative in this regard is the book's 
description of Major Savage's burning of a native food
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cache— a passage that Bunnell seems to have crafted
carefully and that is worth quoting in full. A certain
quantity of captured food had been set aside for the
soldiers' own use, but as their work was nearly complete,
this reserve, too, has been put to the torch. Bunnell,
meanwhile, has just returned from a day of "exploring,"
enjoying the scenery and searching for any remaining food
stores; "the flames were leaping high" as he addresses
himself to Savage:
I briefly, but with some enthusiasm, described my 
view from the cliff up the North Canon, the Mirror 
Lake view of Half Dome, the fall of the South 
Canon and the view of the distant South Dome. I 
volunteered a suggestion that some new tactics 
would have to be devised before we should be able 
to corral the "Grizzlies" or "smoke them out."
The major looked up from the charred mass of 
burning acorns, and as he glanced down the smoky 
valley, said, "This affords the best prospect of 
any yet discovered; just look!" "Splendid!" I 
promptly replied, "Yo-sem-i-te must be beautifully 
grand a few weeks later when the foliage and 
flowers are at their prime, and the rush of waters 
has somewhat subsided. Such cliffs and water­
falls I never saw before, and I doubt if they 
exist in any other place." I was surprised and 
somewhat irritated by the hearty laugh with which 
my reply was greeted. The major caught the 
expression of my eye and shrugged his shoulders as 
he hastily said "I suppose that is all right, 
Doctor, about the water-falls, etc., for there are 
enough of them here for one locality, as we have 
all discovered; but my remark was not in reference 
to the scenery, but the prospect of the Indians 
being starved out, and of their coming in to sue 
for peace. We have all been more or less wet 
since we rolled up our blankets this morning, and 
the fire is very enjoyable, but the prospect that 
it offers to my mind of smoking out the Indians is 
more agreeable to me than its warmth or all the 
scenery in creation." (91-92)
The difference between these two men, the axis of their
misunderstanding, is figured compactly in the word
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"prospect," by which Savage means a pleasing vision of the
future but which Bunnell takes to mean the aesthetic beauty
of the presently visible landscape. This ambiguous term,
"prospect," in fact has a long history in colonialist travel
narrative. Mary Louise Pratt has shown how it invariably
implicates such writing in an imperialist teleology, how it
points always toward "the goal of expanding the capitalist
world system." In the texts which foreground this sort of
dual "prospect,"
European enterprise is seldom mentioned, but the 
sight/site as textualizea consistently presupposes 
a global transformation that, whether the I/eye 
likes it or not, is already understood to be 
underway. In scanning prospects in the spatial 
sense— as landscape panoramas— this eye knows 
itself to be looking at prospects in the temporal 
sense— as possibilities for the future, resources 
to be developed, landscapes to be peopled or 
repeopled by Europeans. (125)
The distinction between the presently visible landscape and 
the imagined future occupation and reconfiguration of that 
landscape tends to become blurred in such writing. Bunnell, 
for example, uses "prospect" in its present-tense sense of 
"scenery," but also enlists the present scene to prefigure a 
peaceful future when the unpleasant and distracting "rush" 
of events will have subsided and "the foliage and flowers 
[will be] at their prime." Similarly, Savage's genocidal 
work is future-oriented (the fire will eventually result in 
the Miwoks "coming in to sue for peace") but also presently 
satisfying (its warmth "is very enjoyable"). This temporal 
confusion is further complicated in this particular text by 
the fact that the narrator— who speaks in the eighteen 
fifties— is the same "I" as the author— who writes nearly
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thirty years later, from within the reconfigured future 
toward which the text points.
It is important to note that Bunnell does not see the 
battallion's genocidal activities as any less ethical than 
Savage does. Bunnell is not horrified by the major's 
laughter, merely "irritated"; he does not see the 
battallion's activities as unethical, merely distasteful. 
What he arrogates to himself in passages such as this is not 
a moral high ground but a superior sensibility, and in the 
process what strikes us today as the crucial issue, the 
immorality of ethnic cleansing, is deflected from ethics to 
aesthetics.
In so doing, The Discovery of the Yosemite exemplifies 
the more general ideological function of aesthetic 
discourse. As Terry Eagleton has shown in his analysis of 
Alexander Baumgarten's Aesthetica— the philosophical 
treatise, published in 1750, which first theorized the 
modern notion of the aesthetic— such discourse should "be 
read as symptomatic of an ideological dilemma," of what was 
then a vexing question: "how can reason, that most 
immaterial of faculties, grasp the grossly sensuous?" The 
answer lay in the aesthetic, conceived as a new form of 
"cognition" that "mediates between the generalities of 
reason and the particulars of sense" (15). Through such 
mediation, power becomes "aestheticized," rendered "at one 
with the body's spontaneous impulses, entwined with 
sensibility and the affections" (20). The primary 
ideological effect of this aestheticizing is to 
significantly "transform the relations" between "morality
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and knowledge" (28). The Earl of Shaftesbury would make
this transformation more explicit, claiming, as Eagleton
summarizes, that
there is somewhere within our immediate experience 
a sense with all the unerring intuition of 
aesthetic taste, which discloses the moral order 
to us. Such is the celebrated "moral sense" of 
the eighteenth-century moralists, which allows us 
to experience right and wrong with all the 
swiftness of the senses. (34)
The aesthetic aligns morality with "the springs of 
sensibility," positing a moral sense that "consists in 'a 
real antipathy or aversion to injustice or wrong, and in a 
real affection or love towards equity and right, for its own 
sake, and on account of its natural beauty and worth'" (34). 
This mapping of the rational onto the sensual has a 
tremendous ideological efficacy, because "feelings, unlike 
propositions, cannot be controverted" (38).
The aesthetic becomes "an ethics entwined with the
sensuous affections," an "alternative" to a genuine ethics
(35). But where a genuine ethics would concern itself with
reasoning out the morality of actions, the aesthetic routes
such concerns into an appreciation of the beauty of what is
(above all) seen— just as Bunnell’s play on the "prospect"
collapses action-in-time into a timeless "view":
Beauty, truth and goodness are ultimately at one: 
what is beautiful is harmonious, what is 
harmonious is true, and what is at once true and 
beautiful is agreeable and good. . . . "For what 
is there on earth a fairer matter of speculation, 
a goodlier view or contemplation, than that of a 
beautiful, proportion'd, and becoming action?"
. . . Truth for this passed-over Platonist is an 
artistic apprehension of the world's inner design: 
to understand something is to grasp its propor­
tioned place in the whole. (35, my emphases)
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In Bunnell's case, this atemporal, spatialized "whole" 
functions as a sort of synchronic equivalent to the self- 
serving capitalist teleology whose goal is the acquisition 
and transformation of the entire American continent. To 
view the (literally) spectacular Yosemite landscape is to 
apprehend Manifest Destiny itself, the larger design within 
which acts of genocide have their "proportioned place."
In The Discovery of the Yosemite. Bunnell invokes the 
temporal and the atemporal simultaneously, setting up a 
division of ideological labor in which he aestheticizes the 
battallion's activity while the less sophisticated Savage 
rationalizes it. Savage subordinates the sensual pleasure 
of the warmth afforded by the burning food stores to the 
rational prospect of military victory; he rejects feeling in 
favor of the prospect offered to his "mind," his calculated 
awareness of the likely historical effect of his actions.
He understands the rightness of his actions through reason, 
albeit a reasoning we today find repugnant. Bunnell, by 
contrast, opts for the prospect that presents itself to his 
eye. He understands essentially the same thing— he no more 
doubts the rightness of his actions than does Savage— but 
he apprehends this skewed morality aesthetically, in a mode 
of understanding which today we do not find repugnant at 
all.
Bunnell repeatedly stresses his own aesthetic 
apprehension and just as frequently contrasts those tender 
feelings to the obliviousness of his less sophisticated 
companions. He writes that "very few of the volunteers 
seemed to have any appreciation of the wonderful proportions
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of the enclosing granite rocks" (90), and he quotes Savage
as saying that Yosemite was just "what we supposed it to be
before seeing it, a h  of a place" (92). His aesthetic
sensibility serves as the class marker distinguishing him
from his crude comrades-in-arms:
To obtain a more distinct and quiet view, I had 
left the trail and my horse and wallowed through 
the snow alone to a projecting granite rock. So 
interested was I in the scene that I did not 
observe that my companions had all moved on. (64)
[T]he coarse jokes of the careless, and the 
indifference of the practical, sensibly jarred my 
more devout feelings . . . as if a sacred object 
had been ruthlessly profaned, or the visible power 
of Deity disregarded. (68)
From my ardor in description, and admiration of 
the scenery, I found myself nicknamed 'Yosemity' 
by some of the batallion. . . . From this hint I 
became less expressive, when conversing on matters 
related to the valley. My self-respect caused me 
to talk less among my comrades generally. (95)
In foregrounding this class dichotomy, Bunnell is 
aestheticizing and nationalizing his readers as well as the 
landscape. "[R]efashioning the human subject from the 
inside," to recall Eagleton's words, he interpellates his 
readers as subjects who can (mis)understand the narrated 
events as morally justifiable by virtue of the beauty of the 
landscape. The reader's only moral obligation is to 
appreciate "the visible power of Deity"; as appreciation 
becomes the locus of ethics, any persisting guilt may be 
displaced along class lines, onto those who are "coarse" and 
"indifferent" to natural beauty.
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Second View: Frederick Law Olmsted, Social Engineer
Scholars and environmentalists alike have stressed the 
fundamental importance of the preservation of Yosemite 
Valley. To David Brower Yosemite was "a key starting point 
for environmentalism in the United States"; to Hans Huth it 
was the "point of departure from which a new idea began to 
gain momentum," namely the systematic approach to landscape 
preservation which would culminate in the National Park 
System, an "institution admirably suited to fill the needs 
of the [American] people" (48). Just as important as the 
legislation itself was Yosemite's first management report, 
written in 1865 by the new park's first superintendent, the 
noted landscape architect Frederick Law Olmsted. "With this 
single report," according to Laura Wood Roper, "Olmsted 
formulated a philosophic base for the creation of state and 
national parks" which "made explicit and systematic the 
political and moral ideas" implicit in Congress's creation 
of the park and "which not only justified their unexampled 
action but established it as sound precedent" (Olmsted 13). 
The report has "since his time become a fundamental policy 
of the National Park Service" (Todd 145).
As we shall see, Olmsted found in Yosemite far more 
than a mere landscape. He thought himself "a sort of social 
engineer," wrote Roper, "whose function was to civilize men 
. . . and to raise the general level of American society by 
exerting a beneficent influence on environment" (282). He 
hoped to make Yosemite the cornerstone of a wide-reaching 
social technology that could, among other things, unite and 
consolidate a fractured national identity, improve the
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nation's supposedly worsening physical and mental health, 
and elevate the public morals. The valley's ability to 
accomplish all this cultural work— its perceived ideological 
efficacy— clearly did not inhere in the landscape itself; it 
was inscribed there, in response to specific historical 
events: the Civil War, the growth of urbanization and 
industrialization, and the capitalist restructuring of the 
West. Far from being "natural," the Yosemite which became 
the initial object of an institutionalized environmentalism 
owes its modern "nature" to a complex intersection of 
aesthetic, sociological, ecological, and other discourses 
attendant upon those events. Its genealogy may be traced in 
particular through two northeastern urban reforms: the so- 
called "rural cemetery," and New York's Central Park.
The rural cemetery movement began in Boston in the 
eighteen twenties as an expression of a growing 
dissatisfaction with life in an increasingly crowded and 
heterogeneous city. The movement was contemporaneous with 
the development of the earliest Boston suburbs, and the 
rural cemetery can in fact be seen as analogous to the 
suburb, with the relocated grave serving, like the suburban 
home, "as a haven in a heartless world" (Farrell 106, 110). 
The new burial practice was also a sanitation reform, one of 
several civic improvements then under consideration in 
response to a population explosion that, in the fifty years 
since the Revolution, had put severe pressure on local 
environments- Problems of air and water pollution in 
particular were felt to be exacerbated by the interment of 
corpses in overcrowded city cemeteries.5
As early as 1822, Boston residents had debated (but not 
approved) a proposal to ban in-city burials. Of course, 
even had such a measure passed, a simple ban on in-city 
burials could not in itself have solved the problem; new 
cemeteries would be needed outside the city. But who would 
create and manage them, and how would they be financed? How 
large should they be? Who might be interred there? Might 
the land set aside for them perform social functions other 
than just burial? In debating such questions, rural 
cemetery advocates moved beyond their initial concern with 
sanitation to larger social and political issues. Some 
wondered "whether vault burial was discriminatory within a 
democratic society" (Sloane 44), others whether government 
should or should not become involved in the matter. For our 
purposes it is worth noting that the debate foregrounded and 
integrated several themes that would find expression not 
only in the new cemeteries, but also in New York's Central 
Park and finally in California's Yosemite Park: questions 
not only of sanitation, but also of democracy, of ecology, 
of preservation in perpetuity, of government's role in 
preserving and managing public lands. The rural cemetery 
movement would transform what had been almost exclusively a 
religious topic into a new and far more expansive 
discipline. Distanced from the churchyard, burial would be 
regulated more and more within the discourses of science and 
aesthetics— particularly as these two discourses came to be 
combined in the new discipline of landscape architecture, 
whose early development as a profession was intimately bound 
up with the rural cemetery movement.
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Theorizing Burial: From Mummification to Museumification
In 1825, three years after the defeat of Boston's 
proposed ban on in-city burials, the interment problem was 
taken up again by a prominent Cambridge physician, Jacob 
Bigelow. "[I]mpressed with the impolicy of burials under 
churches or in churchyards approximating closely to the 
abodes of the living," as one contemporary put it, Bigelow 
met at his home with a number of prominent Bostonians and 
inaugurated the movement that would culminate in 1831 with 
the dedication of the first of the rural cemeteries: the 72- 
acre, carefully landscaped Mount Auburn. (Other cities 
followed Boston's lead, most notably New York, whose Green- 
Wood Cemetery opened in 1838.) A botanist as well as a 
physician, Bigelow was a member of the medical faculty at 
Harvard and a founding member of the Massachusetts 
Horticultural Society. He was also an enthusiastic admirer 
of William Cullen Bryant's "graveyard poetry," and it was 
thus perhaps inevitable that the cemetery movement he 
founded would realize in concrete practice the popular 
romantic conflation of death and burial with picturesque 
scenery.
In arguing for the utility of his scheme, Bigelow 
infused this sort of romantic aestheticism with the 
contemporary scientific discourses of sanitation, botany, 
and ecology. "[S]o inseparably do we connect the feelings 
of the living with the condition of the dead," he is 
recorded as saying in his address to the 1825 meeting, that 
it "is incumbent upon us . . .  to analyze . . . the 
principles which belong to a correct view of the subject."
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Foremost among those principles is a complete rejection of
any sort of mummification, and an acceptance of the rapid
and "natural" decomposition of the corpse. Bigelow
secularizes his argument, basing it not on theology but on
the observation of "nature":
If we take a comprehensive survey of the progress 
and mutations of animal and vegetable life, we 
shall perceive that this necessity of individual 
destruction is the basis of general safety. The 
elements which have once moved and circulated in 
living frames, do not become extinct nor useless 
after death;— they offer themselves as the 
materials from which other living frames are to be 
constructed.
This recognizeably ecological rhetoric highlights natural
cycles and interdependencies and predicts dire consequences
for ignoring them:
The plant which springs from the earth, after 
attaining its growth and perpetuating its species, 
falls to the ground, undergoes decomposition, and 
contributes its remains to the nourishment of 
plants around it. The myriads of animals which 
range the woods or inhabit the air, at length die 
upon the surface of the earth, and if not devoured 
by other animals, prepare for vegetation the place 
which receives their remains. . . . Were it not 
for this law of nature, the soil would soon be 
exhausted, the earth's surface would become a 
barren waste, and the whole race of organized 
beings, for want of sustenance, would become 
extinct.
It is "[m]an alone, the master of the creation," who, at his 
own peril, "does not willingly stoop to become a 
participator" in this "routine of nature" (qtd. in Walter 
29-30).
Bigelow condemns the tremendous efforts made in other 
cultures to preserve the human corpse. Shifting his
strategy, he invokes the rhetoric of democracy rather than
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ecology, noting how the only reasonably successful attempts 
at embalming "are cases of extraordinary exemption . . . 
such as can befall but an exceedingly small portion of the 
human race." The "common fate," by contrast, is to obey 
"the common laws of inert matter." Mummification is not 
merely elitist and un-American, but also unnatural, a 
useless "resistance" to inexorable leveling processes that 
obliterate social distinctions— processes which must be 
obeyed if we are not eventually to "gather round us the dead 
of a hundred generations in a visible and tangible shape"—  
and "what custom," asks Bigelow, "could be more revolting?" 
(Walter 32-33).
To prevent such a political and environmental 
catastrophe, nature "ordains" that, like everything else in 
nature, human bodies "should moulder into dust." Bigelow's 
compactly dialogic argument skilfully blends this 
secularized Christian voice with the discourses of the noble 
savage and the democratic discourse of individual dignity.
"[T]he sooner this change is accomplished," he continues, 
"the better"; decomposition should occur "peacefully, 
silently, separately— in the retired valley or the 
sequestered wood," because there "the soil continues its 
primitive exuberance" and "the earth has not become too 
costly to afford to each occupant at least his length and 
breadth" (Walter 34). Having repeatedly constructed 
ecological process as a social, sanitary, and aesthetic 
good, Bigelow's argument finally makes a seamless segue back 
into a naturalized Christianity:
This can be fitly done, not in the tumultuous and
harassing din of cities,— not in the gloomy and
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almost unapproachable vaults of charnel-houses,—  
but amidst the quiet verdure of the field, under 
the broad and cheerful light of heaven, where the 
harmonious and ever-changing face of nature 
reminds us, by its resuscitating influences, that 
to die is but to live again. (35)
Despite the stress on death and decomposition, the 
longing for eternity has not disappeared but has merely been 
redirected. As "consecrated ground” that is to "remain 
forever, inviolate" (13), it is now the cemetery landscape 
rather than the human body which will be mummified. Green­
wood's charter makes elaborate legal provisions for the 
cemetery's "permanence," insuring funds for the site's 
"perpetual care" and exempting the land "forever" from taxes 
and assessments that might eventually necessitate its 
foreclosure and sale (Cleaveland iv). Management at the 
site itself is preservationist; "ample provision is made" to 
insure "the perpetual embellishment and preservation of the 
grounds" (v), with the cemetery's "noble and varied forest- 
growth" in particular to be "studiously preserved, except 
where convenience or necessity require[s] its removal" (vi). 
The desire for mummification has been displaced from the 
human body onto the body of nature, in terms that closely 
prefigure the "revolutionary" land-management policies later 
formulated by Olmsted for Yosemite.
What Bigelow was proposing in 1825 was not just a new 
form of burial but an entirely new kind of public space.
The rural cemetery was to be public and secular, democratic 
and sanitary, and museumified in a permanently picturesque 
state. Because such spaces were without precedent in the 
United States, their creation entailed considerable
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financial risk. Regardless of whether the new cemetery was 
a for-profit, nonprofit, or government-run enterprise, there 
was the nagging question of whether enough lots would be 
sold to sustain the enterprise. The organizers "were 
committing their association to centuries of burying the 
dead," as one historian put it, "but what if the public 
would not buy?" (Sloane 45). To hedge their bets, the 
cemetery founders joined forces in 1829 with the 
Massachusetts Horticultural Society, which for some time had 
wished to create an experimental garden on a large scale.
It was to be a mutually beneficial arrangement: the cemetery 
organization would not have to bear the full financial risk 
of the venture, while the Horticultural Society felt the 
combined garden and cemetery "would ultimately offer such an 
example of landscape gardening as would be creditable to the 
Society" (46). As it turned out, this arrangement was not 
so mutually beneficial after all; the Horticultural Society 
did put up the six thousand dollars for the purchase of the 
Mount Auburn site, but the planned experimental garden never 
materialized (Rotundo, "Rural" 235). Nonetheless, the link 
between the rural cemetery and the science of horticulture—  
so crucial to the professionalization of landscape 
architecture— would endure through the end of the century.
Fulfilling early hopes that it would be not merely a 
"repository of the dead" but also "a place of consolation 
for the living" (Walter 28), the rural cemeteries quickly 
became popular sites of recreation, often attracting 
hundreds of visitors per day. By mid-century the crowds at 
New York1s Green-Wood Cemetery were estimated to exceed
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thirty thousand visitors annually; they "strolled the 
grounds, guidebook in hand," "enjoying the fresh air" and 
"picnicking along undulating paths" (Jackson and Vergara 
19)— much as they would do in Yosemite a generation later 
(see figure 7).
This popularity made the new cemeteries a logical site 
for the exercise of a certain cultural work that in fact 
they had been expected to perform from the very beginning. 
Jacob Bigelow, for example, had appreciated the "didactic 
implications of the new landscape aesthetic" realized by the 
rural cemetery (Farrell 100); a contemporary characterized 
these spaces as providing the opportunity "to meditate on 
present plans and future prospects" in a beautiful and 
inspiring, yet also morally chastening, environment— where, 
as Wordsworth put it, one may "recognize / In nature the 
language of the sense, / The anchor of our purest thoughts" 
(Walter 5, 7). Another observer noted how the new 
cemeteries prompted "the sentiment of retrospection and 
reverence which embalms forever the examples of the 
benefactors of our race" (Farrell 108).
"Virtuous Habits of Play: Central Park
Apparently it was William Cullen Bryant who first 
popularized the idea of a large-scale park for Manhattan 
(Rosenzweig and Blackmar 24). But it was Andrew Jackson 
Downing, the prominent landscape architect and protege of 
Frederick Law Olmsted, who first saw clearly that such a 
park could, in its didacticism and its normalizing of 
tastes, systematically replicate and broaden the 
disciplinary functions of the rural cemetery. Downing, in
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Figure 7. The rural cemetery as a site of outdoor 
recreation. Top: "Lawn-Girt Hill, Green-wood Cemetery."
Line engraving from a drawing by James Smillie. In Nehemiah 
Cleaveland, Green-Wood Illustrated (New York: R. Martin, 
1847), facing p. 61. Bottom: "View from Mount Auburn (near 
Boston)." Line engraving from a drawing by James Smillie.
In Cornelia W. Walter, Mount Auburn Illustrated (New York:
R. Martin, 1851), facing p. 112.
fact, conceived of the urban park as essentially a scenic 
cemetery without the graves, inaugurating an association of 
the two that would long endure on the institutional level.6 
Downing joined forces with Bryant, and in 1851 the state 
legislature approved their proposal for what would become 
Central Park. Appointed as superintendent of the project 
was Frederick Law Olmsted, Downing's friend and former 
pupil. Olmsted admired the writings of both Bryant (whom he 
knew personally) and Ralph Waldo Emerson. He had been 
particularly impressed with the latter's recently published 
essay, "Nature," and agreed with the Transcendentalists 
generally about "the moral value of nature." He adhered as 
well to the Jeffersonian vision of a democracy stabilized by 
a rural citizenry (Todd 48-49). Olmsted was himself an 
inveterate New Yorker, however, and knew perfectly well that 
the nation's future character was to be increasingly urban, 
that even the wilderness of the far western frontiers would 
eventually be exhausted. One way to characterize his wide- 
ranging work is to see it as mediating the tensions between 
frontier ideal and industrial reality, as an attempt to 
sustain a rural democratic vision for what was becoming an 
urban citizenry.
Central Park was not to be a cemetery, but Olmsted 
nonetheless envisioned it as a species of sanitary reform. 
His work during the Civil War as a member of the United 
States Sanitary Commission (the future Red Cross) had 
involved sanitation as we think of it today, activities 
aimed at preventing the spread of infectious disease 
(notably, given our topic, through the proper disposal of
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corpses). But in the mid-nineteenth century the term 
"sanitation" had a much broader range of connotations.
Along with today's familiar usages, as the OED makes clear, 
it connoted an absence of "deleterious influences"— of the 
social as well as the biological sort. "Sanity" could mean 
what today we think of as a strictly physical health, but 
carried in addition a connotation of what today we might 
term "wholesomeness." Health was considered "as much a 
moral as a biological condition," while disease "was 
associated with 'dissipation,'" which included such 
activities as drinking, gambling, and boxing, and Olmsted 
saw in these notions of "sanitation" the potential for a 
full-fledged conservative social reform (Rosenzweig and 
Blackmar 24).
Olmsted was a prominent officer in the new American
Social Science Association, and believed that "a social
climate was evolving favorable to the promotion of a
collective concern for the physical and moral welfare of all
Americans" (Todd 33, 35). He and his Central Park
supporters considered their proposal a "sanitary" or
"health" measure in the most broadly social terms, and at
the root of society was the family, the crucial nexus where
the park was to work its magic. Reform advocates believed
the park "would provide a site for 'healthy' and 'manly'
exercise," with Bryant stressing
the contribution of parks "to the health . . . and 
to the morals of the community." In contrast to 
rough male sports or the temptations of "brightly 
lighted streets" . . .  a park would encourage 
family outings and inspire "home associations." 
(Rosenzweig and Blackmar 24-25)
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"A park," added Bryant, "might promote 'good morals and good 
order' by encouraging virtuous habits of play as well as 
work" (26). Many liberal observers believed at the time 
that "women's ill health" in particular "reflected their 
general lack of opportunity for physical and mental 
development," and that an urban park would provide a 
particularly valuable chance for "'fair pedestrians to 
[engage in] healthful and natural exercise'" and find relief 
from "the burden of domestic duties" (25). (Of course, by 
setting aside a small portion of the city's public space as 
a site where women might "properly" appear, park proponents 
simultaneously legitimated the continuing segregation of the 
sexes elsewhere.)
Like advocates of the rural cemetery, park proponents 
practiced a not-so-subtle class politics of "elevating" 
their putative inferiors. Downing, for example, declared 
that proper landscape architecture could embody "moral 
rectitude" in "rational enjoyments," and thereby "soften and 
humanize the rude," while the New York Horticultural 
Society's backing of the park was motivated by its vision of 
"botanical gardens that would enhance 'cultivation'— in both 
senses of the word" (Rosenzweig and Blackmar 29-30). Robert 
Minturn and his wife Anna Mary Wendell, two of the project's 
earliest advocates, also came to see the park in such a 
light. Throughout the eighteen-thirties, the Minturns had 
been well known philanthropists, friends of the beggars who 
crowded their door, but Robert’s approach to poverty then 
took a conservative turn. Deciding in 1843 that "personal 
benevolence was a 'dangerous species of charity,'" he gave
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his support instead to the New York Association for the
Improvement of the Poor,
which maintained that the "injudicious dispensa­
tion of relief" was the chief cause of increasing 
poverty. Its agents would separate out the 
"incorrigible mendicants” (who were to be packed 
off to the almshouse or the penitentiary) from the 
deserving poor (who were to be given limited 
physical relief and ample advice on remedying the 
character flaws that had landed them in poverty).
Minturn's fellow park advocates may well have agreed with 
his basic class sympathies, but tried to convince him "that 
a park would be a less repressive means of reforming the 
character of the city's working classes" (26). This easy 
conceptual shift from the penitentiary to the park suggests 
that the park was to function, in Althusserian terms, as 
part of the Ideological State Apparatus, disciplining the 
poorer classes via a "less repressive" regulation of tastes 
and norms rather than a direct use of force.
Olmsted, along with his partner in the park enterprise, 
Calvert Vaux, cast this ideological work as an exercise in 
democracy. While designing the park the two gradually moved 
"from defining pastoral scenery as the aesthetic goal of a 
public park to a larger social philosophy that claimed, as 
Vaux put it, to 'translate Democratic ideas into Trees & 
Dirt'" (Rosenzweig and Blackmar 136). Olmsted in particular 
expressed an unshakeable faith in the elevating powers of 
his own class. In his second annual report on Central Park 
he wrote that the purpose of this public space was to 
provide "healthful recreation for the poor and the rich, the 
young and the old, the vicious and the virtuous"— the 
parallelisms here betraying his real sympathies— by exerting
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"a distinctly harmonizing and refining influence upon the
most unfortunate and lawless classes of the city" (131,
241). "Rejecting the views of his 'cowardly conservative'
opponents, for whom class-based cultural divisions were
fixed," Olmsted
believed members of the lower classes should and 
could acquire "the refinement and taste and the 
mental & moral capital of gentlemen." The "moral 
influence" of public parks, like that of public 
schools and libraries, offered a way for the 
working classes to acquire that "capital" as a 
means of cultural improvement. (241)
Olmsted's class may have closely guarded its genuine, 
economic capital, but it had "moral capital" to spare, and 
one reason for making the park as attractive as possible was 
to enable it, in Olmsted's words, "to force into contact the 
good & bad, the gentlemanly and the rowdy" (139). In 
precisely this way, "the power of natural beauty lay in its 
social influence as well as [its] aesthetic pleasure," and a 
judiciously naturalized landscape might have "a distinctly 
harmonizing and refining influence upon the most unfortunate 
and most lawless classes of the city,— an influence 
favorable to courtesy, self-control, and temperance" (131).
Despite the supposedly inherent abilities of landscape 
to uplift and refine, however, none of this would happen 
"naturally." Olmsted believed firmly that it was necessary 
that the ruling class teach the people how best to use the 
park. The public, that is, "would have to be 'trained' to 
use a park" (Rosenzweig and Blackmar 5). On the one hand, 
Olmsted had long believed that beautiful landscapes could 
"materially promote Moral and Intellectual Improvement" by
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"instructing us in the language of Nature," as if nature 
could speak to us without mediation (qtd. in Todd 49). On 
the other hand, ”[i]n order for the park to exercise its 
'harmonizing and refining influence,' the public needed not 
just firsthand contact with natural beauty"— an unmediated 
experience of nature— "but also 'efficiently controlled and 
judiciously managed' supervision and guidance" (Rosenzweig 
and Blackmar 140). As Olmsted reported to the Central Park 
commissioners shortly after being hired as superintendent, 
in language that presages the interpretive programs that 
would later be formalized by the National Park Service, "[a] 
large part of the people of New York are ignorant of a park, 
properly so-called. They will need to be trained to the 
proper use of it, to be restrained in the abuse of it." By 
"abuse," Olmsted means the sort of "careless stupidity" 
which he felt stemmed from notions that the park was "'like 
a wood,' with which Americans associated 'the idea of 
perfect liberty'" (239).
Ten years later, just before resigning his Central Park 
superintendency and leaving for the wilderness of 
California, Olmsted cited the comparatively small number of 
arrests that had been made in Central Park as evidence in 
favor of such his theories, noting in his journal that 
"[t]he American public is one of the easiest in the world to 
regulate if any body will take the responsibility of 
regulating it" (258),
The Power of Scenery
In 1863, Olmsted resigned his Central Park position in 
a dispute over park policy and took a job in California
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managing the Mariposa County mining properties of the former 
explorer and Republican presidential nominee, John Charles 
Fremont— land near Yosemite Valley that had once been under 
the control of Major James Savage. Olmsted's social 
connections, his experience with Central Park, and his 
physical proximity to Yosemite all drew him naturally into 
the circle of elite Californians who were then discussing 
the proposed state park. When Congress passed and President 
Lincoln signed the Yosemite bill in 18 54, Olmsted was 
appointed to the commission charged with managing the new 
grant and quickly became its head.7
Up to this time the primary spheres of operation of 
landscape architecture, the cemetery and the park, had been 
exclusively urban and suburban. The seamlessness of 
Olmsted's transition to managing the new wilderness park 
underscores the fundamental parallels in social function 
underlying both cityscape and wilderness landscape, 
suggesting that this initial institutionalizing of 
environmentalism had less to do with preserving the Yosemite 
environment "itself" than with contemporary social concerns. 
The environmental reform that took the form of the national 
park was in fact continuous with the reform of the urban 
cemetery and the city park, reforms that became 
"environmental" only because of Olmsted's theory of the 
socializing utility of nature.
On August 9, 1865, during a visit to the valley with 
the other commissioners, Olmsted wrote the commission's 
initial report— the first written text to issue from the 
bureaucracy of the newly institutionalized environmentalism.
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This report has since come to be regarded as remarkably 
prescient and foundational, a sort of environmental maana 
carta that established the "philosophic base” for future 
park preservation (Olmsted 13). Subsequent treatments of 
park history would foreground the overtly environmentalist 
aspects of this philosophy while all but ignoring its 
implicit social theory, obscuring the degree to which 
Olmsted and his fellow commissioners saw environmentalism as 
a vehicle for implementing broadly social aims.
Drawing on his Central Park experience, Olmsted viewed
the valley's preservation as the creation of a work of art—
as just one of several of the great public artworks
completed during the Civil War. To get a clearer sense of
how Olmsted believes art to function— how for Olmsted it
participates directly and decisively in history— I quote the
report's preamble at some length:
It is a fact of much significance with reference 
to the temper and spirit which ruled the loyal 
people of the United States during the war of the 
great rebellion, that a livelier susceptibility to 
the influence of art was apparent, and greater 
progress in the manifestation of artistic talent 
was made, than in any similar period in the 
history of the country.
The great dome of the Capitol was wholly 
constructed during the war, and the forces of the 
insurgents watched it rounding upward to completion 
for nearly a year before they were forced from 
their entrenchments on the opposite bank of the 
Potomac; Crawford's great statue of Liberty was 
poised upon its summit in the year that President 
Lincoln proclaimed the emancipation of the slaves. 
Leutze's fresco of the peopling of the Pacific 
States, the finest work of the painter's art in 
the Capitol; the noble front of the Treasury 
building with its long colonnades of massive mono­
liths; the exquisite hall of the Academy of Arts; 
the great park of New York, and many other works 
of which the nation can be proud, were brought to 
completion during the same period. (13-14)
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Art for Olmsted has considerable power. The image of the 
"insurgent" Confederate soldier watching the completion of 
the dome in particular emblematizes Olmsted's belief in the 
ability of art to reform the wayward citizen, and its role 
in democracy and social unification— the same powers he had 
attributed earlier to the carefully contrived (yet 
"natural") landscape of Central Park. These beliefs spill 
over into Olmsted's decriptions of the physical landscape of 
Yosemite Valley, which he terms "the greatest glory of 
nature" precisely because of "its union of the deepest 
sublimity with the deepest beauty" (16, my emphasis).
Olmsted's rhetoric underscores his larger concerns with 
the health of the body politic, a concern that combines 
economics, psychology, and political science into an 
emerging environmentalist discourse of what might be called 
"social sanitation through outdoor recreation." Olmsted 
describes two specific advantages that will accrue from the 
park. The "first and less important" of these is economic, 
"the direct and obvious pecuniary advantage which comes to a 
commonwealth from the fact that it possesses objects which 
cannot be taken out of its domain." He argues in effect for 
environmental preservation as a form of sustainable 
development, as opposed to the sort of resource extraction 
economy epitomized by the recent Gold Rush, whose 
deleterious ecological and social effects had become 
painfully obvious to him while he was managing the Mariposa 
Estate. He describes how the "industrious and frugal 
people" of Switzerland have utilized their scenery to common
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advantage, with revenues from tourism having supplied "for 
many years the larger part of the state revenue . . . 
without the exportation or abstraction from the country of 
anything of the slightest value to the people." For 
California and the United States, he concludes, Yosemite 
might prove "a similar sort of wealth to the whole 
community" (17).
More important than mere pecuniary and ecological
advantage, however, were "considerations of a political duty
of grave importance to which seldom if ever before has
proper respect been paid by any government in the world."
Olmsted couches this argument in terms vaguely psycho-
sociological :
It is a scientific fact that the occasional 
contemplation of natural scenes of an impressive 
character, particularly if this contemplation 
occurs in connection with relief from ordinary 
cares, change of air and change of habits, is 
favorable to the health and vigor of men and 
especially to the health and vigor of their 
intellect.
Without such recreation, in situations "where men and women 
are habitually pressed by their business and household 
cares," they are susceptible to "a class of disorders" that 
include such forms of "mental disability" as "softening of 
the brain, paralysis, palsy, monomania, or insanity." Less 
severe but more frequent results of a lack of outdoor 
recreation are "mental and nervous excitability, moroseness, 
melancholy or irascibility," all conditions which 
incapacitate the sufferer "for the proper exercise of the 
intellectual and moral forces" (17)— that is to say, 
conditions which render the sufferer unfit for productive
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labor. Reprising the argument he had made earlier in 
defense of Central Park, Olmsted writes that recreation 
generally offers its "greatest blessing" to those classes of 
Americans traditionally excluded from it: the poor more than 
the rich, and the "agricultural class" more than the urban. 
"Women," he adds, "suffer more than men" (20).
Despite its emphasis on inclusiveness, Olmsted's vision
is hardly a democratic one. Rather it universalizes and
normalizes a particular set of tastes and makes of them a
foundation not only of aesthetics but also of sanity and
morality. On the one hand there are "faculties and
susceptibilities of the mind" that are "called into play by
beautiful scenery," and "there can be no doubt that all have
this susceptibility." The "power of appreciating natural
beauty," so "intimately and mysteriously associated with the
moral perceptions and intuitions," is natural and universal,
"something which the Almighty has implanted in every human
being." Yet "with some" this mental susceptibility "is much
more dull and confused than with others." Olmsted's
theorizing in fact consistently implies an elitist and
racist teleology in which Yosemite's preservation marks a
milestone not so much of the history of environmentalism as
of the history of American taste and culture, a teleology
that relegates dissenters to the realm of the uncivilized:
The power of scenery to affect men is, in a large 
way, proportionate to the degree of their 
civilization and the degree in which their taste 
has been cultivated. Among a thousand savages 
there will be a much smaller number who will show 
the least sign of being so affected than among a 
thousand people taken from a civilized community. 
(20-21)
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Landscape appreciation becomes just another axis of 
difference, closely allied with the axes of race and class, 
though theoretically distinct from either. "This is only 
one of the many channels," Olmsted concludes, in which the 
"distinction between civilized and savage men is to be 
generally observed" (21). The Yosemite landscape will 
function not merely to sustain the mental health of the 
civilized individual, but also to define the degree and mode 
of the individual’s civilization, aestheticizing, as we 
shall see more clearly with Clarence King, the existing 
class hierarchy.
Third View: Clarence King
Clarence King, geologist and writer, founder of the 
United States Geological Survey and author of the best­
selling Mountaineering in the Sierra Nevada (1872), arrived 
in California in 1863, the same year as Frederick Law 
Olmsted. King had gone West to join the newly formed 
California Geological Survey, which he felt would offer him 
field experience to supplement the classroom training he had 
just completed at Yale's Sheffield Scientific School. He 
and Olmsted had been friends back east, and when Olmsted 
took over the management of the old Mariposa Estate, he 
asked King to help inventory the property's mineral 
resources. With the geological survey in hiatus, King 
agreed.
The Mariposa needed the attention of someone like King. 
The huge, gold-rich estate had been owned since 1847 by John 
Charles Fremont, the explorer and fomenter of the Bear Flag 
Revolt that wrested California from Mexico. At first the
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Mariposa's mining operations had been profitable enough, in 
spite of Fremont's haphazard management. But by the time 
Olmsted took over its superintendency in 1863, both the 
estate and the general had seen better days. As Thurman 
Wilkins tells it, "[t]hat famous grant, some seventy square 
miles in extent, had slipped from General Fremont's absentee 
control," and to make good on the estate's many encumbrances 
"the general's creditors had formed the Mariposa Mining 
Company and thrown its stock upon the market." It was 
precisely because "production at the mines had slumped" that 
Olmsted sought out the expertise then available from survey 
members such as King.8
In less than fifteen years, that is, the Mariposa had 
slipped from the grasp of the archetypal rugged 
individualist and into the hands of the eastern capitalist. 
The Mariposa was in this respect a microcosm; events there 
presaged and typified the economic transformations that 
would occur with greater and greater rapidity in the West of 
the latter nineteenth century, events widely perceived in 
terms both mythic and economic: as the inexorable passage 
from a heroic to a prosaic age, from the bold enterprise of 
the' hero to the systematic exploitation of a northern and 
eastern capitalist technocracy.9 Clarence King would play 
a significant part in facilitating and mystifying this 
western commodification. In his adventure writing, he 
consistently "celebrat[ed] a romantic ideal of self-reliant 
heroism" (Howarth xii), while his professional activities, 
by bringing western resources more and more under the sway
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of corporate investors, just as consistently functioned to 
foreclose on such local enterprise.
In 1864, King was already thinking ahead to his
greatest professional triumph, the ambitious Fortieth
Parallel Survey, which would map and inventory a vast swath
of the West and lay out the path for a transcontinental
railroad. But his first survey was far more modest. After
the creation of the Yosemite State Park, Olmsted appointed
King to determine the boundary of the new grant and produce
a map. Amid what he described as the "prosaic labor of
running the boundary line" I Mountaineering 120), King had
plenty of time to admire the scenery, which seemed to him to
be itself a mythic western narrative, the visible record of
an older and more heroic order. The boundary line ran
through the High Sierra country above the valley walls,
where it seemed that the ice-age glaciers had only recently
retreated, leaving behind bare expanses where "[n]ot a tree
nor a vestige of life was in sight." It seemed a place
where life was just beginning, offering to King a vision of
the bleak Eden of the Darwinists he so much admired.
Peering down into the valley, now verdant but once filled
with rivers of ice, he found it impossible "not to imagine a
picture of the glacial period" when ice-erosion sculpted
Yosemite into its present morphology. He depicts the scene
as it must have appeared in the Pleistocene era:
Granite and ice and snow, silence broken only by
the howling tempest and the crash of falling ice
or splintered rock, and a sky deep freighted with 
cloud and storm,— these were the elements of a 
period which lasted immeasurably long, and only in 
comparatively the most recent geological times 
have given way to the present marvellously changed
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condition. Nature in her present aspects, as well 
as in the records of her past, here constantly 
offers the most vivid and terrible contrasts. Can 
anything be more wonderfully opposite than that 
period of leaden sky, gray granite, and desolate 
stretches of white, and the present, when of the 
old order we have only left the solid framework of 
granite, and the indelible inscriptions of 
glacier-work? To-day their burnished pathways are 
legibly traced with the history of the past. (ISO- 
131)
Nature for King is a mythic history, the readable record of 
tumultuous passages, from storm to calm, from savagery to 
civilization, from wilderness to metropolis, most generally 
from a primitive (but admirably heroic) past to a civilized 
(but lamentably prosaic) present. Throughout Mountaineering 
in the Sierra Nevada, he is most particularly struck by the 
contrasts between the naked granite expanses of the heights 
and the luxuriant forest growths below— where "richness of 
soil and perfection of condition" sometimes actually "prove 
fatal through overcrowding." The Sierra landscape for King 
is a map of the human world, a Malthusian narrative full of 
proto-ecological warnings for the future, its forests 
"wonderfully like human communities" where "[o]ne may trace 
in an hour's walk nearly all the laws which govern the 
physical life of men" (119).
A Realist Aesthetic
In 1870, during a respite from the fieldwork of the 
Fortieth Parallel Survey, King reviewed a pseudo-scientific 
travel narrative, James Orton's The Andes and the Amazon, 
for the Overland Monthly. Though his friendship with Bret 
Harte had everything to do with King's receiving this 
assignment, he was nonetheless an appropriate choice for the
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job, for two reasons. As a working geologist, he was 
familiar with the new ideas then being introduced by science 
into the popular imagination. And as a developing writer, 
who had already published a travel piece of his own in the 
Overland and was at work on several more (which would be 
collected in 1872 in Mountaineering). King was grappling 
with the special problems inherent in writing about little- 
known lands. These two facets of King's career— the 
literary and the scientific— were not as disparate as might 
at first seem, for both involved the same challenge: that of 
reading and writing western landscapes in a way that would 
be comprehensible to his largely eastern audience. As both 
reader and writer, King thought of himself as a "realist"—  
as a sensitive observer capable of perceiving the way things 
"really" are and an objective writer whose words faithfully 
mirrored that reality. I want now to read King— the 
geologist as well as the writer— as he reads the landscape, 
and to problematize his seemingly straightforward conception 
of realistic representation. In particular, I want to show 
the close relationship between King's realist texts, his 
work as a scientist and the ongoing capitalist appropriation 
of the landscape itself.
King's critique of The Andes and the Amazon focuses on 
a departure from what appears in retrospect to be a key part 
of his developing literary aesthetic. In particular, he 
faults Orton for failing to convey anything which the reader 
has not already encountered in the accounts of previous 
writers, for occupying
that uninteresting middle condition where he has
neither the naive sensitiveness of a new traveler,
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nor the penetration of the practiced observer. No 
sooner is he mounted upon a mule than he begins to 
recognize things with a reckless freedom. The 
ghosts of Humboldt and Darwin flank him upon 
either side. What they had seen, he sees. Not 
once does he lift his eyes from the dusty trail, 
but confines himself to the role of a corrobo­
rator. (King, "Current" 578)
Orton, that is, has failed to elicit any genuinely new 
sensations in the reader, for whom the book is a mere 
"corroboration" offering only the chance to "recognize" what 
has been encountered before— in this case, in the 
travelogues of Humboldt and Darwin.
King's emphasis on the desensitizing effect of 
repetition and, especially, of "recognition" would seem to 
make him an early exponent of the sort of formalism codified 
later by Viktor Shklovsky, for whom "the purpose of art is 
to impart the sensation of things as they are perceived and 
not as they are known," "to make objects 'unfamiliar'" (58). 
But for Shklovsky, making the reader "see" rather than 
merely "recognize" is a matter of effort, of "art as 
technique"; the object must be "defamiliarized" in order to 
remove it from the domain of automatized perception. King 
is suggesting another means of attaining the same end, a 
means implicit in his specific concern with narratives of 
travel and exploration— a genre characterized by special 
limitations but also special opportunities. In the words of 
Mary Fuller, such narratives "document a situation of 
enunciation in which the matter of speech, the topic, the 
referent, physically existed but was always going to be 
physically absent from the place of speaking and listening" 
(46). This conception suggests special problems which I
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will address later; what is important here is that in the 
genuine exploration narrative, the "matter of speech" begins 
as something unfamiliar to the reader. To represent such 
material using the technique of some preceding travel writer 
hardly makes it any newer; if anything, this begins the 
process of familiarizing it. The exploration narrative thus 
seems to be particularly amenable to mimesis, for the 
obvious way out of the dilemma is to avoid any evident 
technique at all, to reproduce the object unadorned in its 
already-unfamiliar reality. For King this crude realism is 
the "technique," suggested in his critique of Orton, of the 
naive traveler who need only read the landscape sensitively 
and then mirror it faithfully for the reader.
King's account in Mountaineering in the Sierra Nevada
of a ride to a remote camp suggests that he conceived of his
descriptive nature writing as just such a mimetic
reproduction:
I was delighted to . . . expose myself, as one 
uncovers a sensitized photographic plate, to be 
influenced; for this is a respite from scientific 
work, when through months you hold yourself 
accountable for seeing everything, for analyzing, 
for instituting perpetual comparison. . . .  No 
tongue can tell the relief to simply withdraw 
scientific observation, and let Nature impress 
you. (108)
The movement from science to literature is for King a shift 
from the active to the passive, from analysis to impression, 
from the production of knowledge about the landscape to the 
mimetic reproduction of the landscape. Though this movement 
takes him into a literary mode, it is paradoxically a 
movement away from language (it is something about which "no
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tongue can tell"). What King sees himself moving toward is 
not words about things, but things themselves— particularly, 
as the reader of Mountaineering quickly becomes aware, 
things in their most basic and immutable manifestations.
This tendency certainly reflects King's concern with what, 
as a geologist, he naturally viewed as the "hard, 
materialistic reality" of nature (253), but it is also 
consonant with a peculiarly American conception of the 
"real," in which, as Lionel Trilling put it, "reality is 
always material reality, hard, resistant, unformed, 
impenetrable, and unpleasant" (qtd. in Sundquist 16). This 
conception of a rock-solid reality appealed not only to the 
geologist in King, but to the writer as well, for— to use 
Trilling's words again— "that mind alone is felt to be 
trustworthy which most resembles this reality by most nearly 
reproducing the sensations it affords" (17). If mimesis is 
the key to representing landscape memorably, then mimesis 
that somehow does justice to a landscape's most fundamental 
and enduring phenomena is the key to representing it 
truthfully and convincingly.
Thus it is hardly surprising to find in King's nature 
writing the recurring tendency "to reduce things to their 
bare essentials, to strip away the superficies of 
vegetation, animal life . . . and human culture"; in doing 
so, he seeks in stone a foundation for a more trustworthy 
language:
[He] is not only seeking accurate knowledge of the 
unexplored mountains of California, but direct 
unmediated experience of the absolute, primal 
world of matter. . . . King's descriptions of the 
Sierra mountainscapes are attempts to recreate in
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language an unmediated experience. (Fontana 25) 
Certainly King's writing is most energetic in those 
mountaineering episodes that take place above timberline, 
where the last settlements and the last vegetation have been 
left far below and he is left alone to contend with the 
primal simplicity of rock and ice. But the fact that his 
attempts to mirror "unmediated experience" produced some 
highly energetic stories hardly validates the literary 
theory behind them. In fact the linguistic claim underlying 
King's aesthetic— that matter and experience can pass into 
language with the same directness and fidelity with which 
landscape passes into image in photography— would almost 
immediately be called into question by a series of bizarre 
events in his own career.
The Footprints of a Man: Deconstructing Landscape
Mountaineering in the Sierra Nevada appeared in 1872. 
Mark Twain's Roughing It appeared that same year, but it was 
Mountaineering which was hailed by the Overland as "the book 
of the season." The book was well received elsewhere as 
well, and within two years would sell out five printings 
(Wilkins, Mountaineering v). Its popularity received an 
unexpected boost from King's involvement in the Great 
Diamond Swindle of 1872, a scam which had begun two years 
earlier when two men posing as miners appeared in San 
Francisco carrying a sack of rough diamonds. The two men—  
Philip Arnold and John Slack— were secretive at first, 
dropping just enough hints to start the entire city talking 
about their cargo and the mine from which it must have come. 
The diamonds were appraised, first in San Francisco and
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later by the Tiffany establishment in New York, and valued 
at a hundred thousand dollars. Slack allowed himself to be 
talked into selling his share of the putative mine— whose 
whereabouts were still kept secret— for just that amount, to 
San Francisco banker William Ralston. Arnold did not sell 
out until later, when the speculative frenzy hit its peak; 
he received half a million dollars for his share (Wilkins, 
Clarence 171-182).
In July of 1872, Ralston filed incorporation papers for 
the San Francisco and New York Mining and Commercial 
Company, which was promptly capitalized at ten million 
dollars. To verify the mine's authenticity, Arnold and 
Slack allowed a visit by company officials and the expert 
Henry Janin, who was regarded as one the most competent and 
incorruptible mining engineers in the country. Janin liked 
what he saw. "I consider this a wonderful discovery," he 
wrote in a report which appeared August 10, "and one that 
will prove extremely profitable. . . .  I do not doubt that 
further prospecting will result in finding diamonds over a 
greater area than is yet proved to be diamondiferous" 
("Diamond" 379). Elsewhere he speculated that, if worked by 
just twenty miners, the diamond fields could yield as much 
as a million dollars worth of gems per month— setting off 
widespread speculation that the mine might severely depress 
the international diamond market and even shift the center 
of the gemstone industry from Amsterdam to San Francisco. 
Janin's pronouncements circulated widely in the papers, and 
by the end of the summer, investors had formed at least 
twenty-five "wildcat" companies, capitalized at more than
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two hundred million dollars in total, in hopes of cashing in 
on the boom as soon as the location of the fields should be 
made public (Wilkins, Clarence 173, 182-183).
Everything was in place for a major rush, which 
undoubtedly would have taken place had it not been for the 
intervention of Clarence King. Whenever their survey work 
brought them into contact with civilization, King and his 
coworkers had brought themselves up to date on the latest 
diamond news, and by -the end of the summer they had pieced 
together enough clues to locate the purported diamond field 
in a remote, potentially diamondiferous region of eastern 
Utah, within the confines of King's survey. Clearly such a 
major find in his own bailiwick could not be ignored, and 
when the summer's fieldwork was completed, King set out 
quietly to inspect the claim himself, arriving at the site 
in November. There he found footprints; following them to 
where they converged with other tracks, he found mining 
notices posted on trees. A quick search of the area turned 
up several rubies and a few diamonds, and at first he was as 
much a believer as Janin. Further inspection, however, 
began to reveal disturbing evidence, and by the end of the 
second day he was convinced the ground had been salted and 
the claim was a fraud (Wilkins, Clarence 177-179). When 
Ralston and Janin were informed, they returned to the site 
with King, who had little trouble convincing them they'd 
been deceived. The story went public, and King was lauded 
not only for saving investors millions of dollars, but for 
preserving the reputation of California's fledgling 
financial establishment. He was the toast of the nation,
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and his name graced front pages from San Francisco to 
London. Not coincidentally, sales of his recently released 
book surged forward (Wilkins, Mountaineering vi).
The entire episode can be read as a linguistic parable, 
in which the swindlers' clever manipulation of the investors 
and the media engendered an intertext made up of newspaper 
stories, investment prospectuses, the report of the mining 
engineer, and, of course, the carefully inscribed 
"realistic" landscape of the diamond field. Such a text was 
not without precedent, its linguistic underpinnings being in 
fact typical of the "El Dorado" narratives so common in the 
literature of the Americas. A similar situation— Walter 
Ralegh’s claims in his 1596 Discoverie of Guiana concerning 
a fabulous South American gold mine— has been analyzed in an 
instructive way by Mary Fuller and is worth examining 
briefly here for the parallels it offers to the Diamond 
Swindle.
In the apologia worked up by King James's court to
justify Ralegh's execution, the latter's claims concerning
the existence of what he variously called Manoa or El Dorado
are subjected to a close analysis:
James's accusations amount to an intensely 
skeptical critique of Ralegh's language. He 
claims that Ralegh's writing is a screen not for 
things but for palpable intentions; that the 
things of which he writes are imaginary, and that 
their objective properties . . . are constructs 
responsive to the wish and will of the writer.
To defend his text in the face of such skepticism, Ralegh 
had resorted to physical evidence in the form of gold ore, a 
"handfull of the mine" which he hoped would ground his claim
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somewhere safely beyond the unstable realm of language. 
Though he doubtless did not think of it in quite these 
terms, he hoped to demonstrate that at the end of the chain 
of signifiers making up the legend of Manoa there was 
something incontrovertible, that is, not another signifier 
but a material object which was not itself the product of 
any linguistic operation. In so doing, Fuller notes, he was 
attempting to make use of "resources not available to the 
mere poet: speaking of gold, he puts a piece of ore in the 
refiner's hand" (44).
But material reality— in Ralegh's case, a "handfull of
the mine"— proves insufficient to validate such claims.
How, for one thing— assuming that El Dorado exists in the
first place— was the reader in London to know that the ore
had actually come from there? The supposedly "mute"
testimony of objects turns out to be not univocal but
ambiguous, and hence to require corroboration; instead of
providing the hoped-for escape from words, the material
routes the reader back into the circuit of language. In the
case of the discovery narrative, as with other attempts to
ground the sign in "nature," not even things turn out to be
free of the influences which engender the figurative drift
of language. As Fuller notes, the objects Ralegh produced
as underpinnings for representations . . . were 
always and everywhere fully implicated with 
rhetorical procedures: substitutions of parts for 
whole, transportations, ellipses. . . . [I]n the 
particular case of Ralegh, the part-for-whole 
synecdoche of handfull for mine masks a previous 
figure of metonymy— in fact, a congerie of 
previous figures. (45)
Ralegh's critics had good reason to question the validity of
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his synecdoche, of his rhetorical substitution of a handful 
of ore— which might have come to London from anywhere— for 
an actual gold mine in Guiana. Clearly, the synecdoche 
cannot be valid unless the felicity of the underlying 
metonymy, the "naturalness" of the association of the 
transported ore with a specific mine, can be established. 
This Ralegh could not do with certainty, since, as he 
admitted, he had never personally been to El Dorado; he 
claimed only to have come near it (54).
In the end, the material Ralegh had hoped would serve 
as irrefutable testimony turned out to be vulnerable to the 
same sort of skeptical analysis to which his words had been 
subjected. In a final effort to validate his claim, he ' 
returned to Guiana in search of the mine itself, an 
expedition which became "literally a search for the 
referent, a place to which [could] be attached the proper 
names Manoa and El Dorado," and which, unfortunately for the 
soon-to-be-executed Ralegh, proved fruitless (51).
The text engendered by the Diamond Swindle has much in 
common with other El Dorado stories. There was, for 
example, a great deal of money at stake— as dozens of 
nervous investors were all too aware— and the remote, still- 
secret location of the mine precluded the usual means of 
verification. It thus shared what Fuller called the 
"peculiar constraints" of the discovery narrative, of "a 
writing situation . . .  in which the issue of truth, 
veracity, was particularly at stake and also particularly 
difficult to check" (45). More important, its authority 
rested ultimately on an appeal to the material— in this
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case, to the gems displayed in San Francisco by Arnold and 
Slack, and the stones turned up by Janin in situ in the 
field.
King was not a linguist but a geologist, and his on­
site investigation of the swindlers' text focused not on its 
words but on the material representations underpinning them. 
His procedure, which recalls the virtuoso tracking 
activities of the heroes in Chapter 21 of The Last of the 
Mohicans, amounts to a "close reading" of the material:
[W]e . . . lay down upon our faces, and got out 
our magnifying-glasses and went to work, system­
atically examining the position of the stones and 
their relation to the natural gravels. The first 
point which excited my suspicion was the finding 
of a diamond on a small point, or knob of rock 
. . .  in a position from which one heavy wind, or
the storms of a single winter, must inevitably
have dislodged it. (Deposition)
The questions which King must answer— How did this object 
come to be here? Is its occurrence natural or the result of
human intervention? Are these formations such as would
naturally be associated with a diamond field?— are 
essentially questions about rhetorical procedures, about the 
transportations and substitutions undergone by the objects 
produced to bolster the swindlers' truth-claims.
His suspicion having been aroused by what appears to be
an unnatural transportation, one which left a diamond
sitting where the elements would not have allowed it to
remain for long, King continues the investigation, embarking
upon a plan of testing the whole question, which 
consisted of a system of outside prospects 
conducted over the whole mesa, carried out by 
digging a bushel or two of earth, averaging it, 
sifting it in sieves, and then washing both the 
saved gravel and the refuse dirt at the stream; of
202
an examination of the trails and tracks of all the 
party; a following of their work from beginning to 
end; . . .  a scrutiny of the rock itself, and of 
the so-called Ruby Gulch. . . . The result . . . 
was that we found no single ruby or diamond 
anywhere off the neighbourhood of the rock or off 
the line of the original Arnold survey.
At issue here is the appropriateness of a metonymy. The 
swindlers' claims rely heavily on the purportedly natural 
association of the gemstones to the gravels in which they 
are found, but King's investigation demonstrates that the 
gems are actually more closely associated with the hoaxers 
themselves:
I fixed upon the trail of Arnold and Janin, recog­
nizing Mr. Janin by his slender foot. . . . Along 
the line of their outward march, here and there in 
the vicinity of survey stakes, we found an 
occasional ruby, but 10 ft. off their line of 
travel never one.
The final touch in King's analysis of the swindlers' text is
his examination of the ant mounds found at the site.
Because ants systematically bring small stones from lower
levels of the earth up to the surface, prospectors use
anthills the way a psychoanalyst uses a slip of the tongue,
to gain information about a formation's underlying
structure. King's examination reveals
artificial holes broken horizontally with some 
stick or small implement through the natural crust 
of the mound, holes easily distinguished from the 
natural avenues made by the insects themselves; 
when traced to the end each artificial hole held 
one or two rubies.
The purported association of the stones in the anthills with 
the underlying levels of the putative mine, another 
metonymical underpinning for the part-for-whole synecdoche 
of the gems displayed in San Francisco, is again shown to be
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invalid: not only are the holes made by men clearly 
distinguishable from those made by ants but, as King so 
tellingly adds near the end of his deposition, in every case 
"about the salted ant-hills were the old storm-worn 
footprints of a man" (Deposition).
Later it would be discovered that Arnold and Slack had 
actually purchased the gems in Amsterdam and London 
(Wilkins, Mountaineering 184). If we agree with Fuller that 
a thing "carried from a place in which it is proper to one 
in which it is not proper" has already "undergone the 
process which makes words figurative or metaphorical" (49), 
then King's deposition amounts to a demonstration that what 
was claimed to be natural was all along rhetorical, the 
result of human agency, a product of the human will— a 
construct, to recall Fuller's words, "responsive to the wish 
and will of the writer." The swindlers' salted landscape- 
text is comparable to the "lying trail" written by that 
other troublesome figure, Magua, the one destabilizing the 
"grounds" of an expanding corporate capitalism just as the 
other destabilized the grounds of a European colonialism. 
Self-Made Myths
King's exposure of the Diamond Swindle demonstrates how 
intentions insinuate their way into seemingly "natural" or 
"realistic" representation. It foregrounds the persistence 
of rhetorical mediation between language and the things it 
claims to represent, of the suspect character of King's own 
mimetic esthetic. Yet he seems never to have applied the 
lesson to his own texts; if anything, his trust in the 
authority and objectivity of his language grew stronger
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following the incident. He seems to have seen in his 
analysis of the swindler's text not a warning about the 
subtlety and persistence of mediation, but a vindication of 
science as a way of discovering and outwitting it.
This heightened confidence in his own language is 
demonstrated clearly in a long passage, describing his 1873 
ascent of Mount Whitney, that was added to the 1874 edition 
of Mountaineering in the Sierra Nevada. Following the 
climb, viewing the peak from below, King reflects on the 
persistence of "mythologizing" in our appreciation of 
landscape— a mode he feels has typified descriptions of 
mountains ranging from the Aryan myth of the "white 
elephant" Dhavalagiri to Ruskin's "Mountain Gloom" and 
"Mountain Glory" chapters in Modern Painters (252). 
Contrasted with this mode is the scientific approach, as 
exemplified by the Alpine writings of the geologist John 
Tyndall. "To follow a chapter of Ruskin's," King writes, 
"with one of Tyndall's is to bridge forty centuries and 
realize the full contrast of archaic and modern thought" 
(253).
. King acknowledges the power and attraction of the
Ruskinian mode, but leaves no doubt as to which of the two
is to be privileged. As he muses on "the geologic history
and hard, materialistic reality" of the mountain, his
reverie is interrupted by an archaic figure, a Paiute Indian
elder who tells him that
the peak was an old, old man who watched this 
valley and cared for the Indians, but who shook 
the country with earthquakes to punish the whites 
for injustice to his tribe. . . .  I watched the 
spare, bronzed face, upon which was written the
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burden of a hundred dark and gloomy superstitions; 
and as he trudged away across the sands, I could 
but feel the liberating power of modern culture 
which unfetters us from the more than iron bands 
of self-made myths. . . .  I saw the great peak 
only as it really is, a splendid mass of granite, 
14,887 -feet high, ice-chiselled and storm-tinted, 
a great monolith left standing amid the ruins of a 
bygone geological empire. (253)
The familiar dichotomy between "myth" and "reality" is 
here widened by King, who demotes myth to mere 
"superstition" as he imputes a "liberating power" to modern 
culture— which for him, as for so many others of his post- 
Darwinian generation, is exemplified by science. His 
alignment of science with "reality" implies the replacement 
of the Indian's myth with a projection of his own, but King 
does not make obvious what is really at stake here: the 
displacement of one ideology by another. The Indian's myth, 
his interpretation of the meaning of natural phenomena, is 
openly political, for it attempts to legitimate the restora­
tion of his people's fast-dwindling power. But whereas the 
content of the Indian's myth is explicit, the politics with 
which King replaces it is disguised; couched in the language 
of science, it appears natural and objective to any reader 
who valorizes such language. This movement is very deft.
The appearance is not of two ideologies in contention, but 
of an obvious "myth"— clearly a construct, openly political- 
-being replaced by an innocent description, a mimetic, 
"unmediated" representation of just that sort of hard 
reality which, as Trilling reminded us, was well calculated 
to instill trust in the minds of King's American readers. 
King promises he will show us the mountain "as it really
is," and indeed the facts he proceeds to give us are 
reasonably accurate. But by offering them as a replacement 
for the Indian's myth— which is not a fact but a truth, a 
statement about the meaning of fact— he collapses a crucial 
distinction. According to Max Westbrook, this sort of 
conflation is common in "objective" or "realistic" 
discourse; in such usage, "fact and truth are the same, fact 
and meaning of fact are the same. All you have to do is 
invoke the magic word, reality" (13). King uses the word 
"really" here in just this way: as the magic word that 
allows him to pass off mere facts as their own meanings, to 
mythologize under the cover of simply reproducing the "real" 
in language. But to say that a mountain is 14,887 feet high 
is not merely to state a fact; it is also— if only in the 
implication that the fact is worth foregrounding for the 
reader— to suggest an interpretation. Of what value, after 
all, is it to know and to present this particular fact? To 
the Paiute elder— who might not dispute its accuracy— such a 
precise figure as "14,887 feet" has no meaning, for it has 
no relation to his ideology, to his culture or its 
prospects. But it is meaningful to King precisely because 
it establishes a datum in the immense grid he is imposing on 
the landscape, a mapping whose primary purpose is to allow 
the region to be more efficiently controlled and exploited. 
That this is the context in which this particular detail 
begins to have meaning is made clear by the metaphorical 
passage immediately following it, in which the mountain, now 
a perdurable symbol of American hegemony, towers above the 
"ruins" of the Indian's culture, whose time has passed just
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as surely as a former geological epoch. By identifying the 
Paiute's culture with inevitable geological processes, the 
passage naturalizes that culture's disappearance; the text 
legitimates power by representing as natural what is really 
the result of human agency.
To write that the mountain is "ice-chiselled and storm-
tinted" is to report a fact of geology, that the peak
underwent glacial erosion and weathering. But to do so
using metaphors grafted onto nature from the realms of
sculpture and painting is to assign a meaning for this fact,
to suggest that there is a shaping hand, a conscious design,
at work in nature. For King that design could be no other
than the belief that the nation's westward expansion, so.
greatly facilitated by his surveys, had divine sanction.
How I Loved Cotter: Mystifying the Frontier
The mountains of our great vacant interior are not 
barren, but full of wealth; the deserts are not 
all desert; the vast plains will produce something 
better than buffalo, namely beef; there is water 
for irrigation, and land fit to receive it. All 
that is needed is to explore and declare the 
nature of the national domain.
— Clarence King (qtd. in Raymond 631)
To be moved from national resource to commodity to 
profit, the West's holdings clearly had to be 
transformed by an investment of capital and labor. 
This was the elemental fact obscured by the myths 
and romances.
— Patricia Limerick (97)
King's description of "the nature of the national 
domain" is typical of a certain kind of travel writing. He 
knows the land is not "vacant" at all; if the tales in 
Mountaineering are any indication, virtually everywhere he
turned in it he found Indians, Mexicans, and newly arrived 
whites already in possession. But the rhetoric of discovery 
habitually effaces such human presences, producing an 
"attenuated" prose in which agency resides not with human 
beings but with the land itself (Pratt 123). Thus for King 
it is neither labor nor investment but the land itself that 
will produce wealth in the West, just as it is the land that 
legitimates its own appropriation. Such writing bespeaks 
the confidence of a maturing capitalism that sees no 
particular obstacles between the discovery of raw resources 
and their transformation into wealth: "all that is needed" 
is to know what is there and to proclaim it one's own. The 
ideological effect of such writing, as Limerick suggests, is 
to obscure the realities of western transformation, to write 
out of existence the unequal social structures organizing 
frontier economies. The West appears as edenic not only in 
its absence of previous human occupants, but in the absence 
of fixed social classes. 10
That King founded his aesthetic, as he thought, in a 
"realistic" rejection of mythmaking is ironic, given that 
today Mountaineering reads so patently as part of the 
nation's myth of this "classless frontier." If this seems 
so in its descriptions of landscape, it is even more so in 
its narrative chapters, particularly in the two chapters 
detailing the ascent of Mount Tyndall. King's official 
report on this exploit is prosaic enough (Wilkins, Clarence 
68), but the account in Mountaineering is full of bravado 
and hair-breadth escapes and has obviously benefitted
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considerably in the retelling. This embellishment aims, of 
course, to thrill the reader; it also embodies the idea, 
popularized twenty years later by Frederick Jackson Turner, 
of the democratizing effects of the frontier. This myth 
creeps up on the reader gradually in those passages, 
scattered throughout Mountaineering, where the raw 
exigencies of western life bring members of disparate races 
and classes into intimate contact— the backwoods settlement 
where all eat together in the only inn, or the mountain 
storm which brings everyone together in the warmth of the 
same campfire. It is precisely the sort of interclass 
conviviality Olmsted hoped to induce with Central Park.
Like Olmsted, King moved in the highest society. In 
New York he frequented William Cullen Bryant's Century Club; 
in Washington he was close friend with the likes of Henry 
Adams and John Hay. On the high mountains of the Sierra, in 
contrast, King frequently finds himself teaming up with the 
only other member of the survey crew willing to take the 
risks of extreme mountaineering: the mule-skinner, Dick 
Cotter. These two men presumably would never have crossed 
paths back east, but as they pass through one alpine 
adventure after another, the social barriers between them 
appear to fall away. This process reaches its climax on the 
perilous ascent of Mount Tyndall, just when their shared 
hardships become most extreme— when night overtakes the 
climbers on a narrow shelf of rock, forcing them to bivouac 
with neither fuel nor shelter in temperatures fast falling 
toward zero. Such extreme circumstances produce a degree of
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intimacy and cooperation impossible within the strictures of 
the metropolitan class structure. "How I loved Cotter,"
King wrote of the long, freezing night in which they nearly 
perished. "How I hugged him and got warm, while our backs 
gradually petrified, till we whirled over and thawed them 
out together!" (51). This is the natural exigency of 
frontier existence keyed to its highest pitch; survival both 
allows and dictates interclass contact that elsewhere would
be proscribed. 12
For the remainder of the climb, King and Cotter appear 
to work together as equals. Cotter more and more frequently 
takes the lead when King is at a loss as to how to proceed, 
and when the terrain steepens, they rope themselves together 
so that, should the worst happen, they will "share a common 
fate" (58). At one point, King is forced to tie his silk 
handkerchiefs around a spike of rock as an anchor (57); the 
fine cloth signifies King's superior status, but also serves 
as an aid to their mutual survival. Suggestively, this 
class marker is left behind early in the journey.
Cotter and King reach the top of the peak two days 
later. The apparent class integration which has developed 
during the climb will resume during their long trek 
homeward, but for a moment on the summit, we are reminded 
that it is only a myth after all. "I rang my hammer upon 
the topmost rock," King writes of this moment of triumph.
"We grasped hands, and I reverently named the grand peak 
MOUNT TYNDALL" (64). The pronouns here are noteworthy: the 
two men share equally in the event by shaking hands, but to
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King alone is reserved the right of naming the peak. This 
Adamic prerogative is his, of course, by virtue of his rank 
in the survey hierarchy, in the class structure which, 
despite the narrative's nearly ubiquitous assertions to the 
contrary, he has transplanted intact into the heart of the 
"democratizing" wilderness.
This brief slip is for King what the unnaturally placed 
diamond was for Arnold and Slack: an unintentional 
revelation that the "realistic" text is not a faithful 
reproduction of some objective "reality," but instead a 
construct, "responsive to the wish and will of the writer." 
The social function of this construct becomes clearer when 
we realize that it appeared just as King's detailed surveys 
were making the West less democratic— when, by facilitating 
the orderly development of the region by absentee corporate 
financiers, they were precluding the sort of individualistic 
entrepreneurship of the democratic myth. To see the myth in 
this way is to see its similarity to that of the old Indian, 
for whom mythologizing was a means of perpetuating a vision 
in spite of disturbing evidence that it would never again be 
a reality. It is also, perhaps, to see what may well be the 
only consistent thread running through the widely varied 
activities of King's career: his reading and writing of the 
West in ways that served an ideology of capitalist 
expansion. When that ideology called for accurate maps 
which would facilitate development, King was there to 
provide them with his transit and barometer. When it called 
for a secure and predictable investment climate, King was
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there again— this time to deconstruct a swindle which 
threatened to panic the market. Finally, as the influx of 
capital began the long-running economic reorganization that 
would replace the mythic frontier hero— the lone prospector, 
the resourceful Forty-Niner, even the death-defying, 
mountain-climbing geologist— with the likes of Kennecott 
Copper and Peabody Coal, King was there again, not to 
deconstruct this time, but to construct a landscape that 
seemed the very embodiment of boundless opportunity, that 
maintained in image the illusion of what was even then being 
foreclosed in reality.
Notes to Chapter Four
1 For detailed treatments of the Mariposa War, see 
Solnit 268-354 and Annie Mitchell, "Major James D. Savage 
and the Tularehos."
2 The accepted white historiography of Yosemite Valley 
implies that Indians ceased to live in Yosemite after the 
Mariposa War.
Solnit points out, however, that considerable numbers 
of native people continued to live either in or immediately 
adjacent to the valley, and that those people were evicted 
on a recurring basis— by military forces in 1851 and 1906, 
and by the National Park Service in 1929 and 1969 (288).
For details, see the discussion of Savage Dreams in Chapter 
Five.
3 See Bunnell 297-299. Bunnell claims elsewhere that 
"Ten-ie-ya was the last chief of his people" (80), but in 
fact there remained several other leaders of the Yosemite 
tribe, and resistance continued after Tenaya’s death (Solnit 
281-282).
4 Though created by federal legislation, Yosemite was 
not strictly speaking the first national park, because 
immediately after its creation the federal government ceded 
the site to the State of California for management.
Yosemite would not become a national park until 1890, 
eighteen years after the creation of Yellowstone National 
Park, which remained under federal control from the 
beginning (Nash 106). See also Huth 65-68.
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5 Rotundo, "Mount Auburn" 258; Sloane 45. In addition 
to these two sources, I have drawn in this section on 
Rotundo's "The Rural Cemetery Movement"; James J. Farrell's 
"Inventing the American Way of Death"; Stanley French's "The 
Cemetery as Cultural Institution"; Thomas Bender's "The 
'Rural' Cemetery Movement"; and David Schuyler's "The 
Evolution of the Anglo-American Rural Cemetery." Hans Huth 
has preceded me in discussing the movement's relation to 
environmentali sm (60-62).
6 The American Association of Cemetery Superintendents, 
which preceded by twelve years the creation of the American 
Society of Landscape Architects, was in many ways the latter 
group's direct antecedent.
In 1895, when the AACS changed the title of its 
official journal from Modern Cemetery to Park and Cemetery, 
the journal's editor noted that "the superintendents of our 
leading cemeteries" had long "recognized the fact that the 
requirements of the cemetery, apart from the burial of the 
dead, are very largely those of the park" (qtd. in Farrell 
117) .
7 Olmsted 13, Todd 145. Apparently because he feared 
that the funding requested by Olmsted for the new Yosemite 
park might be taken from the funds earmarked for his own 
California Geological Survey, Josiah Dwight Whitney helped 
to suppress this report, which never reached the California 
legislature and remained lost until it was recovered in 1952 
(Roper 13).
8 Wilkins, Clarence 57; see also Roper 233-234.
9 As Patricia Limerick has pointed out, mining 
operations such as those at the Mariposa Grant provide a 
particularly clear window into this period of western 
history because they recapitulate the region's frenetic 
economic and social transformations in a sort of fast- 
forward:
Mining placed settlements of white people where 
none had been before. It provoked major conflicts 
with Indians. It called territories and states 
into being and forced them to an early maturity.
It drew merchandising and farming into its wake.
As it changed from individual enterprise to a 
consolidated, industrialized business, mining 
threw the West into the forefront of 
industrialized life. (99-100)
In reality King was highly class conscious, a fact 
that manifests itself when he writes in modes other than
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that of the discovery narrative. Like Lafayette Bunnell, to 
give one example, King tries to dissociate himself from what 
he considers Yosemite's more vulgar visitors. Here he has 
just passed near the famous Inspiration Point, which has 
provided generations of visitors their first view of the 
valley:
I always go by this famous point of view now, 
feeling somehow that I don't belong to that army 
of literary travellers who have here planted 
themselves and burst into rhetoric. Here all who 
make California books, down to the last and most 
sentimental specimen who so much as meditates a 
letter to his or her local paper, dismount and 
inflate. (127)
On another occasion King writes of the "vulgar gold-dirt" 
(154) of the mining districts in which he worked.
This contempt for Mammon strikes me as a hollow pose, 
however, considering how assiduously King strove for wealth 
later in his life. But at least in his belletristic 
writings he evidently felt compelled to mimic the sort of 
disinterested air which his wealthy friends could genuinely 
afford.
11 In this scene and elsewhere, the sexual undercurrent 
of King's adventures with Cotter is unmistakable. In 
addition to a genuine homosexual desire it may mark a 
certain gendering of King's class anxieties.
The two men's socially proscribed class relationship, 
that is, may be conflated here with an equally "trans- 
gressive" gender relationship. Any attempt at a queer 
analysis of King would have to take into account his common- 
law marriage to a poor black woman, Ada Todd— a heterosexual 
but otherwise socially transgressive relationship crossing 
boundaries of both race and class. William Howarth termed 
this secret marriage "King's supreme fiction, the novel he 
never wrote" (xi), and contends that while
King detested this secrecy . . .  he lacked the 
courage to defy prevailing social taboos. He also 
had a lifelong preference for women of color, an 
appetite that conveniently preserved his own 
prestige and power, (xii)
The marriage may thus have functioned more generally to 
compensate King for the feelings of social inadequacy he 
presumably felt while circulating in the high society of 
Washington and Manhattan. Todd was more than twenty years 
younger than King (Wilkins, Clarence 359)— a factor which 
also would have worked to bolster King's sense of power and 
prestige.
Wilkins notes that while King was attracted toward 
women of color, whom he seems to have viewed as embodying 
"the archaic" he so much admired, "his role of voluptuary of
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the primitive and exotic . . . could swing to that of bitter 
misogynist" when it came to white women "of his own class" 
(Clarence 359).
For details, see Mountaineering xi-xii and Wilkins, 
Clarence 362-364 and 408-411.
CHAPTER FIVE
Savage Dreams and The End of Nature: Two Views 
of the Postnatural Landscape
"We live," writes Bill McKibben, "in a postnatural 
world" (60). What might it mean to be postnatural? More 
specifically, how might notions of the postnatural help or 
hinder us in revising the myth we have come to call the 
environment? I have tried throughout this project to show 
how early constructions of the environment enabled and 
naturalized a position from which to misunderstand our 
relationships to the land and to each other, allowing 
literary environmentalism to serve not only a progressive 
ecological thinking but also a conservative social agenda. 
The question that interests me here is whether those 
constructions must continue to serve that agenda. In this 
final section I want briefly to examine the idea of 
postnaturality as it has been deployed in McKibben's The End 
of Nature and Rebecca Solnit's Savage Dreams, texts that 
seem to me to demonstrate both the danger and the promise of 
a postnatural environmental writing.
Nightmare in Eden
The danger is that a new environmental writing will 
simply reinscribe the old myths, and this is precisely what 
happens in Bill McKibben's oddly reactionary notion of 
postnaturality. Despite the postmodern ring of his book's
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title, nature for McKibben remains an idea grounded in an 
ideal: wilderness, nature untouched by "man," the mythical 
scene of our origin and the physical scene to which we could 
always return to remind ourselves of who we are. But, says 
McKibben, genuine wilderness no longer exists, because such 
contemporary phenomena as ozone depletion and acid rain have 
altered the earth's entire ecosystem, leaving "every spot on 
earth man-made and artificial" (58). The ecological 
moorings of the idea of nature have disappeared, and this 
for McKibben is the crux of postnaturality.
Now that our wilderness paradise has been lost, one
must work to imagine the pristine nature that was once so
easily experienced. McKibben insists that we should
continue to perform this work, and he tells us just how to
go about it: first by suppressing any disturbing evidences
of the social within the natural, and second by appealing to
an imagined purity. The first of these steps requires a
sort of willed blindness or psychological repression— what
McKibben calls "[o]ur ability to shut the destroyed areas
from our minds, to see beauty around man’s degradation"
(57). The second involves accessing an original wilderness
of. which one's own surroundings may be imagined as a copy.
If the ground is dusty and trodden, we look at the 
sky; if the sky is smoggy, we travel someplace 
where it's clear; if we can't travel to someplace 
where it's clear, we imagine ourselves in Alaska 
or Australia or some place where it is, and that 
works nearly as well. (58)
To illustrate how these processes work in the fallen world 
of the postnatural, McKibben describes an Adirondack lake in
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which he and his wife like to swim. "A few summer homes
cluster at one end" of this lake, "but mostly it is
surrounded by wild state land" (49).
During the week we swim across and back, a trip of 
maybe forty minutes— plenty of time to forget 
everything but the feel of the water around your 
body and the rippling, muscular joy of a hard kick 
and the pull of your arms.
But on the weekends, more and more often, 
someone will bring a boat out for waterskiing, and 
make pass after pass up and down the lake. And 
then the whole experience changes, changes 
entirely. (49)
Clearly this utter change is as much psychological as it is
ecological; as important as any disruption of the lake's
ecology is the motorboat's intrusion into a carefully
guarded psychic territory:
Instead of being able to forget everything but 
yourself, and even yourself except for the muscles 
and the skin, you must be alert, looking up every 
dozen strokes to see where the boat is, thinking 
about what you will do if it comes near. It is 
not so much the danger. . . .  It's not even so 
much the blue smoke that hangs low over the water. 
It's that the motorboat gets in your mind. You're 
forced to think, not feel— to think of human 
society and of people. (49)
To be forced to think rather than feel is to be forced out 
of the aesthetic mode which permits McKibben to experience 
this impure setting as wild, which allows him to blind 
himself to the presence "of human society and of people."
For McKibben, the increasing difficulty of repressing this 
ubiquitous "smoke" is the tragedy of the postnatural world.
The other task of the postnatural wilderness-seeker is 
to appeal to an originary landscape. Since genuinely
pristine country is not available in the present, it must be
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called up from the past, accessed from the literary 
tradition of nature writing- Out "of a thousand examples," 
McKibben chooses to quote "his favorite," an exemplary 
passage from George Catlin's journal, a description of a 
valley "'far more beautiful than could be imagined by mortal 
man,'" one of those increasingly rare "visions of the world 
as it existed outside human history." McKibben makes no 
bones about this passage's mythic function: it is "a 
baseline, a reminder of where we began"; if it "had a little 
number at the start of each sentence, it could be Genesis" 
(52).
Of course, McKibben can imagine Catlin's valley as Eden
only if he can imagine Catlin as Adam, and Catlin can only
be Adam if he is the first man on the scene. This will take
some effort, for, in a passage elided by McKibben, Catlin
writes of this valley that
[tjhe Indians, also, I found, had loved it once, 
and left it; for here and there were their 
solitary and deserted graves, which told, though 
briefly, of former chants and sports; and perhaps, 
of wars and deaths, that have once rung and echoed 
through this silent vale. (105)
By excising this crucial sentence, McKibben makes an 
inhabited valley into a wilderness via precisely the same 
process he used to make a wilderness of his Adirondack lake. 
But this valley, of course, was not supposed to be such a 
performance; it was supposed to be the original.
Catlin himself fantasized this valley as Eden, but for 
him it was not so easy to efface the presence of native 
people. Indians, after all, were precisely what he had gone
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out West to see. He nonetheless strives to minimize their
presence— by relegating it to a mythified past— and this too
is an act of narratorial and psychological repression. But
in Catlin's case the repressed is still perilously close to
the surface; the Indian grave yet "speaks” to him, and the
sound of those chants and wars— of all that evidence of
"human society and of people"— has clearly gotten into his
mind, as McKibben might say. We are not surprised, then, to
find Catlin prefacing his description with the following
strange tale. He is camping out in the beautiful vale,
sleeping peacefully, as it seemed, under the stars, when in
the middle of the night I waked, whilst I was 
lying on my back, and on half opening my eyes, I 
was instantly shocked to the soul, by the huge 
figure (as I thought) of an Indian, standing over 
me, and in the very instant of taking mv scalp! 
(103)
" [Pjaralysed" for a moment by a "chill of horror," Catlin 
soon realizes he is looking up at his horse. One does not 
need to be Freud to see here the return of what must always 
be repressed in constructing the wilderness Eden, in making 
of any previously occupied territory a scene of origin.
If Catlin, too, makes his wilderness via the same sort 
of willful repression by which McKibben makes a wilderness 
of his Adirondack lake, how can one say that today "all is 
changed"? What is clear is that these "originals" are as 
constructed as their postnatural simulacra. McKibben 
completely misses the crux of postnaturality: it is not that 
pure nature has been irreparably sullied, but that there was 
never any such purity to begin with.
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Reading the Environment Responsibly
Unlike McKibben, Rebecca Solnit does not sidestep the 
implications of postnaturality. She engages the social 
dimensions of the environment forthrightly and, as I will 
argue below, responsibly. What might it mean to read and 
write the environment responsibly? To answer this I want to 
return briefly to the problem posed by Lafayette Bunnell's 
description of the genocidal "prospect" of Yosemite Valley. 
In The Discovery of the Yosemite. as we have seen, Bunnell 
aestheticized the Mariposa Battallion's genocidal 
activities, inviting his readers to understand the rightness 
of those actions through an appeal to the valley's natural 
beauty. "[R]efashioning the human subject from the inside," 
to recall Terry Eagleton's phrase, he interpellated his 
readers in a way that encouraged them to feel aesthetic 
beauty rather than think about political reality.
The situation is analogous to that analyzed by Myra 
Jehlen in a recent essay on the horrors depicted in Gustave 
Flaubert's Salammbo, and I would like to reframe her 
argument here, asking, "What would constitute a 
'responsibility' of the reader of a text whose aesthetics 
seems to be grounded in such manifest evil?" Reading,
Jehlen suggests, "ought to engage the imagination not only 
aesthetically but ethically as well" (10)— but what is the 
reader to do when when the ethical and the aesthetic are 
opposed? Bunnell is no Flaubert, and The Discovery of the 
Yosemite is no Salammbo. in terms of either literary 
sophistication or of the extremity of the depicted
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atrocities. Nonetheless it seems fair to characterize it, 
as Jehlen does Salammbo, as "a text that seems to have 
issued from a nightmare rather than a dream and seems to 
adT%nce at each step in defiance of all duties save one," 
the "hardly moral" allegiance to beauty (10). More 
particularly, the extravagantly depicted violence of 
Salammbo produces something very like the effect Bunnell 
achieves in his own depiction of Yosemite's ethnic 
cleansing,
something that less repulsive accounts might not 
achieve, namely, a separation of exquisite form 
from hideous content and the subsequent triumph of 
form over content. The separation occurs when 
readers are repelled by the content and attracted 
by the form; it occurs when a content, by its 
repulsiveness, forces the reader to become 
conscious of the difference between it and an 
attractive form. . . . Flaubert has created a 
tension between the repellent unpleasantness of 
the scene described and the aesthetic attraction 
of the description as art [and] this tension works 
to enhance the aesthetic experience by making it 
stand apart, distinctively valuable and moreover 
ultimately redemptive of the repugnance engendered 
by the disgusting content. (11)
In Bunnell's case, this "separation" is structured a bit 
differently; it is the scene we find attractive and the 
narration that is repugnant. Nonetheless, Bunnell's 
abstraction of form from content produces the same tension 
Jehlen describes above.
I am not suggesting that we are doomed to read The 
Discovery of the Yosemite with the same racist sensibility 
that Bunnell's contemporaries presumably brought to the 
text; clearly we are capable of maintaining a certain
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critical distance. But what of our reading of its 
intertext, the Yosemite landscape "itself," which Bunnell 
has also written for us, via precisely the same strategy of 
aesthetic abstraction? I am not so sure we can completely 
divorce our appreciation of this text from the violence of 
its initial inscription; little has happened in the 
intervening century to suggest that Euro-Americans have 
rejected the sense that Yosemite's beauty is "ultimately 
redemptive" of its repugnant history. Our aesthetic 
responses, as Eagleton said, cannot be so easily 
controverted. Jehlen puts it a bit differently: "When the 
beauty of the literary expression triumphs over the 
ugliness" it expresses, "it also triumphs over the reader's 
ethical impulse to condemn" (11). Furthermore, the reader 
is even "brought to actually value" the ugliness, "since it 
permits such beautiful writing." Confronted with "an art 
that nourishes itself from the contemplation of suffering" 
(12), the reader "abjures her or his moral responsibility in 
order to enjoy [the] dream" (11).
What, then, may the reader do to "be responsible 
toward" a text such as Salammbo or Yosemite Valley? Jehlen 
suggests that the contradictions enabling such aestheticism 
are "permanent" and "can only grow further apart"; she 
doubts "whether there is anything beyond recognition to be 
done." She considers this a "weak conclusion" (13), and 
indeed mere recognition may not seem like much. But when 
the root of the problem is precisely repression— as it is in 
traditional literary environmentalism— then recognition
224
seems a crucial part of the solution. If we think of 
Yosemite not as a fixed natural inscription but as 
continually reconstituted social text, then recognition may 
become re-cognition, a rethinking of the landscape's uses 
and meanings. And if that rethinking is performed in 
response to the region's genuine history and politics— as 
opposed to some mythic essence of the landscape "itself"— it 
will constitute a responsible recognition. For a concrete 
example of what I have in mind, I turn now to Savage Dreams. 
Landscapes in History
Rebecca Solnit does not use the term "postnatural"— the 
coinage appears to be McKibben's— but her Savage Dreams 
nonetheless strikes me as a genuinely postnatural text. It 
is not primarily concerned with changes in the biological 
configuration of life on the planet; it is not rooted in 
ecology, or nature, or even "reality." Unlike The End of 
Nature, Savage Dreams is not about escaping to some mythic 
origin, but about the here and now, "about trying to come to 
terms with what it means to be living in the American West." 
Where McKibben longs to "forget human society," Solnit 
strives to recover a full political and historical 
consciousness, and her writing is explicitly concerned with 
"how what we believe blinds us to what is going on," in 
particular to "how the nuclear war that was supposed to be 
our future and the Indian wars of our past are being waged 
simultaneously" in the present (xi) .
Savage Dreams categorically rejects the "problematic 
idea" of virgin wilderness (24). It does not cling to the
idea of nature as eternal and separate, nor does it 
privilege particular landscapes on the basis of traditional 
aesthetic criteria. Rather it juxtaposes two landscapes 
that at first seem utterly unassimilable: the highly 
canonical Yosemite National Park in California, and the 
decidedly noncanonical Nevada Test Site northwest of Las 
Vegas. What relates the two is not nature but political 
struggle, the fact that both are flash points in the "hidden 
wars of the American West." Each is a fiercely contested 
site, and each has witnessed the unspeakable— genocide on 
the one hand, and some nine hundred nuclear explosions on 
the other. Each deepens the author's conviction that 
"political engagement [is] a normal and permanent state" 
(14).
For the writer of the postnatural environmental 
narrative, landscape must highlight rather than obscure the 
complexities of politics, and the Nevada Test Site does this 
well. It is a central target of the international 
antinuclear movement, useful for its ability to give 
concreteness to "[t]hat utter abstraction the Arms Race"
(14).. It is also part of a 43,000-square-mile tract of land 
that the Western Shoshone people consider their nation, land 
they have never ceded and are still actively trying to claim 
(30). The first half of Savage Dreams details Solnit's 
participation in Native American land struggles and in the 
American Peace Test of the late nineteen-eighties and early 
nineties. The narrative focuses not on the lyric portrayal 
of landscape— though there is some of that— but on her
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conversations with the various people contesting the 
landscape: her fellow nuclear protestors; government 
officials from the county, the military, and the Department 
of Energy; and Western Shoshone tribespeople, such as the 
ranchers Mary and Carrie Dann.
The Danns' story is particularly instructive because of
the way it complicates environmental politics, implicating
traditional environmentalism in the larger structures of
power that organize the West. In particular, the Danns'
narrative shows how Bureau of Land Management policies
designed to protect the ecology of rangelands prove
inseparable from unresolved questions of sovereignty and the
ongoing oppression of the Shoshone. Says Mary Dann of her
first encounter with a BLM official:
[H]e was waiting for me in the house, and we 
talked, and he says, "Do you know you're tres­
passing?" I told him I wasn't. I told him that 
the only time I'd consider myself trespassing is 
when I went over on the Paiute land. Then I would 
be trespassing, I says. I'm in our own territory, 
our own treaty. I told him about the treaty and 
showed him the map and he told me, "Well that's a 
big territory." And I told him, Yes." (159).
The tone is gentle, but challenging, and there is no promise 
of any easy resolution. When the BLM threatens to 
confiscate the Danns' cows, the antinuclear protestors join 
forces with the two women. Since many of the protestors are 
themselves environmentalists with traditional views of 
ecological purity— including a distaste for cattle grazing 
on public rangeland— the incident becomes a complex parable 
of environmental revisionism. .
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Savage Dreams makes no effort to reduce the 
complexities of environmental politics to a simple visual 
image of a picture-postcard wilderness. Solnit's desert and 
mountain environments are free to exist and evolve within 
human history. They are not perpetually available for the 
nature writer's mythic reinscription; they are places that 
have always been inhabited, places that have already been 
invested with a multitude of stories. Savage Dreams is 
"responsible" precisely in its response to these stories: 
rejecting the traditional habits of repression and mystic 
appeal, Solnit insists that competing stories be restored 
and heard; that they be evaluated from an ethical rather 
than an aesthetic standpoint; and finally that their 
conflicting claims be negotiated.
This is a complicated and often messy process, and not 
necessarily conducive to the elegiac style of traditional 
nature writing. Solnit's landscape descriptions are often 
poetic, but she is wary of investing scenery with trans­
cendent meanings. It is instructive to compare McKibben's 
traditional (and traditionally masculine) treatment of his 
Adirondack lake to Solnit's postnatural description of a 
swim in the Yosemite Sierra:
I finally got to Lake Tenaya, on a warm day in 
August. The water was marvelously clear. . . . 
Skeins of golden light slipped over the lake 
floor, and rounded boulders rose out of the water 
or hovered just below its surface. . . .  It was 
an uncanny place. It was hard to trust that this 
cold, clear substance would bear me up if I 
immersed myself in it, or that I would emerge the 
same as I went in. In the gravelly shallows, 
eddies of fool's gold rose around me at every
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step, glittering in the bright light of the
mountains. (279)
With its domestic imagery ("skeins") and its references to 
roundedness and immersion, this is a decidedly feminine 
landscape. But it is not the typical scene (as analyzed by 
Annette Kolodny and epitomized by writers from Cooper to 
McKibben) of the masculine subject's escape from the 
suffocating domestic order of civilization, nor is it an 
attempt to imagine a stable, transcendent ground of identity 
and meaning. It is, rather, a landscape "hard to trust," 
sparkling with "fool's gold"— a perfect figure for the 
unreliability of the "natural" significations swirling 
around the subject. It is literally a fluid rather than a 
fixed scene, not a secure ground in which to affirm one's 
identity. The author suspects that the water will not "bear 
her up," and she fears uncertain changes should she enter 
it. Where McKibben might have found solidity and 
assurances, Solnit offers a cautionary tale of fluidity and 
trans formation.
In the second half of Savage Dreams, Solnit approaches 
Yosemite's mountain landscape with a political consciousness 
awakened in the politics of the Nevada desert. She finds 
Yosemite, too, a fiercely contested site, an intersection of 
struggles over both land and the meaning of land. She 
acknowledges the work of traditional environmentalists 
trying to change the more destructive policies of the Park 
Service, but she problematizes what is merely an ecological 
agenda by situating it within human history. Citing the
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insights of postmodern ecologists like Daniel Botkin, she 
points out that attempts to "restore" Yosemite to a "pre­
contact" state are both incoherent and politically 
obnoxious: the valley as it was "discovered" by Savage and 
Bunnell was not a wilderness, but a garden that had been 
tended for thousands of years by native people. Efforts to 
"restore" Yosemite to a "wilderness" state provide a point 
of continuity with earlier white attempts to naturalize the 
valley— attempts stretching back to the days of Mariposa 
War.
Such a purely ecological approach to managing the park 
reinscribes a colonialist mythology under the guise of 
"protecting" the land. It naturalizes a racist 
historiography predicated on the idea that Yosemite's 
Ahwahneechee Indians "became extinct" in the nineteenth 
century. Writing across this official grain, Solnit reveals 
that in fact large numbers of native people have continued 
to live either in or immediately adjacent to the park, and 
that the federal government has seen fit to evict them on a 
recurring basis— not just in 1851 but also in 1906, 1929, 
and .1969. This is a decidedly different "prospect" than the 
traditional view still privileged by the National Park 
Service's own interpretations (288).
Such hegemonic interpretations are challenged most 
effectively, of course, by the Ahwahneechee people 
themselves. Particularly instructive is a story related by 
Jay Johnson, a Park Service employee and an Ahwahneechee, 
"part of the leadership of the Mariposa Indian Council
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attempting to get federal recognition for the 2,000 Southern
Miwok still in the area" (290). In 1980, Johnson and four
other Yosemite Indians visited the Smithsonian Institution,
where they found an exhibit about their tribe. A caption
offered the information that the Yosemites had ceased to
exist, and Johnson tried to alert a Smithsonian employee to
the error. The ensuing exchange is a telling parable about
the social construction of the environment. As Solnit
retells the story, Johnson informs a curator that the
exhibit "is nice, but there's an error in the statement,"
and she says, "Oh no, there can't be. Every 
little word goes through channels and committees 
and whatnot," and I says, "It's OK, but," I says, 
"It tells me that there are no more Yosemite 
Indians today." She says, "Well that's true, it's 
very sad but whatever's out there is true." So I
say, "Well I hate to disturb you, but I'm a
Yosemite Indian, and we're here on business for 
our tribe." And she caught her breath and said, 
"Ohhh, uh, let me call somebody," and she called 
somebody who was in charge of exhibits, and I went
and told her the same thing. If there's a
statement saying that there are descendants of the 
Ahwahneechees living there today, all of us 
natives would be satisfied. But it hasn't been 
changed. (292-293)
It should not be thought odd that the Ahwahneechees, 
discursively effaced and literally dispossessed, would be 
satisfied with such a seemingly minor concession as simply 
revising this caption— nor that the Smithsonian should be so 
reluctant to revise it. Each side recognizes in this 
epistemological standoff the key to both the interpretation 
and the ownership of the nation's most canonical landscape.
By foregrounding this linkage between interpretation and
ownership, Savage Dreams departs radically from what I 
referred to in Chapter One as the "Great Books" tradition of 
literary environmentalism. In that tradition, the national 
parks function as an environmental canon, a collection of 
reverently preserved texts with seemingly transparent and 
unchallengeable meanings. Through the interlocking 
interpretive activities of institutions such as the National 
Park Service and the Smithsonian, those meanings are 
generated and disseminated as part of the larger formation 
of "cultural literacy," the highly selective complex of 
knowledge that, as E. D. Hirsch quite correctly claimed, 
helped to "create" and serves still to "perpetuate" the 
nation (ix). The postnatural environmental writing of 
Savage Dreams. by contrast, works not to perpetuate but to 
destabilize the fictional narrative of "nation," not least 
by restoring the voices traditionally excised from it.
Where the purely natural environment has functioned as a 
myth facilitating the landscape's appropriation and 
commodification, the postnatural environment may serve as a 
revisionist history, a new and more inclusive myth enabling 
the landscape's democratization. If that is what it means 
to live, as McKibben insists we do, "in a postnatural 
world," I see no need to mourn nature's demise.
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